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Abstract 
 
The core theme of this thesis explores the evolving position of religion in the British public 
realm in the 1980s. Recent scholarship on modern religious history has sought to relocate 
Britain‟s „secularization moment‟ from the industrialization of  the nineteenth century to the 
social and cultural upheavals of  the 1960s. My thesis seeks to add to this debate by examining 
the way in which the established Church and Christian doctrine continued to play a central 
role in the politics of the 1980s. More specifically it analyses the conflict between the 
Conservative party and the once labelled „Tory party at Prayer‟, the Church of England. 
Both Church and state during this period were at loggerheads, projecting contrasting 
visions of the Christian underpinnings of the nation‟s political values.  
The first part of  this thesis addresses the established Church. It begins with an 
examination of  how the Church defined its role as the „conscience of  the nation‟ in a period 
of  national fragmentation and political polarization. It then goes onto explore how the 
Anglican leadership, Church activists and associated pressure groups together subjected 
Thatcherite neo-liberal economics to moral scrutiny and upheld social democratic values as the 
essence of  Christian doctrine. The next chapter analyses how the Church conceptualized 
Christian citizenship and the problems it encountered when it disseminated this message to its 
parishioners.   
The second half  of  this study focuses on the contribution of  Christian thought to the 
New Right. Firstly, it explores the parallels between political and religious conservatism in this 
period and the widespread disaffection with liberal Anglicanism, revealing how Parliament 
became one of  the central platforms for the traditionalist Anglican cause.  Secondly, it 
demonstrates how those on the right argued for the Christian basis of  economic liberalism and 
of  the moral superiority of  capitalism over socialism. The next chapter focuses on the public 
doctrine of  Margaret Thatcher, detailing how she drew upon Christian doctrine, language and 
imagery to help shape and legitimise her political vision and reinforce her authority as 
leader. Finally, the epilogue traces the why this Christian-centric dialogue between the 
Church and Conservative government eventually dissipated and was superseded by a much 
more fundamental issue in the 1990s as both the ruling elite and the Church were forced to 
recognise the religious diversity within British society.  
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„Not odd, said God, I‟d have you know,  
It may seem easy down below  
To keep the Bishops all in tow 
Just propping up the Thatcher show 
Up here, you see, there‟s hell to pay 
She wants to tell ME what to say!‟  
                 (Michael Foot MP, The Times, 1984)1 
 
                                                 
1
 Michael Foot, The Times, 27 September 1984. 
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        CHAPTER 1 
   INTRODUCTION 
               God and Mrs Thatcher: the Interrelationship between Religion  
                                          and Politics in 1980s Britain 
 „The Church, by its very existence, is a challenge to the state to consider its policies within a moral and 
spiritual dimension. And the state is a constant challenge to the Church to accept its proper responsibility     
                    for the secular world.‟ Stuart Blanch, Archbishop of York, 1981.1 
 
The historian Arthur Marwick in the opening pages of his comprehensive survey of 
postwar Britain set out what he considered to be the fundamental factors which had shaped 
the nation since World War Two.2 Alongside the themes of liberalisation and decline, 
progress and false hope, Marwick positioned „secular Anglicanism‟ as the prevailing ethos 
which had guaranteed the „stability and unity of British society‟ throughout the tumultuous 
postwar decades.3 In Marwick‟s opinion, this tradition could be traced back to the birth of 
religious tolerance in the seventeenth century and was the main ethos which determined the 
„broad political consensus of the mid-twentieth century.‟ Marwick described „secular 
Anglicanism‟ as specifically an English mentality, derived from „established Anglicanism‟ 
and defined by its tolerance, desire for consensus and distaste for extremities or 
fundamentalism of any kind. It could be restrictive and stagnant but ultimately created a 
nation that was stable and harmonious. In his view, it was this spirit which had ensured that 
England did not experience the religious fundamentalism or anti-clericalism that befell parts 
of mainland Europe, America and the Celtic fringes of the United Kingdom. And it was the 
„continuing vigour‟ of this tradition in the second half of the twentieth century which 
conditioned Britain‟s „peaceful accommodation‟ to the social and cultural challenges of the 
1960s.4  Yet, according to Marwick, these values were to be dramatically overthrown by an 
„abrasive‟ and ideologically minded Thatcher government resulting in a decade that was 
fraught with social fragmentation, political polarisation and cultural conflict.5  
Whatever the merits or pitfalls of this historical interpretation, Marwick‟s particular 
assertion that „secular Anglicanism‟ was effectively silenced during the Thatcher years, 
requires a reconsideration when one looks beyond the activities of the political parties and 
focuses on the institution which was the source of this tradition; namely the Church of 
                                                 
1
 York University Library, Borthwick Institute, York Diocesan Leaflet, July 1981, p.1. 
2
 Arthur Marwick, British Society since 1945 (London, 4th edition, 2003), pp.ix-xi. 
3
 Ibid, p.241. For a further elucidation of this theme, see pp.120-1, 218-9, 241, 392-3. 
4
 Ibid, p.218.  
5
 Marwick argues that this „secular Anglican‟ ethos was only temporarily dislodged by Thatcherism and 
was restored, albeit with limited success, under the premiership of Tony Blair: Marwick, British Society, 
p.6.  
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England.  For in this era of division and discord, the Church emerged as one of the chief 
defenders of the values of consensus, community and citizenship; the very essence of 
Marwick‟s „secular Anglicanism‟. From the pulpit to the picket line, from the Lords benches 
to the inner cities, the Anglican bishops persistently condemned the selfish individualism of 
enterprise culture, the destruction of the collective ethos within society and the rampant 
materialism being unleashed by free-market economics. Operating as a quasi-pressure 
group, the Church and its associated organisations made formal submissions to 
government, produced pamphlets, mobilised their constituency of parishioners and used 
their experience as leaders in the voluntary sector in a concerted effort to counter what they 
considered to be the unchristian dogmatics of Thatcherism. Defending the principles of the 
social democratic consensus that had reigned during the postwar years, Church leaders 
heralded the welfare state, redistributive taxation and government responsibility for the 
disadvantaged as the correct political manifestation of the Biblical doctrine of Christian 
fellowship.  The 1980s was not the first time the Church had been critical of the state or 
offered its perspective on the politics of the day, yet the Thatcher years are significant 
because of the degree and energy with which this was done and because of the new secular 
context in which the Church was operating. 
The election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 had signified much more than the return 
of the Conservative party into power, for Mrs Thatcher‟s brand of right-wing Conservatism 
was the climax of a much broader „conservative turn‟ in British political culture. It had 
grown out a deep-rooted disillusionment with what some considered as the economic, 
political and moral degenerate state of the nation in the 1970s. The reconfigured 
Conservative party that emerged under Mrs Thatcher therefore proclaimed its mission to 
revitalise Britain by reinstating a market economy and reining in social „permissiveness‟. 
Motivated by a genuine belief in the religious basis of their politics and the moral failings of 
socialism, those on the right reasserted the link between Protestant and capitalist values and 
preached a theo-political vision based on personal freedom, responsibility and moral 
restraint. Unlike America, Christian Conservatism in Britain did not serve to galvanise the 
electorate, rather it operated as an important philosophical undercurrent, crucial in setting 
the tone and intellectual framing of what would become known as Thatcherism.6 Margaret 
Thatcher, herself raised in a strict Methodist household, led the way in articulating the 
                                                 
6
 The author is conscious of the problems associated with the term „Thatcherism‟, however in this thesis it 
serves as a convenient shorthand term for the political philosophy which lay behind the policies and 
outlook of the Conservative government in the 1980s. The „New Right‟ is used here to describe the 
broader cultural, moral and philosophical movement that emerged from the mid-1970s onwards: see 
chapter 5 of this thesis for a full breakdown of the constituents within the New Right.  
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Christian justification for economic liberalism and refuting the Church‟s protestations about 
collective altruism and the Christianised welfare state.  
This story therefore is one of a fraught and highly tense conflict between the Tory 
party and the once labelled „Tory Party at Prayer‟, the Church of England.  These two 
organisations, which historically had always been aligned, were involved in an intellectual 
and theological dispute centred on the Christian underpinnings of the nation‟s political 
values and its citizens.  In this sense, the dialogue between the Conservative Party and the 
established Church was not simply a series of public spats encouraged by a scandal-hungry 
right-wing press. In fact, at the root of this tension were contrasting views about the 
political interpretation of the Christian message: did Christianity chiefly concern the 
individual or the collective?  
To a certain extent, it is possible to divide this feud into two parts. In the first 
period, which lasted until the mid-1980s, the discussion took the form of a „state of the 
nation‟ debate.  Under the philosophical banner of liberty and individualism, Mrs Thatcher 
projected her faith in free-market economics, a scaled-down welfare state and restrictions 
on union power. The Church, on the other hand, called for a reconstituted Butskellite 
vision which would involve greater public investment to alleviate poverty, a corporatist 
industrial policy to ease tensions with the unions and a government-sponsored employment 
programme to curb unemployment. By 1987, however, the year of Mrs Thatcher‟s third 
election victory, in the wake of the defeat of the miners, the privatisation of key state-
industries and the deregulation of the City, many had come to accept (including the Labour 
party), that the economic and political landscape had been completely reordered. But with it 
came a concern that a market economy was creating a selfish and materialistic society. Thus 
the latter period saw the Conservative party speak with even greater enthusiasm on the 
moral virtues of capitalism while at the same time the government channelled its efforts 
into installing a philanthropic and charitable ethic amongst the affluent members of society. 
The Church also switched its emphasis, criticising the amoral nature of the market, the 
failure of „trickle-down‟ economics and proclaiming that a consumerist culture was 
corrupting the Christian values within society.  
This impression of „Maggie‟ engaged in an all out war with her „Butskellite bishops‟, 
made front-page news at the time and, to an extent, is also the dominant portrayal in the 
limited academic literature on this subject. Henry Clark‟s 1993 work, The Church under 
Thatcher for example focuses on the activities of the Church‟s General Synod and its 
bureaucracy, detailing the method and meaning behind the Anglican public position against 
 15 
the Thatcher government. In Clark‟s opinion, „open acrimony‟ was inevitable between a 
Conservative party that had replaced its Anglican patrician roots for neo-liberal economics 
and a Church with a renewed appreciation of the social gospel.7 This assessment is shared 
by the historian Peter Catterall who has argued that the strained relations between Church 
and party during the eighties was a culmination of broader shifts during the twentieth 
century which had seen both organisations move in opposite directions. Catterall contends 
that the Church had distanced itself from the Conservative party, preferring instead to 
invest in the non-partisan social democratic postwar settlement.8 Political scientists 
Kenneth Medhurst and George Mosyer in contrast argue that the Church, influenced by 
developments in political theology, carved out a new independent ecclesiastical identity in 
the eighties. In their view, this shift from a conservative to a more radical outlook afforded 
the Church a more influential voice in the public realm in this period, despite it causing 
tensions with its laity.9 
Two strands emerge from this body of literature: firstly, a tendency to stress the 
„radicalisation‟ of the Church. While academics are divided on precisely how „radical‟ 
Anglicanism was in the 1980s, most are agreed that a left-of-centre political position had 
become the reigning orthodoxy amongst the Anglican hierarchy. Secondly, scholars are 
inclined to view the Church‟s position on Thatcherism as simply a reiteration of 
Butskellism. This preference of Anglican leaders to reaffirm the social-democratic 
consensus has led one historian to conclude that the Church did not seek to enact change, 
only to voice dissent.10 Notably less attention has been paid to the New Right or 
Conservatism in these analyses, especially the Christian underpinnings of the New Right, 
the connections between traditionalist Anglicans and the Conservative party, or the 
religious protestations of Mrs Thatcher herself. These are glaring omissions, as these factors 
are crucial in explaining why there was such hostility between Church and the Conservative 
party in the 1980s. Graeme Smith‟s article, which seeks to construct Thatcher‟s „theo-
political identity‟, serves as a useful introduction to the Prime Minister‟s personal 
Christianity. Nevertheless, there is a need to locate what Smith calls Mrs Thatcher‟s „Anglo-
                                                 
7
 Henry Clark, The Church Under Thatcher (London, 1993).  
8
 Peter Catterall, „The Party and Religion‟ in A. Seldon & S. Ball (eds.), The Conservative Century 
(Oxford, 1994), pp.637-670. 
9
 Kenneth N. Medhurst & George H. Moyser, Church and Politics in a Secular Age (Oxford, 1988). 
10
 Andrew Partington, Church and State: The Contribution of the Church of England Bishops to the House 
of Lords during the Thatcher Years (Milton Keynes, 2006), p.254. 
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Saxon Nonconformity‟ within the wider context of morality politics, conservative 
Anglicanism and Mrs Thatcher‟s conflict with the Church of England.11 
While the dispute between Church and state has received little attention from 
academics, two broader themes, Thatcherism and secularisation, have generated a wealth of 
literature and it is these two subjects that provide the historiographical framework for this 
study. The list of published studies on Mrs Thatcher and Thatcherism is exhaustive, and 
yet, key areas of debate can be ascertained. Firstly, some scholars have sought to portray 
Thatcherism as an all-encompassing ideological project, which linked social, economic and 
moral themes, permeating all levels of political and civic life. This is an interpretation which 
has been most forcefully put forward by Stuart Hall. Hall sees Thatcherism in Gramscian 
terms as amounting to a „hegemonic shift‟ in British political culture.12 Some scholars, 
notably J. Bulpitt and more recently Richard Vinen, have argued the opposite, claiming its 
anti-intellectual and pragmatic credentials.13 Connected to this, is a debate concerning the 
roots of Thatcherism and its place within the history of Conservative thought.14 Scholars 
are in dispute as to whether Thatcherism represented a complete break from the party‟s 
pragmatic tradition, or took its inspiration from either neo-Conservatism in America or 
Victorian Liberalism.15 Others such as Heather Nunn and Peter Riddell have tied their 
analysis much more closely to the personality and leadership of Mrs Thatcher. Nunn, for 
example, positions the Prime Minister as the personification of Thatcherite values and 
prejudices, while Riddell has traced the roots of Thatcherism back to the young Margaret‟s 
childhood in interwar Grantham.16  
                                                 
11
 Graeme Smith, „Margaret Thatcher‟s Christian Faith: A Case Study in Political Theology‟, Journal of 
Religious Ethics, Vol.35. No. 3, (June 2007), pp.233-257. 
12
 Stuart Hall & Martin Jacques (eds.), The Politics of Thatcherism (London, 1983) and The Hard Road to 
Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left (London, 1988). Hall has since clarified his position 
stating that Thatcherism did not represent a new hegemony, but contained „hegemonic‟ characteristics.  
13
 J. Bulpitt, „The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs. Thatcher's Domestic Statecraft‟, Political 
Studies, Vol.34, No.1, (1986), pp.19-39; Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: the 
Politics of Thatcherism (Basingstoke, 1994); Richard Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain: The Political and Social 
Upheavals of the 1980s (London, 2009).  
14
 Shirley Letwin, The Anatomy of Thatcherism (London, 1992); E.H.H. Green, Thatcher (London, 2006), pp.26-
54 and Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, 2002), ch.8; 
Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism (Cambridge, 2nd edition, 1990), preface; Mark Garnett & Lord Gilmour, 
„Thatcherism and the Conservative Tradition‟ in M. Francis & I. Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds.), The 
Conservatives and British Society 1880-1990 (Cardiff, 1996), pp.78-95; Brendan Evans, Thatcherism and 
British Politics 1975-1999 (Stroud, 1999); David Willets, Modern Conservatism (Harmondsworth, 1992).  
15
 Desmond S. King, The New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship (Basingstoke, 1987); Andrew 
Adonis & Tim Hames (eds.), A Conservative Revolution. The Thatcher-Reagan Decade in Perspective 
(Manchester, 1994). There is also a historiographical debate as to whether there was a „postwar‟ social 
democratic consensus and where Thatcherism stands in relation to it: Ben Pimlott, „The Myth of 
Consensus‟ in L.M. Smith (ed.), The Making of Britain. Echoes of Greatness (London, 1988). 
16
 Heather Nunn, Thatcher, Politics and Fantasy: The Political Culture of Gender and Nation (London, 2002); 
Peter Riddell, The Thatcher Era and its Legacy (London, 2nd edition, 1991).  
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This thesis does not aim to refute but to build on this existing literature by 
examining 1980s Conservatism through the previously unexplored lens of religion. It does 
not contend that Christianity was the single most important ingredient in Thatcherism, but 
argues that a particular individualistic Christianity was one of the defining factors which 
shaped it and differentiated it from traditional Tory Anglicanism. Much has been written 
about the morality politics of Thatcherism, with historians and commentators divided on 
the extent to which the government displayed authoritarian or libertarian tendencies on 
matters of individual morality.17 It is proposed here, however, that the „Victorian values‟ 
rhetoric of Thatcherism is best understood when located in its religious as well as its 
political context, especially in light of Mrs Thatcher‟s on-going dispute with the Church.  
Moreover, by exploring the religious roots of the New Right and the Prime Minister, this 
thesis will add to an understanding of the philosophical heritage and make-up of 
Thatcherism and Mrs Thatcher‟s own unique contribution to it.  
 In focusing on the interrelationship between religion and politics in the modern 
era, this study also seeks to engage with the wealth of literature on the sociology of religion. 
This area of research has been largely framed around the secularisation thesis, that is, in the 
succinct words of sociologist Bryan Wilson, the „process whereby religious thinking, 
practice and institutions, lose social significance‟.18 Or put another way, that the forces of 
modernity (economic, cultural and political) gradually erode spiritual belief, which result in 
the privatisation of religion and its disconnection from public life and politics. This theory 
is one that has been amply applied to the modern history of Britain. Up until recently, 
sociologists and historians had rooted the start of this secularising course firmly in the 
nineteenth century, in the context of the Industrial Revolution and the Enlightenment. 
Recent work by Callum Brown and Hugh McLeod however has sought to re-locate 
Britain‟s „secularisation moment‟ to the social and cultural revolution of the 1960s. While 
Brown and McLeod deploy different methodologies and contrasting emphases, both are of 
the view that this period saw new identities and priorities replace an adherence to 
                                                 
17
 Martin Durham, Sex and Politics: The Family and Morality in the Thatcher Years (Basingstoke, 1991); 
Andrew Holden, Makers and Manners: Politics and Morality in Post-War Britain (London, 2004). 
18
 Bryan Wilson, Religion in Secular Society (London, 1966), p.xiv. See also Peter L. Berger, The Sacred 
Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New York, 1967). For revisions on this thesis, 
see Peter L. Berger (eds.), The Desecularisation of the World; Resurgent Religion and World Politics 
(Washington, 1999); Linda Woodhead, Paul Heelas & David Martin (eds.), Peter Berger and the Study of 
Religion (London, 2001); David Martin, A General Theory of Secularisation  (Oxford, 1978) and On 
Secularisation: Towards a Revised General Theory  (Aldershot, 2005); Steve Bruce (ed.), Religion and 
Modernisation: Sociologists and Historians debate the Secularisation Thesis (Oxford, 1992). 
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Christianity, whereby the generational transference of faith was irretrievably broken.19 There 
is thus an emerging academic consensus that the 1960s is the important turning point in the 
religious history of the nation.20 Most are agreed that the rise of pluralism, consumerism 
and individualism combined with the liberalisation of morality and the growing 
responsibilities of state, triggered a sharp collapse of faith amongst the populace and a loss 
of influence for the churches.21 That there was a dramatic drop in churchgoing is 
indisputable, however, one question that this thesis poses is what aspects of Britain‟s 
religious culture remained in public political realm, and why? 22 Sociologist Grace Davie has 
revealed through an analysis of public attitude surveys and other evidence, the continual 
prevalence of an implicit Christian faith amongst the British people. Davie has labelled this 
„believing without belonging‟; a diffuse Christian belief which may not have reflected itself 
in churchgoing, but was evidence of the continual prevalence of Christian values within 
society.  Drawing on Davie‟s example, this thesis will apply the same approach for the 
politics of the 1980s, in effect to tease out the „implicit‟ Christianity which bubbled under 
the surface of British public life and to ascertain precisely how religion featured in the 
politics of the day.23   
Sociologists and historians of modern religion in Britain have quite rightly focused 
on the changing fortunes of Christianity within popular culture and society. This has meant, 
however, that scholars have paid less attention to the role of institutional churches within 
the realm of politics and public debate. It is assumed that the decline of the Church in 
society rendered its public role meaningless and irrelevant. Work by Matthew Grimley and 
others has sought to rectify this gap in the literature, showing the abiding influence of the 
Church in the political life of the nation. Grimley‟s assessment on liberal Anglican theories 
of state in the interwar period has been matched by Dianne Kirby‟s work on the 
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contribution of the Anglican leaders in the diplomatic politics of the Cold War.24 Taking a 
long-view approach, G.I.T. Machin has traced this process over the course of the twentieth 
century, revealing how the churches‟ political involvement increased as their spiritual and 
moral influence declined.25 All of this scholarly work pertains to the way in which the 
Church has influenced politics, but also how the Church itself has been shaped by the 
political developments of the twentieth century.  One of the key historiographical 
arguments centres on the effectiveness and importance of this spiritual contribution. While 
Grimley cites interwar liberal Anglicanism as illustrative of a positive interaction between 
Church and society, other scholars have proposed that the Church‟s growing involvement 
in politics was reflective of an institution struggling to maintain influence in an increasingly 
secularised nation.  Sociologist Steve Bruce, for example, concurs that, although the Church 
has adopted a more independent and critical role in the political domain, this „freedom has 
been brought at the price of the government listening to them‟.26  The ecclesiastical 
historian Edward Norman, on the other hand, has judged that the Church of England‟s 
engagement with secular ideas and spheres came at the cost of its spiritual integrity. 
Norman contends that the Church hierarchy adopted the ideas, language and outlook of the 
secular liberal elite in order to maintain influence in less religious times.27 One of the key 
questions examined here is how, if at all, the Church‟s contribution to politics in the 1980s 
was important and whether the dialogue between Church and the state was reflective of 
what Norman has deemed the „secularisation‟ of Christianity, or was, in fact, an indication 
of the implicit religiosity within the public domain.  
Some sociologists have aimed at establishing an analytical framework for the 
interrelationship between religion and politics in a secular age. Jose Casanova‟s Public 
Religions in the Modern World starts from the basis that the late-twentieth century saw the re-
emergence of a religious involvement in political movements on both left and right of the 
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ideological spectrum.28  Casanova groups together the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the 
Solidarity movement in Poland, the rise of Protestant fundamentalism in America and the 
prominence of Catholicism in Nicaragua as illustrative of this world-wide trend.  In his 
attempt to explain this phenomenon, Casanova shows how religious bodies, in different 
contexts and through varied means, have shed their former associations with power and re-
entered the public sphere as initiators of political change. Faith organisations, Casanova 
explains, were now occupying the „discursive space‟ of civil society and offering a moral 
critique of power that was legitimate, desirable and justified. Building on Casanova‟s ideas, 
David Herbert, sees the shift in terms of a reformulation of religion‟s public role in the 
secular plural age, whereby faith is no longer seen as reactionary, conservative or beholden 
to temporal power, but on the side of modernity, proselytising liberal values in the interests 
of the whole of society. According to Herbert, this has resulted in religious beliefs and 
rights becoming politicised and political matters such as economics being judged within a 
religious prism.29 Casanova and Herbert‟s analyses of these global developments provide a 
comparative framework, however clearly the fact that the Church of England retained its 
links with the state inevitably means that it does not fully adhere to these conclusions. Quite 
how and why the Church of England both contradicts and complements this theory will be 
fleshed out in this thesis.  
               This study does not seek to refute the claim that Britain had gone through a 
significant „secularising‟ experience in the second half of the twentieth century rather it aims 
for a more nuanced understanding of these changes by examining the complexities and 
extent of this process in the political arena.  Nor does it wish to exaggerate the place of 
religion within the politics of the 1980s, but rather to shed new light on the importance of 
Christian doctrine and the established Church to political thought and action in late-
twentieth century Britain.  In this sense, the aim is to unravel, what George Moyser has 
called the „latent religious presence at the heart of English society and politics‟.30  
As will be demonstrated, the Church of England, and its bishops in particular, were 
a dynamic presence on the public stage to the extent that some labelled the Church as „the 
unofficial opposition‟ to the Thatcher government. A key factor as to why the Church‟s 
intervention in this period is significant (and indeed worthy of analysis) was that it came at a 
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time when the Labour party was crippled by internal conflict, the press was largely pro-
Conservative and when the resistance from the trade unions and local councils was to be 
effectively crushed by the government. In some historical accounts, the Church is 
positioned alongside other members of the „wet liberal Establishment‟, which were also 
against the Thatcherite tide, such as the BBC, universities and the arts fraternity.31 This 
thesis however, singles the Church of England out, arguing that it represents a unique case, 
because of the extent of its organisational structure, its position as the established Church 
and its moral credibility as a non-partisan voice in the community and on the national stage.  
As one commentator has recognised, the Church has an enviable set of resources at its 
disposal:  
 
It has the things which other charities and lobbying groups value and 
work to obtain: a brand name which is instinctively recognised; royal 
patronage; access to opinion-formers, decision makers and government; 
a professional staff at Church House and Lambeth Palace – many of 
whom come from the ranks of the civil service, who understand the 
business of government; a network of local organisations and an army of 
volunteers willing to do the drudgery work.32 
 
The Church of England was not the only religious body to speak out against the Thatcher 
government; the Roman Catholic Church, the Nonconformist churches and ecumenical 
bodies from all parts of the Kingdom were also pro-active in this regard.
33
 Yet it is the 
contention here that the Church of England merits special attention as its historic 
connection to the Tory party meant that its opposition posed a distinct challenge to 
Conservative party identity, which the other churches did not.
34
 Indeed, as we shall see, the 
conflict was a highly emotive and fraught one, which involved accusations of betrayal on 
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both sides. Moreover, it was the Church of England which received the greatest attention 
from politicians (not simply Conservative MPs) and the media (not just confined to the 
broadsheet press). This was partly reflective of the fact that, paradoxically, in this age of 
religious decline and ecumenicalism, the Church of England‟s position as the chief spiritual 
representative in Britain had been reinforced rather than undermined.  
In examining the contribution of theology to political discourse, the aim here is not 
to make wide-ranging assertions about the religious motivations of the electorate; as 
historians and sociologists have correctly assessed, faith had long since ceased to be a 
determining factor at the ballot box. Nevertheless, public opinion is important in our story: 
in the first instance because both Conservatives and the Church laid claim to the underlying 
Christian ethos within society and therefore imprinted specific motivations and priorities 
onto the electorate. Secondly, because of the important constituency of Anglican 
Conservative voters who felt torn between their Church and their party during this period.  
This aside, the central aim of this study is to show how Christianity underpinned the 
political discourse of the ruling elite rather than determined the political choices of the 
electorate. It will show how Mrs Thatcher‟s religious protestations were central to her image 
and how theological doctrine provided a framework for her political philosophy. Moreover, 
it will explain how traditional Christianity was central to the make-up of New Right and 
how tensions between the Conservative party and the Church of England closely paralleled 
the internal conflict within Anglicanism between traditionalists and liberals. A major theme, 
therefore, will be the theological and personal ties between religious and political 
conservatism in this period. A full explanation of the spilt within Anglicanism is beyond 
this thesis, yet the division between traditionalist and liberal Anglicans will be explained in 
terms of where it crossed over into the political sphere and how it impacted on the 
relationship between the Church and government.  
            If the theological dispute within Anglicanism provides the backdrop, then the focus 
of this study is the articulation of political values by clergymen and Conservatives. The 
Church extolled the idea of a moral community promoted by an altruistic egalitarian welfare 
system and a harmonious industrial policy which bound voters, workers and legislators 
together around the Christian ideal of fellowship. Mrs Thatcher and her colleagues in 
contrast proclaimed individualism and liberty as the essence of the Christian faith and 
central to the nation‟s ethos, stressing the benefit that these Judeo-Christian values brought 
to the whole of society. Disagreements about policy between the Church and government, 
be they taxation levels or youth employment schemes, therefore tended to escalate into a 
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debate about Christian doctrine and its relationship to political values; was the nation‟s 
altruism best displayed through mandatory taxation or voluntary donations to charity for 
example? Even though both Church and government advanced contrasting views on the 
relationship between the individual and state, there was a shared underlying assumption that 
political values were rooted in Christianity and that Britain remained, in essence, a Christian 
nation.  For this reason, this thesis addresses the broader theme of the nation‟s religious 
identity in a secular plural age and analyses how the concept of a „Christian nation‟ operated 
and was defended in this period. It will also trace how this notion was eventually 
undermined, not by greater secularism but by religious pluralism, as both the Church and 
the political elite gradually came to recognise the multi-faith nature of British society.  
  Recent developments in political history writing have seen historians becoming 
increasingly concerned with what is broadly defined as „political culture‟; a desire to show 
how „high politics‟ interacts with „popular culture‟ by weaving together content, political 
communication methods and its reception into an all intertwining analysis.  Susan Pederson 
has explained how historians who previously confined their analysis to „high politics‟ have 
recently embraced a much broader vision of what constitutes „the political‟.35 This thesis 
focuses on political dialogue on the national stage, yet it also seeks to show how this debate 
played out at a local level, particularly how the Church disseminated its message to the 
parishes. Nonetheless, this thesis primarily concerns itself with political thought and 
therefore, its approach, to borrow historian Jonathan Parry‟s phrase, is to outline the 
„intellectual setting in which political activity took place‟.36 In this case, to assess how 
theological ideas about society and politics were discussed and interpreted and acted upon 
by the Church and government. The emphasis is on reconstructing what conservative 
historian Maurice Cowling termed „public doctrine‟, in his monumental work Religion and 
Public Doctrine.37 That is, „the assumptions that constitute the framework within which 
teaching, writing and public action are conducted‟.38 Cowling‟s work may be highly 
disputable, but it is important for the way in which it has inspired an interest in the currency 
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and content of „public doctrine‟ in the political culture of the nation.39 This thesis therefore 
will show how both the Church and the Conservative government articulated separate and 
conflicting „public doctrines‟, analysing the religious tone and substance of these divergent 
ideologies and showing how both tapped into prevailing interests, fears and prejudices.  In 
this way, this thesis does not present Thatcherism as an unopposed orthodoxy, but one 
which experienced an important philosophical challenge from the Church of England.   
As this study involves the intellectual conversation between Conservatism and 
Anglicanism in the 1980s, it makes use of a whole host of published material and public 
statements, including religious tracts, sermons, political speeches, Hansard and Synod 
debates as well as the secular and religious press, television and radio. It also draws upon 
previously unused private and personal archives of Conservative MPs (including Mrs 
Thatcher), individual bishops‟ papers, those of the central Church bureaucracy and 
associated Christian organisations and pressure groups.40 Thus the originality of this study 
lies in the private and public source material that the author has managed to collate on this 
subject.  
The media was crucial in fostering the dialogue between Church and state, yet there 
is also a need to apply caution here for the press, particularly its right-wing contingents, 
tended to engage in a mixture of exaggeration, simplification and hyperbole when reporting 
these matters. There is also the additional problem of viewing public pronouncements as 
evidence of actual beliefs, especially with the input of speechwriters. Effort will therefore be 
made to show whether these public statements were engineered for political purposes or 
were the genuine convictions of those preaching them, especially in regards to Margaret 
Thatcher. This is in addition to the problem of viewing utterances of figures such as the 
Prime Minister or the Archbishop of Canterbury as representative of respectively the 
Conservative party or the Church of England. Therefore, where possible, this analysis has 
been reinforced with private papers in order to highlight any discrepancies and differences 
between individual and organisational/institutional positions.  
The analysis centres on the Church of England and the Conservative party, 
although reference will be made to the other political parties and denominations for 
essential counter points and context. Particular attention is given over to the ideological 
parallels between the newly-formed Social Democratic Party and the Church of England 
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and on the religious side, the unique ecumenical partnership between the Catholic 
Archbishop Derek Worlock and the Anglican Bishop David Sheppard in Liverpool. The 
thesis takes a broadly thematic approach while maintaining a narrative form, detailing for 
example the important events and transitions that took place during this momentous 
decade such as the miners‟ strike, the urban riots and the government‟s dispute with the 
Militant Council in Liverpool.41 In terms of structure, this thesis is divided into two halves. 
The first part (chapters 2-4) explores the Church‟s response to Thatcherism, the second 
section (chapters 5 and 6) deals with the New Right‟s critique of Anglicanism and the 
Christian basis of Thatcherism. As has already been alluded to, sociologists and historians 
of religion have assumed that the decline in religious belief precipitated a weakening of the 
Church‟s public position, chapter two, therefore, addresses this issue by focusing on how 
the Church of England reconfigured its role within this new secular context. Centred on the 
question of how the Church legitimised its role as a critic of government, it will show how 
Church leaders justified this political intervention through the Church‟s role in civil society 
and as a purveyor of Christian values. Having explored the nature of the Church‟s authority 
in the political arena, chapter three looks at how the Church, as an agency of political 
power, probed and challenged the moral basis of Thatcherism in respect to the 
government‟s policies on poverty, welfare, industry and wealth. Chapter four seeks to assess 
the Church‟s contribution; positioning the Church‟s stance within the context of partisan 
politics of the 1980s, and assessing the meaning and significance of the Church‟s 
intervention in this polarised era. 
In the second part of the thesis, the emphasis switches from the Church to the New 
Right. Chapter five explores the intellectual and religious roots of the „conservative turn‟ in 
political culture, examining how Christianity and in particular a dissatisfaction with a liberal 
politicised Anglicanism was a factor which united the various facets of the New Right 
including Tory intellectuals, traditionalist Anglicans, economic liberals, the moral lobby and 
the Conservative party. It explores how Anglican Conservatives, of various guises, 
reasserted the individualist nature of faith and the traditional liturgical, moral and 
ecclesiastical basis of Anglicanism. It is the doctrinal politics of the Prime Minister herself 
that is considered in chapter six.  Tracing her faith back to her Methodist upbringing in 
                                                 
41
 The analytical focus here is on the Church‟s involvement in domestic affairs, chiefly social, moral and 
economic issues. During this period the Church was also pro-active in „foreign affairs‟, particularly 
involving debates about nuclear rearmament and the developing world. These subjects are only tentatively 
dealt with here partly because they addressed broader themes about international ethics and decolonisation 
but also because these debates dated back to the 1950s and were not unique to the 1980s or explicitly 
connected to the Church‟s refutation of Thatcherism.   
 26 
interwar Grantham, this section follows Mrs Thatcher‟s own spiritual journey, revealing 
how, by the late 1970s, in the climate of moral „permissiveness‟ and political 
disillusionment, Mrs Thatcher rediscovered the Nonconformity of her youth. Secondly, it 
will look in extensive depth at the religious understanding conveyed in her speeches, 
revealing how she harnessed theological concepts such as the Protestant work ethic, original 
sin and man‟s individual relationship to God and linked these to the political doctrines of 
individualism, liberty and self-restraint.   
The epilogue surveys developments in the immediate aftermath of the Thatcher 
decade, demonstrating how, once Mrs Thatcher had left office, the Church retreated from 
the public political stage and became more and more immersed in ecclesiastical affairs, 
chiefly the ordination of women debate. Secondly, it shows how a female priesthood 
proved to be the deal-breaker for many Anglican Tories, who subsequently left the Church 
of England; a symbolic moment, which heralded the final spilt between Conservatism and 
Anglicanism. Finally, it traces how the notion of a „Christian nation‟ on which the dialogue 
between the Church and state had been predicated, was uprooted and ultimately became 
redundant as The Satanic Verses controversy triggered a slow but definite recalibration of the 
nation‟s religious identity, from a Christian to a multi-faith nation. 
 
 
 27 
 
       CHAPTER II 
      Public Anglicanism: the Role of the Established Church in a Secular Plural               
                                                            Nation 
 
  „The creed of the English is that there is no God and that it is wise to pray to Him from time to time.‟  
Alasdair MacIntyre, 1963.1 
 
         „The Church is the Church of England, not just the Church of those who formally belong to it.‟ 
                     Stuart Blanch, Archbishop of York, 1983.2 
 
          „It is Christianity rather than one church which is established in Britain.‟ 
   Rev. Alan Webster, 1985.3 
 
On a summer afternoon in 1982, the Archbishop of Canterbury, standing in the pulpit of St 
Paul‟s Cathedral, the „parish of the Empire‟, launched into his sermon for the thanksgiving 
service for the Falkland Islands conflict. The quick and decisive victory over the 
Argentinians earlier that year had been heralded as a reversal in the nation‟s fortunes, the 
moment when Britain, in Mrs Thatcher‟s words, „ceased to be a nation in retreat‟.4  The 
sense of national revival was reinforced with images of patriotic crowds waving their Union 
Jacks at Portsmouth dock welcoming home the Task Force. In the run up to the war, the 
Anglican bishops had supported the British government‟s right to defend the Islands. 
However, the whole episode had proved extremely problematic for the Church coinciding 
as it did with Pope John Paul‟s tour of Britain.5 The Pontiff‟s visit, the first by a reigning 
Pope since the Reformation, was supposed to represent the culmination of closer relations 
between Canterbury and Rome however, the outbreak of war between Britain and a 
Catholic country threatened to completely overshadow the entire event.6 It was against this 
backdrop that Runcie was called upon to speak on behalf of the nation at the thanksgiving 
service. Would the leading Primate of the established Church seek to embrace the jubilant 
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and celebratory mood and reunite the holy trinity of patriotism, imperialism and 
Christianity?  
 „War‟, the Archbishop boldly declared, was „a sign of human failure.‟ Articulating a 
message of peace and reconciliation, Runcie reprimanded against the false idol of 
nationalism and while not singling anyone out, condemned those who had displayed a 
distasteful enthusiasm for war.7  Indeed, as an officer in the Scots Guards in the Second 
World War and bearer of the Military Cross, the Archbishop knew the realities of combat 
more than most.8 Runcie also used the opportunity to denounce the immorality of the 
international arms trade and nuclear weaponry, and controversially closed the service by 
leading the congregation in prayers for both the British and Argentinian casualties of war.9  
Returning to the Commons terrace after the service, Denis Thatcher was reported 
to have remarked to one Conservative MP, „the boss is livid‟ and this sense of outrage from 
Conservative quarters also filled the pages of the right-wing press the next day. 
Conservative MP Julian Amery had judged that the ceremony was typical of the „pacifist, 
liberal, wet Establishment‟ which was out of touch with popular opinion and the 
government.10 There was nothing that was particularly radical in Runcie‟s sermon, the 
Church had long been extolling such ideas on nuclear rearmament and peace and 
reconciliation, yet the incident was important for the way it marked the Church of England 
out as fundamentally in conflict with the ethos and direction of the Conservative 
government. The war that cemented Mrs Thatcher‟s position as Prime Minister also 
cemented the Church of England‟s reputation as one of the leading opponents of the 
Conservative administration. According to Robert Runcie, from that moment on, the 
Church became an „acceptable target‟ for the right-wing press and Thatcherites, who would 
consistently dismiss Anglican leaders for their „wet‟ thinking and left-leaning pretensions.11  
That summer of 1982 witnessed another important event which would also mark 
the Church out as an important political voice in the nation: the formation of the 
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Archbishop‟s report into urban poverty.12 The inner city riots the previous year had 
prompted Runcie to gather together a committee of Christian and lay experts to examine 
the role of the Church and to put forward proposals for government and other secular 
agencies in order to alleviate social deprivation. Faith in the City: A Call for Action by Church 
and Nation, as it became known, was finally published three years later in December 1985, 
and would prove to be one of the most important and illuminating political documents of 
the 1980s.13 Moreover, its moral condemnation of Thatcherism and defence of the welfare 
state firmly positioned the Church against the neo-Conservative tide.   
These two events – Runcie‟s Falkland‟s sermon and the establishment of the Faith in 
the City commission – reflected the priorities of the Anglican hierarchy during the 1980s: a 
desire to speak on behalf of the poor, rather than the victorious; and a belief that its 
mission lay in challenging, rather than legitimising, government action whether in the 
ceremonial or political spheres. The origins, rationale and method of this increasingly 
prominent and politicised role of the Church in a secular public domain will be the subject 
of this chapter. The first section will provide the historical context to this study, tracing the 
development of Anglicanism from the nineteenth century and the important theological 
and political spilt between liberals and traditionalists that emerged within the Church from 
the 1960s. The second section will focus on those institutions, organisations and 
personalities which made up the Anglican opposition to Thatcherism: what has been 
labelled here as „the channels of priestly pressure‟. The remainder of the chapter will 
examine how the Church legitimised its public position in a secular plural nation, pointing 
to how clergymen conceptualised the role of the established Church as one not tied to 
temporal power, but as a crucial agent in civil society and an articulator of latent Christian 
values which they argued continued to bind the nation together.   
 
I. Historical Context: Developments within Anglicanism  
The Church of England since its foundation has always been a „broad Church‟ in doctrinal 
terms, comprising of what has sometimes felt like an „unholy‟ alliance among evangelicals, 
liberals and high-Anglicans. The nineteenth century however, saw it gradually develop into 
a „broad Church‟ politically, as Anglicans became increasingly divided along partisan lines. 
The evangelical revival which had its roots in the eighteenth century had given birth to a 
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generation of committed social reformers and philanthropists who channelled their faith 
and zeal into alleviating the social distress caused by industrialisation. At the same time, 
however, evangelical notions of personal salvation and the moral individual were crucial in 
providing the spiritual basis for laissez faire capitalism.14  Meanwhile the gradual assimilation 
and acceptance of Nonconformist and Catholic churches gently eroded (but did not 
destroy) Anglicanism‟s privileged place in the realm. Nepotism and well-endowed benefices 
guaranteed the Anglican clergy‟s continual place as part of the ruling elite, while the 
perennial threat of disestablishment also ensured that the Anglican leadership remained 
closely tied to its protective ally; the Conservative party. A significant problem, however, 
was the Church‟s slow and inadequate response to the changes wrought by the Industrial 
Revolution, especially with the Nonconformist and Catholic churches proving adept at 
providing a spiritual focus for the new urbanised working class. As the social effects of 
industrialisation took their toll, however, there emerged a (predominantly anglo-catholic) 
Christian socialist movement which culminated in the formation of the Christian Social 
Union in 1889. Its emphasis was on Christian brotherhood and its ethos was decidedly 
paternalistic, with its membership rarely extending beyond the confines of the middle-class 
clergy. This fact has led one historian to conclude that the movement was more effective in 
„interesting Christians in socialism than socialists in Christianity.‟15  
The new century would see Christian socialism parallel its secular counterpart in 
attaining greater respectability and support within the Church. In the aftermath of the First 
World War, an Anglican committee, aided by a young R.H. Tawney, produced a report 
entitled Christianity and Industrial Problems, which was judged by the then Regius Professor of 
Oxford to be projecting a message that „state socialism is an integral part of Christian 
teaching.‟16 If the 1918 report was a sign that the Church hierarchy had embraced socialist 
ideas, then the unenthusiastic response it received in some quarters points to the fact that 
there was a clear division between individualism and collectivism within the pews. In the 
interwar years the Church achieved greater autonomy from Parliament with the 
establishment of its own assembly, yet Westminster‟s subsequent rejection of the revised 
Prayer Book in 1927-8 was an indication that MPs (by and large Conservatives) were still 
prepared to hold the Church to account on ecclesiastical matters. The establishment in 1924 
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of the Conference on Politics, Economics and Citizenship (COPEC) – an 
interdenominational gathering dealing with issues as wide-ranging as housing, education, 
industry, crime, property and contraception – was both a testimony to closer relations 
between denominations and the central place accorded to social reform by the churches.17 
Inspired by the New Liberalism of the age and the spirit of ecumenicalism, William Temple 
and other prominent Christians increasingly added their theological weight to contemporary 
debates about unemployment, poverty and housing, and together constructed a forceful 
Christian case for government interventionism rooted in a harmonious concept of a 
Christian citizenry and a benevolent state.18 These ideas would eventually form the 
foundations of the postwar welfare settlement, with Archbishop William Temple, who had 
set out his Christian vision of government in Christianity and Social Order, designated the 
moral architect of this New Jerusalem.19 Commenting on the crucial contribution of liberal 
Anglicanism to postwar reconstruction, theologian Duncan Forrester has put it simply: 
„Christianity provided the philosophy that the welfare state required.‟20 R.H. Tawney, whose 
writings explored the incompatibility of Protestant and capitalist values and proposed the 
Christian case for equality, stands alongside William Temple as a pivotal figure in the 
successful reformulation of Christianity around progressive values in the first half of the 
twentieth century.21  
The social and cultural upheavals of the 1960s – with the arrival of affluence, the 
end of deference, the rise of identity politics and a relaxation of social mores – had 
ramifications for the whole of Christendom, especially Britain. First and foremost, these 
years saw a dramatic decline in churchgoing, Christian rituals and religious forms of 
socialisation. Denominational adherence ceased to be a social convention or measure of 
respectability, while Christian notions of the self and expectations of godly conduct 
(especially for women) gradually eroded within the liberalised moral climate.22 
Nonconformist and Anglican numbers gradually dwindled, and even though Roman 
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Catholic congregations actually increased during the 1960s, Catholicism eventually followed 
suit, experiencing a sharp drop in attendance the following decade.23 This would prove to 
be a long-term trend which the mainstream churches had little hope of reversing, for as 
Hugh McLeod has put it, the 1960s proved to be the defining moment when faith „became 
optional‟.24  
This upheaval inevitably prompted discussion within the churches on how 
Christianity should respond to the new secular culture. As Machin has pointed out, „None 
of these questions was unfamiliar before the 1960s, though they now appeared in more 
concentrated and challenging form.‟25 A spilt soon emerged, however, between progressives 
who sought to adapt Christian prophecy to this new world order, and conservatives whose 
inclination was to firmly reinstate traditional moral and doctrinal values.26 Hugh McLeod 
cites theologian John Robinson and moral campaigner Mary Whitehouse as illustrative of 
the sharp divide within Anglicanism in this period.  Indeed Robinson‟s controversial 
reshaping of Christianity around modern society as set out in Honest to God could not be 
further from Mrs Whitehouse‟s moral crusade against the forces of „permissiveness‟.27 Fork 
lines were drawn between those who argued that Christianity needed to adapt in order to 
survive, and those who viewed any accommodation as a corruption of Christianity and a 
capitulation to secularism. This schism soon permeated all areas of church policy, from 
music to liturgy through to politics, and gradually this bifurcation between traditionalists 
and reformers came to supplant (but not replace) existing divisions between anglo-catholics, 
evangelicals and liberals. New alliances were thus formed between liberal evangelicals and 
anglo-catholics who embraced reform, and conservative evangelicals and anglo-catholics 
who were determined to rein in these changes. Reflecting on the nature of this separation 
within the Church in the early 1980s, conservative Bishop of London, Graham Leonard, 
described it in the following terms:   
 
It is a realignment between those on the one hand who believe that the 
Christian Gospel is revealed by God, is to be heard and received and that 
its purpose is to enable men and women to obey God in love, and 
through them for creation itself to be redeemed. On the other hand are 
those who believe that it can and should be modified and adapted to the 
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cultural and intellectual attitudes and demands of successive generations 
and indeed originates in them.28 
 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s it was the liberals who were dominant, with a wave of 
reformist optimism leading to an updating of the Anglican liturgy, worship and music styles 
in a sincere belief that modernisation would ensure Christianity‟s appeal in changing times. 
Meanwhile, Anglican bishops were instrumental in the passing of legislation relating to 
abortion, homosexuality, capital punishment and divorce. Church reports outlining the 
„Christian‟ perspective on these issues directly influenced the drafting of these laws whilst 
the Church‟s endorsement lent a much-needed spiritual legitimacy to these changes.29 If this 
involvement by the Anglican leadership reflected an acceptance that Biblical notions of „sin‟ 
could no longer be set in law, then it also reflected a widespread belief within the Church 
that little was to be gained from preaching resolute Christian moral standards which many 
in society no longer upheld.30 Even though only a small minority of clergy subscribed to the 
radical theology associated with „South Bank religion‟, by the mid-1970s few could deny 
that the nation‟s moral code and the Church‟s role in sustaining these values had been 
fundamentally reordered.  
In truth, clergymen appeared ever more comfortable in speaking about the morality 
of politics and economics than on the morality of the individual, with this period seeing 
Anglican clergymen (and those from other denominations) become increasingly involved in 
progressive political causes. Men in dog-collars could thus be seen leading the CND 
„pilgrimages‟ to Aldermaston, calling for a cricket boycott of South Africa and pioneering 
pressure groups such as the homeless charity Shelter.31 In particular, evangelicalism 
underwent a profound development in this period. The gathering of the National 
Evangelical Congress in 1967 at Keele proved to be a turning point when evangelicalism 
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broke free from its Victorian moralistic and pietistic traditions and embraced its social and 
ecumenical mission.32 Anglicanism, whether of an evangelical, liberal or anglo-catholic ilk, 
also drew inspiration from the development of different theologies (both Catholic and 
Protestant) from across the globe including Black liberation theology in the US, notions of 
social justice emerging in the decolonised developing world, and Catholic liberation 
theology in South America.33 This exposure to radical theo-political outlooks, which many 
Anglican clergy had experienced first-hand, gently reshaped the Anglican mindset. There 
was now a growing consensus amongst the clergy that the Church must shed its image of 
silent compliance, speak out against injustice and stand shoulder to shoulder with the 
oppressed in society. This desire for the Church to assert and distinguish itself as an 
independent voice added further weight to existing calls for greater autonomy from the 
state. In the 1970s, the formation of the General Synod and the reform of the procedure 
for selecting bishops, therefore, was on the initiative of clerics rather than politicians. These 
changes reflected an ecclesiastical desire for self-governance and a belief that the complete 
supremacy of the state over the Church was an archaic and cumbersome system which 
could no longer be justified. The Church of England‟s position as the established Church 
remained very much in-tact, yet these changes did lead some to question whether the 
Church was on a slow road towards disestablishment.34 
If independence from temporal power was one aim, then so too was a more 
aggressive stance towards capitalism. A crucial facet of 1960s post-materialist culture was its 
moral assault on Western capitalism; a mood which gave birth to the ecological and fair-
trade movements. These were causes in which liberal Christians had taken a considerable 
lead.  The Christian critique of capitalism that emerged in this era was much more 
combative and all encompassing than its earlier gestations. Taking a global rather than a 
domestic perspective, it was critical not only of the immorality of the market place, but also 
the operations of global corporations, industrial culture and the ethos of wealth creation 
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itself.35  The extreme manifestation of this was liberation theology, which was an explicit 
tying of Marxist ideas of oppression and solidarity with Biblical notions of fellowship and a 
divine „bias to the poor‟.36 The following words from Argentinian theologian, Jose Miguez 
Bonino, gives a flavour of this uncompromising judgement on capitalism:  
 
The basic ethos of capitalism is definitely anti-Christian: it is the 
maximising of economic gain, the raising of man‟s grasping impulse, the 
idolising of the strong, the subordination of man to the economic 
production. Humanisation is for capitalism an unintended by-product, 
while for socialism, an explicit goal.37 
 
As will become clear, liberation theology did influence some radical Anglicans, however, its 
impact on those leading the Church of England was minimal. Broadly speaking, 
Anglicanism in the first half of the twentieth century had gradually shifted politically to the 
left. What the experience of the 1960s had done was to highlight some of the failures and 
restrictions of interwar liberal Anglicanism and to nudge it further in a leftward direction. It 
would therefore be incorrect to assume that the Church of England, on the eve of the 
Thatcher decade was a radically reordered, politically galvanised Church, even if some 
traditionalist Anglicans may have viewed it as such.38  
Much more important was that the Church was fundamentally spilt on all of this. 
The 1960s could be characterised as a period of optimism and hope for liberal Christianity, 
yet by the mid-1970s the conservative movement within Anglicanism began to gain 
prominence.39 Calling for the reinforcement of Christian morality and the maintenance of 
traditional liturgical and ecclesiastical practises (particularly an exclusively male priesthood), 
conservatives denounced liberal Anglicanism as an undermining of tradition and evidence 
of the infiltration of contemporary secular thought within the Church. One particular 
charge was that the liberal Anglican hierarchy had politicised Christianity through its 
deliberate (but in their view false) tying of Christianity with atheistic socialism. The leading 
conservative critic, historian Edward Norman used the occasion of the 1978 BBC Reith 
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Lectures to take issue with liberation theology, which in his view was not only a debasement 
of doctrine, but demonstrative of the Christian Church politicising theology in order to 
maintain credibility in the modern world:  
 
The present identification of Christianity with western bourgeois 
liberalism seems an unnecessary consecration of a highly relative and 
unstable set of values, the more unsatisfactory because it is generally 
done unconsciously. Liberalism actually occupies a very narrow band on 
the spectrum of political theories. To regard it as the distillation of 
Christian wisdom, as the contemporary repository of a timeless faith, is, 
to say the least, a short-term view.40 
 
The traditionalist faction drew much of its source and strength from the growth of 
conservative evangelicalism in this period while it also included many disaffected anglo-
catholics among its supporters. In political terms, some traditionalists were of the „pietist‟ 
tradition, believing Christianity had no role in the temporal sphere of politics, whereas 
others, as we shall see, came increasingly to link Christian values with political Conservatism 
and, in particular, to stress the doctrinal basis of capitalism. The result of all this, however, 
was an internal religio-political divide within the Church: an alliance between liberal 
Anglicans and those on the left, and traditional Anglicanism and the New Right.41 
Thus the social and cultural changes of the 1960s not only triggered a collapse of 
Christian faith amongst the populace, but also gave rise to an internal „cultural-political war‟ 
within the Church.42  This polarisation was not confined to Anglicanism but was part of a 
broader trend within all religions, not least the Catholic Church, where the liberal Vatican II 
reforms were subsequently curbed by a conservative backlash.43 Its effects could also be 
seen in the Anglican Communion, where progressives (mostly from North America) came 
into conflict with conservatives (especially evangelicals from the African continent) over the 
acceptance of homosexual and female priests. Indeed, it appeared that just as 
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ecumenicalism had dissipated sectarian tensions among denominations, this was superseded 
by the growth of internal tensions within the churches themselves.44  
  The 1980s began with a new Archbishop at Lambeth Palace and the return of a 
Conservative Prime Minister to No.10. The factions that Mrs Thatcher had to contend with 
within her party, however, were nothing compared to the tensions that Runcie had to face 
in his Church. Anglicanism was about to enter a period of extreme unease, which would 
become even more heightened and fractious as the decade wore on. It would involve not 
only discussions about internal ecclesiastical decisions such as the ordination of women, but 
also the role of the Church in society and its position on politics. At the helm however, was 
a set of leaders who were steeped in the liberal Anglican tradition, influenced by radical 
theology and confident of their independence from the state. Thus with the rise of neo-
Conservatism, they soon felt compelled to take a much more interventionist position on the 
public stage.  
 
II. Public Anglicanism in the 1980s: the Channels of Priestly Pressure 
The 1980s inspired a new wave of Anglican political activism leading to the formation of 
new pressure groups, an increasingly politicised Synod and an explosion of Christian-
political literature. Tactics and modes of political engagement varied, as did the political 
message and theological perspective.  In fact, the disparate nature of the Church of England 
makes it extremely difficult to ascertain the „official view of the Church‟ on political 
matters; not even speeches by bishops or Synod resolutions could be said to be universally 
representative. Set out below are the various Anglican „voices‟ which together constituted 
the Church of England‟s opposition to Thatcherism, of which the most prominent and 
important of these were undoubtedly the bishops.  
 
The Bishops 
The 1980s saw leading prelates such as David Jenkins at Durham, David Sheppard at 
Liverpool, Hugh Montefiore at Birmingham and Stanley Booth-Clibborn at Manchester 
emerge as the figureheads of the new era of Christian social concern during the Thatcher 
years.45 Politically aware and publicly outspoken, this generation of bishops was much more 
inclined to be openly critical of the state than to voice their worries behind closed doors. 
This was not a new phenomenon, bishops such as John Robinson and Mervyn Stockwood 
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had gained notoriety in the 1960s as prominent radicals, although they were never seen as 
being representative of the Anglican mainstream.46 The 1980s stands out as a time when 
those in high ecclesiastical office adopted a confrontational position against the government 
and achieved an almost celebrity-like status within the media.47 The prelates varied in 
personality, experience and theological tradition. David Sheppard, for example, was an 
evangelical and former England cricketer whose public prominence in the 1980s was 
confirmed through his successful partnership with Catholic Archbishop Worlock in 
Liverpool and his outspokenness against the government‟s record on poverty and 
unemployment. On the other side of Lancashire, in Manchester, was Stanley Booth-
Clibborn, a card-carrying member of the Labour party and a direct descendant of Salvation 
Army founder William Booth. After spending the first decade of his ministry working in 
Kenya and subsequently, at various posts within England, he was eventually elevated to the 
See of Manchester in 1979. In the chief diocese of the Midlands in Birmingham was Hugh 
Montefiore. Born into a wealthy Jewish family, he had undergone a conversion to 
Christianity at 16 while at Rugby school. After serving in the war, he soon made his way up 
the ecclesiastical ladder, firstly, as suffragan bishop of Kingston and then subsequently, at 
Birmingham from 1977-1987.  David Jenkins, on the other hand, was an Anglican liberal 
who had worked at the World Council of Churches and as director of the William Temple 
Foundation before becoming a professor of theology at Leeds University. He caused a 
public outcry soon after being elected to Durham in 1984 when he questioned the historical 
validity of the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection in a television interview. His reputation as 
a controversial figure was sealed when he used his enthronement sermon to attack the 
government‟s handling of the miners‟ strike. John Habgood, the Archbishop of York was a 
much more cautious and thoughtful man. As a former scientist he was particularly 
interested in the subject of medical ethics and as an ecclesiastical pragmatist, he was heavily 
involved in ecumenical matters and liturgical reform, providing much of the inspiration 
behind the controversial modernised version of the Prayer Book. Rarely critical of the 
government, Habgood advocated the Church of England‟s central role as a source of unity 
in an era of social and political polarisation. Archbishop Runcie, on the other hand, had 
earned his priestly spurs as Principle of Cuddesdon theological college before becoming 
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Bishop of St Albans. A high-Anglican liberal, Archbishop Runcie was frequently criticised 
for sitting on the fence on ecclesiastical matters although he took a strong lead on political 
issues such as the Faith in the City report and the miners‟ strike. Separate from this group, 
but an equally important figure, was the Bishop of London, Graham Leonard. As the most 
senior anglo-catholic traditionalist, he became the figurehead of the conservative 
movement, leading the opposition against the ordination of women and the proposed 
Covenant with the Nonconformist churches. He also stood out from his senior 
ecclesiastical colleagues for the hard-line position he took on homosexuality and divorce. 
Leonard was to be become increasingly disillusioned with Anglicanism, especially over the 
ordination of women issue and eventually converted to Roman Catholicism in 1994, soon 
after his retirement.  
During the 1980s, the press tended to present any utterance by a prelate as 
considered Church policy.  Bishops‟ personal archives, however, indicate the varying 
priorities of the individual prelates, revealing them to be autonomous and independent 
figures with a free rein to comment on public affairs as they pleased. The lack of clear 
Public Relations management from Lambeth Palace or Church House perhaps explains 
why a number of bishops experienced a somewhat troubled relationship with the press.48 
Despite these differences, the bishops could collectively be described as theologically 
moderate, ecumenical in outlook and broadly centrist in politics.49 They were also all from 
solid Establishment stock: most were from the middle-to-upper class, had been educated at 
one of the nation‟s leading public schools and had attended either Oxford or Cambridge.50 
One of the key ways that bishops were able to contribute to political debate was of 
course through their presence in the House of Lords.51 In the eighties, the Church sought 
to maximise this privilege, with Lambeth Palace ensuring that the bishop‟s bench was 
always occupied during crucial debates and that attendees were fully briefed.52 Prelates‟ 
division records give an insight into which way they swayed on legislative matters. Between 
1979-1990, 61 per cent of the total votes cast by the bishops were against the government, 
                                                 
48
 The fact that a number of dioceses appointed press officers in this period was an attempt to rectify this. 
49
 Medhurst & Moyser, Church and Politics, pp.125-131. 
50
 Ibid., p.111.   
51
 Partington, The Contribution of the Church of England Bishops. 
52
 Partington shows that the most prominent bishops such as David Sheppard and David Jenkins in the 
1980s were not necessarily the most vocal members in the chamber: Partington, The Contribution, pp.78-
81. The Archbishop of Canterbury attended only 60 times in this period, the Archbishop of York just 41: 
p.81. Naturally those bishops located in dioceses within commutable distance to Westminster attended 
more regularly than those further away. Revealingly however, Episcopal contributions reached a peak 
during Mrs Thatcher‟s second term (1983-7) when the crucial decisions about industrial relations, 
unemployment and poverty were being made. 
 40 
in contrast to 27 per cent of voters in favour. David Say, the Bishop of Rochester, was the 
most consistent with 70 out of 88 votes against. Other notable opponents included Stanley 
Booth-Clibborn (42/46), Ronald Bowlby at Southwark, (36/43) and David Sheppard on 
(30/39).53 The Archbishop of Canterbury voted on a ratio of 6:1 against, while the 
Archbishop of York opposed the government on every occasion he entered the division 
lobby. The content of their speeches tells a similar story, for only 49 contributions were in 
support of government measures, compared with 172 against.54 
David Sheppard, writing to the Bishop of Birmingham in 1983 to congratulate him 
on being formally inducted into the Lords, mused: „It‟s a funny place….it is also confusing 
to estimate how much notice anyone takes of what one says…my own view is that we can 
exaggerate the significance of what goes on there, but I still believe we have to try to keep 
some issues alive in that forum.‟55 These sentiments reflected the general attitude of the 
bishops towards the second chamber for, although they welcomed the privilege, they were 
aware of its limitations as a place of influence or for reaching out to the general public. The 
twenty-six bishops who sat in the Lords were rarely decisive in deciding the fate of 
legislation, with the British Nationality Act (1981) and the Education Act (1988) the only 
two significant occasions when their intervention proved critical.56 Importantly, however, 
the prelates were not seen as an archaic irrelevance by the Lords Temporal and lobbyists, 
and in the absence of adequate representation of other faiths, they were considered as 
offering a vital Christian/religious perspective on forthcoming legislation.57 The Lords 
Spiritual therefore did more than provide the ceremonial daily prayers in the Upper House 
during this period. The bishops dressed in their full ecclesiastical regalia, both visually and 
verbally, cut distinctive figures on the benches.  
Of more significance than the House of Lords, was the attention the bishops 
received from the media.  A speech by a prelate was much more likely to gain coverage than 
either a Synod resolution, a statement by other religious leaders or a press release from a 
faceless bureaucratic organisation such as the British Council of Churches.58 This was partly 
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because controversial utterances from Anglican prelates were deemed headline-worthy, yet 
it also pertained to the fact, as David Sheppard recognised: „There remains a certain 
mystique about being a bishop that in a less religious age seems to hold sway.‟59 Press 
interviews and TV and radio appearances provided the main means through which bishops 
were able to reach out to the non-churchgoing mass. With bishops regularly featuring on 
such topical programmes as Question Time – with even the Archbishop of Canterbury 
appearing on popular chat-show Parkinson – it could be argued that this generation of 
prelates enjoyed more exposure, coverage and publicity than any of their predecessors.60 
Religious broadcasting also played an important part here, for in this period its content 
branched out beyond televised worship to the production of programmes exploring the 
Christian critique of society and politics.61 Equally crucial was the (predominantly hostile) 
right-wing press. The Times, Mail, Express, Telegraph and even the Sun frequently ran front-
page stories on the Church and this coverage proved pivotal in engineering a dialogue 
between liberal Anglicanism and the New Right, as the editor of the Sunday Telegraph 
inadvertently explained:  
 
I don‟t recall in recent times reading a speech by a bishop that I‟d want 
to see printed in my paper for edification. Rather we report them 
because we get hot under the collar when the Bishop of Durham says 
something that a bishop has no business saying.62 
 
Board for Social Responsibility  
The bishops may have received the greatest attention from the press, yet it was the Board 
for Social Responsibility (BSR), a quasi-think-tank located within the Church‟s 
Headquarters in Westminster, which was in charge of devising the Church‟s policy on 
national and international political issues.63 Its aims were three-fold: firstly, to coordinate 
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the Anglican response on the key issues of the day; secondly, to act as a lobby group to 
enact pressure on Parliament and Whitehall; and thirdly, as an educational body, 
disseminating its message to the Church, laity and the populace at large.  
The BSR, with a prelate at its head, comprised of seven different committees of 
which the most relevant here is the Social Policy Committee (SPC) and the Industrial and 
Economic Affairs Committee (IEAC).64 On these sat not only clerics, but also 
representatives from government, industry, academia, voluntary sector and unions. The 
IEAC for example counted Mr Roy Woolliscroft of the Mirror Group newspapers, Mr 
Geoffrey Holland of the Manpower Services Commission, Mr David Warburton from the 
Home Office, a representative from GMWU Union and theologian John Atherton amongst 
its members. The minutes of the SPC also reveal its close relations with non-governmental 
organisations such as Age Concern, The Children‟s Society, Church Housing, the National 
Council for Voluntary Organisations, the Mother‟s Union, Church Army and the British 
Council of Churches.65 This cross-fertilisation between the secular and religious spheres is 
further illustrated by the number of academics, civil servants and third-sector 
representatives who sat on the working parties for BSR reports.  
One of the chief operations of the BSR was the publication of pamphlets offering a 
Christian perspective on contemporary issues. Of the forty-six of these produced by the 
BSR between 1979-1990, forty-one concerned social and economic policy, the remaining 
five addressed international affairs, the environment and the developing world. The SPC 
(whose remit included social policy as well as personal moral issues) produced fifteen 
publications, of which only two of these addressed sexual-moral and medical ethics 
(homosexuality and divorce, human fertilisation and euthanasia) with the majority dealing 
with social policy themes such as housing, welfare and benefits.66 The Board‟s quarterly 
journal, Crucible, also demonstrates this prioritisation of social-economic issues over ethical 
or moral concerns. The BSR reports sold few copies yet their ideas filtered down to the 
lower echelons of the Church through debates in the Synod, diocesan newsletters and the 
Board‟s network of local officers.67  
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In general terms, the literature produced by the BSR promulgated a centre-left 
position and was largely critical of the Conservative government. The reports by-and-large 
received a favourable hearing in the Synod, although mutterings of opposition particularly 
from the House of Laity pointed to the fact that BSR reports were not representative of the 
whole Church.68 As the decade wore on, there was a growing discontent about the 
politicised work of the BSR, which, in conservative evangelical Rachel Tingle‟s view, was 
„an unrepresentative minority‟ operating „as a pressure group at the heart of the Church and, 
through that, on our wider society.‟69  
 
The Synod  
The formation of the General Synod in 1970, with its three houses of bishops, clergy and 
laity, aimed at making the Church more accountable and democratic, yet in fact it had the 
effect of reinforcing factionalism within the Church. During the 1980s, as the pressing 
issues of female ordination, interdenominational relations and liturgical reform came to the 
fore, so the tri-annual meetings of the Synod became a forum for division rather than unity. 
The composition of the Synod changed over this period, positions hardened and factions 
became more acute. Liberals may have remained the dominant force, but they were 
increasingly being challenged by traditionalists, particularly from the House of Laity.70  
 At the meetings of the General Synod, although ecclesiastical subjects inevitably 
dominated the agenda, resolutions on domestic politics, emanating from the BSR, diocesan 
synods or individuals, also generated heated discussion within the debating chamber. The 
resolutions on political subjects were always quite vague, but were often a thinly veiled 
condemnation of Conservative government policy. The 1984 motion on the economy for 
example, which affirmed that „economic values are not self-justifying but need to be set 
within the larger context of human values‟, was typical of the sort of language emanating 
from the Synod.71 There were some instances where more specific resolutions were agreed 
such as the demand for the long-term unemployed to be entitled to supplementary benefit 
and the call for the government to increase expenditure on job creation schemes rather than 
reduce taxation.72 Resolutions however, tended to undergo a series of amendments during 
the debating process which would inevitably have the effect of watering-down the original 
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proposal. The final statements passed may have been uncontroversial, yet the actual debates 
(which tended to be reported in the press) demonstrated the breadth of opinion in the 
Synod on political matters, not least the prevalence of strong Conservative party support 
within the House of Laity.73 While the clergy and laity may have stood for election to the 
chamber chiefly out of a desire to influence ecclesiastical affairs, they also found that the 
Synod proved to be a forum where their secular political prejudices were exercised as well.  
 
Anglican Voluntary Organisations and Pressure Groups  
Outside the Church of England‟s formal bureaucratic structures, there were a number of 
independent charities and foundations whose knowledge on the ground and efforts at 
mobilising parishioners proved crucial to the Church‟s presence on the national stage in this 
period.74 The 1980s saw the re-birth of existing religious charities and the establishment of 
new bodies devoted to engaging and lobbying on the issue of poverty in Britain. 
Organisations such as the Children‟s Society and Christian Action (CA) worked alongside 
new groups such as Church Action on Poverty (CAP) and Church Action with the 
Unemployed (CAWTU) combining remedial work with political activism and campaigning. 
Church Action on Poverty, established in 1980 in Manchester, operated solely as lobby 
group and partnered up with secular bodies concerned with the poverty agenda.75 It also 
had strong links with the official channels of the Church, counting two members of the 
BSR on its board. Christian Action, on the other hand, was an ecumenical body, which 
dated back to 1942. It saw its role as primarily educative and took a leading role in Faith in 
the City – incidentally it had been its Chairman, the Rev. Eric James, who had first proposed 
the idea of a report.76 The pivotal role of these organisations, as will be explored, lay in their 
ability to stimulate interest at parish level and provide insights and information which fed 
into and reinforced the Church‟s role on the national stage.  
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Christian Commentators and Theologians 
This engagement with the politics of Thatcherism even extended into the theology faculties 
of Britain‟s universities. Professor R.H. Preston of Manchester, for example, author of 
several books on the interrelationship between religion and politics, served on the BSR 
committees which produced the Not just for the Poor report in 1986 and Changing Britain in 
1987.77 Another important figure was Duncan Forrester, who was head of the Centre for 
Theology and Public Issues at the University of Edinburgh and wrote a series of books on 
the nature and purpose of the Church‟s prophecy in the 1980s.78 This was in addition to the 
Urban Theology Unit at the University of Sheffield, the interdenominational Evangelical 
Coalition for Urban Mission (established in 1980) and the William Temple Foundation in 
Manchester, whose work centred on the nature of the Church‟s ministry and prophecy in 
the urban context.79 The latter was home to the Rev. John Atherton, Canon of Manchester 
Cathedral. As a member of the Faith in the City committee, author of numerous books, and 
member of the BSR, Atherton was both an active member and a constructive critic of 
contemporary social Anglicanism. This period also saw a growth in literature pertaining to 
the nature and purpose of social Christianity which was seemingly of genuine interest to 
publishers and readers. Between 1977-1986 books penned on social and ecclesiastical 
theology out-numbered those on Biblical theology and moral theology.80 
This brief survey of the various tentacles of Anglican social activism in the 1980s 
points to the way in which the Church of England‟s contribution was not confined to a few 
adverse statements by wayward bishops, but involved a proactive and intellectual 
engagement with the politics of the New Right at all levels – from the Archbishop of 
Canterbury down to the individual member of Christian Action. In view of this analysis, the 
remainder of this chapter sets out how Anglican leaders justified the Church‟s involvement 
in the politics of the day and its continual relevance in a secular plural nation. 
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III. A Christian Nation in Thought rather than Deed 
Writing in the late seventies on the plight of religious and communal life in Britain, 
theologian Daniel Jenkins lamented that the established Church gave „the impression that 
she has lost heart about her role as the church of the English people‟ and that she was 
„more interested in herself as an institution than she is in England‟. Jenkins concluded that 
the Church of England was on a „slow and cautious‟ retreat into „denominational status‟.81 
Jenkins was vocalising a then widely-held view that greater ecclesiastical autonomy coupled 
with religious decline had caused the Church to become internalised and neglectful of its 
duties to the nation at large. Writing three years later, The Times religious correspondent 
Clifford Longley agreed: „the tendency has been to draw away from the popular concept of 
Christianity into a kind of inward-looking churchiness that emphasises the distance between 
“church Christianity” and “the popular sort”‟.82 In the 1970s then, many considered that the 
distinction between regular worshippers and nominal members had become so acute that 
Anglicanism had become a congregational sect rather than the territorial Church of the 
land.83 When in 1976 the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Donald Coggan, issued a „Call to 
the Nation‟ urging the public to write to him of their concerns about the social, economic 
and spiritual breakdown of Britain, it proved to be a rather short-lived and inconsequential 
exercise. The fact that the BBC also refused Coggan‟s request to broadcast his „Call‟ seemed 
to symbolise the redundancy of public Anglicanism in a secular era.84 Yet, this concept, 
namely an understanding that Britain remained a Christian nation and that the established 
Church had a responsibility to vocalise Christian unitary values in the public domain, 
underwent a significant revival during the Thatcher years.  
Instrumental in this change of thinking was a report produced in 1981by a 
committee of leaders from the Anglican Communion, entitled To a Rebellious House. The 
committee had concluded that Anglicanism had become stifled by a bureaucratic and 
internalised perspective and urged the Mother Church to rediscover its prophetic voice to 
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the nation.85 Speaking at the Synod debate on the report in 1982, the then Archbishop of 
York, Stuart Blanch, mused on this point and cautioned synodical representatives against 
perceiving the outside world as „secular‟.86 Asserting that „folk religion remains a powerful 
influence in the attitudes people form and decisions which they make,‟ Blanch called for a 
realignment of priorities within the Church: „the fields are ripe for harvest if we can only get 
out into the fields and not spend all our time mending the barns or oiling the machinery.‟87  
Anglican statements from the 1980s are marked by the way in which the bishops, 
clergy and pressure groups continually referred to the nation as „Christian‟ and drew on a 
notion of „folk Christianity‟ as a way of asserting the position of the Church in the public 
realm. On the occasion of his enthronement in 1983, for example, the newly appointed 
Archbishop of York, John Habgood made a special plea for the Church to embrace its 
national responsibilities, proclaiming in an interview with the Yorkshire Post: „One of the 
great gifts the Church of England has to give to the Church at large is that it is concerned 
with the life of a nation, the whole nation.‟88 Public Anglicanism was not a new concept, for 
as Matthew Grimley has shown, William Temple and others espoused similar ideas in the 
first half of the century. Political intervention by clergy was resented and challenged in the 
1930s as much as it was in the 1980s. The chief difference, however, was that Runcie and 
his bishops‟ claims about the central place of Christianity and the Church of England in 
national public life could not be assumed, but needed clarifying as well as justifying in these 
more secularised times.89 
 For the Anglican hierarchy of the 1980s, the Church‟s legitimacy was rooted in an 
understanding that, despite declining congregations, an underlying Christian ethos remained 
within the nation. This faith may not have manifested itself in weekly worship, they 
contended, but it continued to act as an important guiding force in the nation‟s political and 
moral values. Speaking on Thought for the Day on the wedding day of Prince Charles and 
Lady Diana Spencer in 1981, the Archbishop of York, offered what he considered to be the 
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symbolic importance of the wedding as a ceremonial demonstration of the nation‟s 
Christian unity:  
 
              We warmly recognise the presence amongst us of many men and women 
of diverse race and culture and religion. But for the greater part we 
remain, if we are anything, a Christian nation – Christian by instinct if 
not by conviction. If we have any standards, if we have any spiritual 
aspirations they are Christian aspirations, if there is a name that still 
evokes some responses in our hearts, it is the name of Christ.90  
 
 
In his early morning message, the Archbishop was evoking the essential ingredients of 
national identity by intertwining royalty, Christianity and the nation. It was not uncommon 
for clergymen to evoke spiritual nationalism on royal, civic or religious ceremonies and it is 
hardly surprising that the Archbishop used it on this occasion given that the nation had 
been rocked by widespread inner city rioting only weeks before. Revealingly, however, this 
concept of a Christian nation was not only raised in the ceremonial sphere but also littered 
clergymen‟s statements on politics in this period. In Faith in the City, for example, the 
commission asserted that „the British people are by a great majority a believing people‟ and 
that there existed a „strong substratum of religion in British society.‟91 They concluded that 
the thoughts and resolutions in the report were in line with the „basic Christian principles of 
justice and compassion‟ which were shared by „the great majority of the people of Britain‟.92 
The commission directly connected this to the role and purpose of Anglicanism, 
proclaiming that because the Church of England was: „in the position of being the national 
Church, it has a particular duty to act as the conscience of the nation‟.93  
Anglican leaders defined the notion of a „Christian nation‟ in careful terms. They 
avoided making bold and ambitious statements about the strength of religious feeling 
amongst the populace and instead categorised it as a fundamental ethos, a residual 
Christianity, a faith which was hard to detect and quantify, but nonetheless prevalent and an 
important force guiding the lives and values of the British people. The nation was perceived 
Christian rather than specifically Anglican or Protestant, and was imagined as encompassing 
(admittedly rather vaguely) the whole of the British Isles.94 The contention was that while 
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there had undoubtedly been a decline in worship, there were limits to how „secular‟ the 
nation was. This was a conscious reformulation of Christianity and the national Church 
within the new secular plural landscape of late-twentieth century Britain but it was also a 
deliberate spiritual response to the prevailing sense of national crisis that was abound from 
the late-1970s onwards.   
This notion of „folk Christianity‟ was not a new concept, yet in the 1980s it assumed 
new credibility in both clerical and academic circles. While historians challenged Weber‟s 
theory of secularisation through empirical studies of nineteenth century urban religious 
culture, sociologists aimed for a more nuanced understanding of secularism within 
contemporary British society, looking beyond churchgoing statistics to an exploration of 
the existence of an „implicit faith‟ amongst the populace.95 Case studies such as Geoffrey 
Ahern‟s survey of Leeds and David Clark‟s analysis of a North Yorkshire village, although 
different in scope and detail, added to an emerging impression of a complex religious 
culture and an academic consensus that statistics on worship only provided half the 
picture.96   
Most significant, was a survey conducted in 1981 by sociologists for the European 
Values System Study Group (EVSSG) which examined, amongst other things, British 
attitudes towards religion.97 Three-quarters of the sample claimed a belief in God while half 
admitted to praying regularly, yet only one-fifth stated that they were weekly worshippers. 
Significantly, a larger proportion of British respondents had stated they were believers than 
those in France, West Germany, Holland or Denmark.  These findings led the group to 
conclude that, although Britain was on the surface more secularised than its European 
counterparts, basic Christian values remained strong. In the words of sociologist A. H. 
Halsey, who organised the survey: 
 
They [the British] are in their normal geographical-cum-cultural position 
with respect to the religious Commandments to worship only one God, 
not to take His name in vain, and to keep the Sabbath. But with respect 
to honouring their parents and injunctions against murder, adultery, 
theft, envy and lust they out-do the Scandinavians, Northern Europeans 
and Latins in virtuous declaration. In short….the British are to be seen 
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and see themselves as a relatively unchurched, nationalistic, optimistic, 
satisfied, conservative, and moralistic people.98  
 
These results prompted Clifford Longley to conclude that: „This surprising image of the 
British as a predominantly religious nation is in contrast to the received view of itself as 
secular.‟99  
The comprehensiveness of the survey may have been open to dispute, what is 
significant however, was the appropriation of these results by the Church of England. The 
EVSSG study was directly quoted in the 1987 Anglican pamphlet Changing Britain: Social 
Diversity and Moral Unity as proof of the „strong moral and ethical tradition‟ within the 
nation.100 Further evidence of a connection between sociological research into implicit 
religion and the Church‟s renewed sense of national purpose was also found in the work of 
sociologist Grace Davie who was hired by the Faith in the City commission to assess the 
nature of Christian belief in Britain especially in the inner cities. Davie concluded that, 
although urban centres were traditionally sites of secularity, there remained a latent 
Christian belief in the inner cities and the nation at large.101 Crucially she linked this „residual 
Christianity‟ to the Church of England‟s distinct social purpose and relevance, proposing 
that the inner city clergy should not be „beset by doubts about failure because the church 
remains empty on Sundays‟ for the local parish priest had a „strategic role‟ in providing a 
„bridge‟ in civil society.102 
 Irrespective of whether Church leaders directly drew on this scholarship, the notion 
of a Christian nation was undoubtedly the predominant thinking amongst the Anglican 
leadership in this period, as Clifford Longley recognised:  
 
              Folk Religion is the general “C of E” religiosity of the masses…..The 
new fashion is to detect hitherto unseen virtues in it, particularly the 
raison d‟etre it gives the professional churchman. This relationship 
between the “C of E” majority and the Church of England minority is 
the new form of Establishment, the special tie between church and 
people that was once seen primarily in legal and constitutional bonds.103  
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The leading exponent of this reformulated understanding of establishment was the 
Archbishop of York who, in 1983, penned a book entitled Church and Nation in a Secular Age 
which attended to the issue of residual Christianity and its importance for the Church. 
Habgood contended that the contemporary struggle against secularism was not a new 
phenomenon nor was a division between a churchgoing and non-churchgoing mass, 
declaring that „active churchgoers form the top of a huge religious iceberg. There are simply 
the most visible and articulate part of a much more widespread phenomenon.‟104 Habgood 
affirmed that the Church needed to look upon the untapped and widespread prevalence of 
folk Christianity as a positive opportunity.105 The task of the national Church therefore 
should be to welcome „those whose beliefs may seem inadequate‟ and „those who seem 
merely to want to use it [the church] for their own convenience‟ and attempt to nurture and 
strengthen this vestigial faith into a „fuller and more explicit Christian experience‟.106 Folk 
Christianity, according to Habgood therefore, may have been doctrinally confused and 
incoherent, but it was a genuine religious expression and more importantly evidence of the 
continual existence of Christian values in society and a reminder of the Church of 
England‟s responsibilities to the nation as a whole.  
This notion of a Christian nation was particular to the Church of England and one 
not shared by the Catholic or Nonconformist denominations, which did not make any 
claims to a broader constituency. This of course made it possible for the Church of 
England to assert that „folk religion‟ was in essence a „folk Anglicanism‟.107 According to 
Clifford Longley, the English people‟s modern casual relationship with faith was a 
continuation of the nation‟s historic and evolving relationship with the Church of England.  
The English, in Longley‟s view, had always rejected „dogma‟ and shown „a certain 
„ambivalence‟ towards the clergy and the Church.108 This attitude had continued in more 
secular times, with the populace maintaining certain expectations of the spiritual arm of the 
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state: „The church is a place to stay away from, but on which they secretly depend, just as a 
rebelling adolescent needs to know his parents are still there.‟109  
  This vision of a Christian consensus espoused by Church leaders, however, was 
ultimately a position of defence than one of confidence. Despite Habgood‟s optimistic 
message on the potentialities of folk Christianity, clergymen remained fearful about 
depleting congregations, especially as figures revealed that the Church‟s increasing public 
profile had not triggered a reversal in its fortunes.110 According to radical cleric Rev. 
Kenneth Leech the understanding that „the majority of the population, perhaps including 
the government, are basically “closet Christians” needing gentle persuasion,‟ was 
fundamentally wrong: „It is not self-evident that the values of the gospel are common to 
society as a whole. Indeed the evidence to the contrary is considerable.‟111 Leech concluded 
that such a vision was unwise and unhelpful for both the Church and society:  
 
Today the myth of a national Church, the religious arm of the nation, is 
blatant nonsense. Yet the Church of England clings to it as a way of 
„influencing‟ the national scene……Is the idea of „influencing society‟, 
which seems to dominate the thinking of the report as it does many 
church statements, an adequate model for the Church‟s social witness?112  
 
Leech was speaking as a Christian socialist, one who believed that the Church needed to 
remove itself from the structures of temporal power in order to become an effective 
political voice. He was not the only one, however, to question why the Church seemed to 
content to trade off the myth of a Christian nation rather than evangelising to make it a 
reality.113 The central problem, critics argued, was that the Church was assuming a public 
influence, which was no longer credible and that its self-appointed role as the „conscience 
of the nation‟ was neither appropriate nor welcome. Theologian Duncan Forrester perhaps 
judged it correctly when he wrote that the concept of a Christian consensus revealed more 
about contemporary Anglican anxieties about secularity than about the state of faith within 
the nation.114  
Public Anglicanism may have been an outdated and in some circles unwanted 
vision, but it was a purpose, which Anglican leaders believed in, took incredibly seriously 
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and one they demonstrated with a degree of integrity and moral weight. Crucially, the 
Anglican hierarchy did not think that they were imposing Christian ideas on a semi-
Christian nation, rather, that an elucidation of widely-held Christian values would helped 
forge a sense of unity at a time of intense national division. It was no accident therefore that 
the concept of public Anglicanism underwent a revival during the Thatcher decade. As 
John Habgood proclaimed at his enthronement sermon in 1983:  „Public faith‟ provided the 
values and aspirations of society and reflected a „promise that beyond our separations as 
Christians, as people, as one nation in a divided world, there is an ultimate unity.‟115 
 
IV. Christian Community: The Church of England’s Position in Civil Society  
It was not only this notion of a Christian consensus which the Anglican hierarchy drew 
upon to sanction their role as public critics. The Church‟s presence in society through its 
parish system and voluntary organisations also carried much political weight and validated 
the Church‟s position. Speaking at the Lord‟s debate in the aftermath of the Brixton riots 
for example, Archbishop Runcie declared the right of the Church, as „vital agents‟ in the 
community, to speak on behalf of the residents of Brixton. According to Runcie, the clergy, 
unlike policemen, social workers and other public servants, actually lived in the community 
they served and were therefore „close to their fellow citizens in a way few other 
professionals are‟.116 The Primate‟s comments were symptomatic of a renewed faith in the 
local parish as a „vital agency‟ in communities. That the Church‟s parish network gave its 
leadership a unique perspective on social and economic developments was a claim made 
time and time again in the BSR‟s various policy submissions to government departments.117 
Even those who disagreed with the Church‟s political position were willing to concede that 
its presence within communities was „a qualification that no other national body has in 
anything like the same degree‟ and one which should ensure „that the testimony of the 
Church of England is at least seriously listened to‟.118 This proved particularly effective in 
the House of Lords where the Anglican bishops, as the only representatives in the second 
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chamber with an active constituency, drew upon the stories and experiences of their 
parishioners.119 
For David Sheppard, the local operations of the Church‟s ministry were crucial and, 
although this had weakened in spiritual and worshipping terms, the very existence of 
parishes in urban areas remained hugely significant within a political context. „However 
tenuously it may sometimes cling on, the Church has a presence in every community in the 
nation. We‟re there – and we know…..We possess knowledge which is very unpopular with 
some of those……who insist that U.K Limited is prospering,‟ Sheppard boldly proclaimed 
in a lecture in 1989.120  The aim of the parish, Sheppard contended, was to operate as a link 
between disparate groups within society and as a centre of resistance to injustice, apathy 
and despair.121 The Church‟s local and national purpose were thus entwined. Many believed 
that just as the Church‟s leadership could act as a source of unity on a national platform, so 
the parish could operate as a central bridge within communities.  
It was not only the parish system, but also the Church‟s network of voluntary 
associations which lent much credibility and legitimacy to its political voice. The fact that 
during the 1980s many of these organisations worked in partnership with local and central 
government delivering services, meant that Church leaders talked knowingly about 
experiences on the ground, not least the failures of government employment and welfare 
programmes. It was important that the Church‟s social critique was rooted in reality for it 
meant that the clergy spoke from a position of specifics rather than just naïve compassion, 
making it all the more difficult to dismiss.  
All of this was part of a broader reassertion of the territorial rather than a 
congregational understanding of Anglicanism in the 1980s. It was easy to reel out a long-list of 
the historic failures and contemporary flaws of the Church‟s urban ministry, and yet when 
seen in a civic rather than a spiritual light, the Church could legitimately claim (and did) that 
its local clergy were better informed, more intimately connected and less alienated from 
socially disenfranchised communities than the mechanisms of state. One of the reasons why 
Faith in the City proved such an illuminating document, therefore, was the way in which it 
had highlighted the breach between those in power and the powerless in society. 
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The Church‟s emphasis on the importance of the local parish directly fed into the 
then widespread disillusionment with bureaucratic centralism. In the late 1970s, those on 
both sides of the political spectrum had complained that the impersonal and remote 
structures of state were failing to reach those in need and that a renewed emphasis on local-
based service delivery was crucial.122 These concerns were symptomatic of a much deeper 
malaise. The rise of community politics, the campaign for proportional representation and 
the Welsh and Scottish nationalist movements were all manifestations of a much larger 
issue, namely the lack of accountability in Britain‟s democratic and governmental system. 
These debates continued and only intensified in the eighties as the Conservative 
government restricted union practises, reduced the power of local government and 
privatised public services. The Church, along with other non-governmental organisations, 
thus benefited from this culture of suspicion towards central government and associated 
fears regarding accountability and representation. 
This positioning of the Church of England‟s clergy at the heart of the local 
community, well versed in the plight of the marginalised did not go unchallenged however. 
The claim that the parish priest, unlike most public servants, inhabited the place in which 
he ministered was of course technically true, yet as sociologist and theologian Robin Gill 
corrected: „he [the clergyman] doesn‟t live in the council estate but in middle-class 
isolation‟.123 For all its honourable intentions of demonstrating a „bias to the poor‟, the 
Church could not escape criticisms that it was predominantly a middle-class institution in 
both composition and outlook, and that its attitude towards the underprivileged was 
essentially an age-old paternalistic one. The right-wing clergyman Rev. Digby Anderson for 
example, commenting on the earnestness with which David Sheppard spoke about the 
poor, quipped: „apparently the Bishop has his feet on the ground but in truth he is 
airborne.‟124 If Anderson was accusing Sheppard of being a tad naïve, then he was also 
striking at the heart of the Church‟s own insecurities, one which had plagued it since the 
nineteenth century; namely its failure to establish a strong presence amongst the urbanised 
working class and the limitations that came from being the established Church, part of the 
ruling elite.   
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Some Anglicans believed that it was precisely this „Establishment‟ link and mindset 
which prevented the Anglican hierarchy from embracing a more radicalised model of 
Christian action. There was definite truth in these claims. And yet paradoxically, the 
Church‟s class bias, its association with the corridors of power and its non-radical 
credentials both guaranteed and undermined its credibility as a voice for the underprivileged 
in society.  Calls for the Church to address its own institutional failures persisted 
throughout the decade however, with many accusing the Church bureaucracy of reflecting 
and perpetuating the very inequalities it was seeking to abolish.125 This criticism had 
particular validity in respect to the issue of race, for although Church leaders had played a 
key role in denouncing the government‟s restrictive British Nationality Act of 1981, the 
Church‟s own record on racial integration at both a central and parochial level was 
decidedly less flattering.126 Black Anglicans, despite being one of the most active Christian 
constituencies in Britain, were a marginalised group within the Church. This sense of 
alienation from Anglicanism had led many to set up their own independent black-led 
churches.127 The Faith in the City commission had sought to address this problem by 
proposing that a Commission for Black Anglican Concerns be established. This proposal 
was defeated in the Synod, which led to accusations that there was an underlying 
institutional racism within the Church that seriously needed to be tackled.128  
Equally embarrassing was the Church‟s record on housing.  As the third largest 
landowner in the country, with an extensive portfolio in many of England‟s city centres, 
Church leaders spoke from a platform of experience when it criticised the Thatcher 
government‟s cuts in the social housing budget. The Church, however, soon found that its 
own conduct as property owners was subject to scrutiny. One Conservative MP denounced 
the ecclesiastical landlords as „worse than Rachman‟ when it was revealed that a Church-
owned housing corporation in Paddington, London, had been sold off to a private investor 
for maximum profit.129 Many of the decisions made by the Church Commissioners on the 
Church‟s behalf often directly contradicted and undermined the Anglican public position 
on both domestic and international affairs. And all too often this hypocrisy was publicly 
exposed. „Truthfully, I find it rather embarrassing‟ stated one priest in a letter to David 
Sheppard in 1990 in response to a recently published article on Church property 
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investments: „is there anything that the Commissioners can do to be part of taking the 
housing crisis seriously – and to be seen to be acting more in light of Faith in the City.‟130 
Frank Field, writing to The Times soon after the publication of Faith in the City, argued that if 
the Church wanted to be taken seriously, it needed to demonstrate its own commitment to 
the inner cities, to „lead by example and not just with words‟.131 The setting up of the 
Church Urban Fund (one of the recommendations in Faith in the City) in which Church 
Commissioners and individual dioceses donated monies towards Church-led urban 
initiatives, was an attempt to address this problem.132 For some however, such actions did 
not go far enough.  
 Far from being preoccupied with its institutional failures and declining worshipping 
numbers, the 1980s is marked by the way in which the Church leadership spoke in 
confident and assured terms of the Church‟s role and responsibilities in a society which they 
deemed to be still shaped by Christian values. As the Archbishop of Canterbury explained 
in a speech in 1984: 
 
 I think the weaknesses of the Church can be exaggerated by those with a 
romantic view of its past, or ignorance of its present life. Diminished in 
numbers and distanced from Westminster, it is still the largest network 
of voluntary associations for social well-being in this country. Time and 
again it is this network, mostly staffed by the laity, that nudges the 
government. Above all, the Church still provides a nationwide meeting 
place for people of otherwise differing opinions to seek and find divine 
inspiration.133 
 
Quite how Anglican leaders were able to position public Anglicanism within an increasingly 
crowded and secularised public realm was a subject which also generated much thought and 
criticism and it is to this issue that this chapter now turns.  
 
V. Articulating Christian values in a secular plural age 
Anglican leaders may have attributed special importance to national Christian values and 
the privileged place of the Church of England in articulating these on the public stage, but 
this was always coupled with an acceptance of the secular and pluralist nature of British 
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society.134  From the 1960s, Anglican leaders had positively embraced multiculturalism and 
had been pro-active in promoting the cause of racial equality (even if the internal Church 
structures may not have been quite so welcoming).135 Both the Anglican leadership and the 
British Council of Churches spoke out against racism and of the need for tolerance on 
every occasion Parliament sought to restrict immigration or when racial tensions boiled 
over in the inner cities.136 In 1964, for example, Archbishop Ramsey was appointed by the 
Labour government to act as chairman of the National Committee for Commonwealth 
Immigrants and, after coming out strongly against the 1968 Immigration Act, Ramsey 
became a target for the National Front. Within the Church, some traditionalist Anglicans 
were suspicious of this positive embracement of multiculturalism, which they viewed as an 
illustration of the Anglican hierarchy‟s predilection for trendy secular leftist ideals.137 In the 
opinion of John Habgood, however, racial tolerance and social diversity were not exclusive 
to either secularism or socialism but values rooted in the Bible and upheld by the Church of 
England in the nineteenth century when it had helped accommodate the Catholic and 
Nonconformists communities.138 Viewing the Victorian assimilation of religious minorities 
as the source of the pluralist tradition in British society was perhaps an „airbrushed‟ version 
of history, yet Habgood was correct in characterising the modern Church of England as an 
institution which did not see other minorities, either racial or religious, as a threat to its 
dominance or its position as the established Church.  
 Just as the Anglican hierarchy welcomed the diversification of British society, so 
they also recognised that one of the by-products of this was an increasingly crowded public 
realm; one in which the Church would have to fight to be heard. In this way, its bishops, 
the BSR and associated Anglican pressure groups, acknowledged that they were one of 
many voices contributing to public discourse and discussion. The Church saw itself as 
offering a distinct Christian-moral perspective, but recognised that this contribution was 
most effective when the Church engaged with the language and specifics of secular politics. 
This outlook however, raised the fundamental issue about the presentation of theology as 
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rational discourse. But as the Bishop of Manchester explained in a letter in 1985 to 
Conservative Anglican MP, John Gummer:  
 
Where the misunderstanding comes I think is that the public imagine 
that when bishops speak, they do not expect to be contradicted and they 
are speaking in a sense ex cathedra in their own view. From my knowledge 
of my colleagues, I do not believe this to be true. I think we regard 
ourselves as taking part in the whole process of public debate, but 
hopefully doing so out of a deep concern for the moral and spiritual 
issues in the light of our own knowledge of Christian faith….To put 
them [bishops] on a pedestal is simply to detach them further from 
ordinary life.139  
 
The prelate‟s letter had been in response to a lecture given by John Gummer in which the 
Conservative minister had argued that spiritual leaders could not offer any enlightened 
insights into the political questions of the day.140 Gummer reasserted that theology was not 
a matter for political dialogue and something open for discussion, but fundamental truths 
which should be proclaimed, not least by the spiritual guardians of the nation‟s faith.141  
This dichotomy on the nature of theology and its fusion with politics would prove to be a 
major bone of contention between liberal Anglicans and the New Right.  
Anglican leaders however did not envision themselves as simply political animals 
engaging in debate, but more specifically providing a focus for unity in an era increasingly 
characterised by fragmentation and conflict. There was little doubt that the crises of the late 
1970s and the social and economic polarities of the early 1980s had precipitated a loss of 
confidence in the collective ethos of the nation. The Church, however, saw itself as taking 
up this mantle by providing the language of consensus and solidarity in an era of national 
confusion. As the Archbishop of York explained:    
 
Social cohesion and national unity depend on invisible struts and beams, 
many of which have a strong moral component. Though built into the 
structure of national life, they cannot be assumed to retain their strength 
without constant reinforcement. And this is one level on which 
churches, and no doubt other bodies as well, have an important 
contribution to make. Unless they make it, the nation could in the end 
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find itself living in a very different kind of house, or even in a row of 
separate bungalows.142  
 
 
In an era when gender, racial, political and social divisions were acute, Habgood was 
promoting the churches as a key social glue; one of the chief „means‟ by which unitary 
„social values‟ could be „generated and transmitted‟. One of the striking features of liberal 
theological discourse in the 1980s was a reassertion of the Church and Christian values as a 
source of national consensus. For Habgood, there were at least four ways in which the 
churches were able to contribute to society and the public realm: firstly, the parishes and 
network of charities should serve as the bedrock of the nation‟s associational culture; 
secondly, the churches must operate as articulators of national principles; thirdly, they 
should encourage the British people‟s continual adherence to Christianity; and finally, as a 
„cement in society‟ in order to help maintain national unity.143 This vision was formalised 
four years later in a pamphlet Changing Britain: Social Diversity and Moral Unity by a 
commission headed by Habgood himself.144 On the „particular vocation‟ of the established 
Church, it affirmed its obligation to „articulate national values‟ and to aim for:  
 
breadth of vision, the ability to handle complexity and to live with 
polarities, moral concern rooted in basic principles rather than detailed 
prescriptions, wide pastoral contacts and commitments, a recognised 
place both in the voluntary sector and as an integral part of national life, 
a sense of responsibility for the whole nation constantly tempered by 
broader international and religious perspectives, a realistic appraisal of 
our human capacity to deceive ourselves and serve our own interests, a 
message of hope in the face of failure, cynicism and despair.145 
 
 
The fact that Habgood‟s analysis had emphasised the contribution of all Christian 
denominations in Britain rather than exclusively the Church of England is an illustration of 
the ecumenical mindset of Anglican clergymen in the 1980s. In truth, a belief in the 
privileged role of the Church of England as the purveyor of values went hand in hand with 
an understanding that the churches were most effective when they operated in unison. 
 The ecumenical movement had come a long way since its birth in the interwar 
years. Relations between Protestant denominations in Britain had been solidified with the 
formation of the British Council of Churches (BCC), while this relationship had also found 
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an international footing with the establishment of the World Council of Churches 
(WCC).146 Anglicans had taken a considerable lead in both organisations and in respect to 
the former, the BCC, had provided most of its funds. Some Anglican traditionalists became 
distinctly wary of the ecumenical movement, particularly its increasingly political 
involvement. The WCC‟s Programme to Combat Racism established in 1968, garnered 
much criticism, especially when it was disclosed that it supported organisations involved in 
direct political action. Whilst the Catholic Church was not a member of BCC, relations 
between Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism also prospered in this period. The 1970s saw 
the setting up of the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC). This 
was a decade-long project designed to establish areas of common ground and to bring the 
two churches closer together in worship and doctrine.147 Ecumenical initiatives were not 
confined to central organisations but extended (and in many ways proved more fruitful) in 
the local context, with the uniting of charitable and welfare activities, the sharing of church 
buildings, and in some cases, joint worship. The involvement of leading figures from 
Britain‟s Christian churches at national religious services had become the norm by the 
1980s.  The participation of the General Secretary of the World Council of Churches and 
the Roman Catholic Cardinal at the enthronement ceremony for Archbishop Runcie in 
1980 was testimony to the strength of ecumenicalism and the acceptance that all Christian 
denominations, especially the Roman Catholic Church, were an important facet of British 
religious life.   
The eminent sociologist Bryan Wilson has argued that the forging of closer relations 
between denominations reflected a desire for consolidation and Christian unity against 
encroaching secularism.148 This is no doubt true, yet it also represented the dissipation of 
age-old tensions and a genuine willingness to work and worship together.149 The generation 
of Anglican clergy who were at the helm in the 1980s, had spent their formative years 
working within an ecumenical environment and this had instilled a broadly Christian rather 
than narrow denominational outlook.150 Not all Anglicans shared this enthusiasm for 
greater ecumenical links.151 As the Church of England formed ever-close relationships with 
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both its Nonconformist and Catholic partners, this prompted a backlash from both hard-
line evangelicals and high-Anglicans. While the former were convinced that closer unity 
with Roman Catholicism threatened the Church of England‟s Protestant foundations, high-
Anglicans, on the other hand, feared that any fixed settlement between the Protestant 
denominations undermined the Anglican‟s links with Rome. In 1982, for example, the 
proposed Covenant between Anglicanism and the Free Churches was defeated in the Synod 
in a concerted effort by a group of disgruntled anglo-catholics.152 All of this meant that 
ecumenicalism was more often than not a cause of division rather than unity within the 
Anglican ranks.  
Relations between denominations may have been the cause of friction within 
Anglicanism, yet in many respects, ecumenicalism enhanced rather than undermined the 
public position of the Church of England. The break-up of traditional religio-political 
allegiances in the interwar period and the subsequent advances made in the postwar years 
enabled the Church of England, in the words of historian S.J.D. Green, to enjoy „a spiritual 
superiority over all other churches, and a confident sense of its growing political, social and 
even intellectual claim to a place in the mainstream of national life‟.153 Green contends that 
this remained the case even after the upheavals of the 1960s, whereby the Church of 
England emerged as the spokesperson and figurehead for Christianity in British public 
life.154 This was certainly how it was treated by the media and even in Westminster, where 
the Lords Spiritual were considered as representatives of Christianity and not simply the 
Church of England. This was reinforced by the fact that the bishops would often state that 
their position was the „Christian‟ rather than specifically „Anglican‟ perspective on an 
issue.155 The demise of Nonconformity, the strength of cooperation between churches as 
well as the declining influence of all institutional Christianity, meant that the Church of 
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England was inter par pares in respect to other main Christian denominations and could 
confidently claim to be the spiritual focus for the nation.156            
    
      * 
 
Breaking free from the culture of introspection of the 1970s emerged a Church which was 
more outward looking, politicised and confident in the contribution it could make to public 
debate, yet also wary that its place within a secular pluralised public realm needed to be 
negotiated rather than simply assumed.  Accompanying this was a tendency to see itself, 
quite justifiably, as the public representatives of the latent Christianity amongst the 
populace. The understanding of the established Church as the articulator of nominal 
Christianity and as a force within the local community was a vision, however, that could 
have only emerged out of the crisis in socio-democratic consensus of the seventies and the 
political polarities of the 1980s. How the Church responded to this situation and 
specificities of the Church‟s political position is the subject to which this thesis now turns
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CHAPTER THREE  
  Statements of Faith: The Christian response to Thatcherism  
 
„If we truly believe that we are all members of one Body then we have a responsibility to show that we are     
                        prepared to share our personal wealth.‟ Faith in the City, 1985.1 
 
 „If the incarnation were to take place today Jesus would exercise his ministry in places like Netherley      
                  and Toxteth.‟ David Sheppard, Liverpool Diocesan Synod, 1987.2  
 
 „in the midst of extreme affluence and plenty it is more than a political disgrace; it is a confessional     
                       matter going to the heart of what we believe about God and his purposes.‟  
       Church Action on Poverty statement, Winchester Diocesan Newsletter, 1989.3 
 
  
No publication or event in the 1980s better reflects the Church‟s social witness than the 
1985 Faith in the City report into urban poverty.  Political surveys and Church histories 
chronicling this decade routinely point to it as the defining moment in the Church‟s 
prophetic ministry.4 As this chapter will reveal, Faith in the City was not an isolated episode, 
but was simply one aspect of a much broader Anglican engagement with the economic and 
social agenda of the 1980s.  Here, Faith in the City will be viewed alongside publications 
from the BSR, speeches and sermons by the bishops, writings by theologians and Christian 
commentators and debates in the Synod in an effort to ascertain the Anglican position on 
four key themes: poverty, welfare, industrial relations and wealth creation. The picture that 
emerges is of a response which was firmly rooted in the Anglican liberal tradition and the 
Church‟s historic connection with the postwar settlement, but also one which grew out of 
an intellectual engagement with contemporary sociological literature, models of political 
theology and perhaps most important of all, the specific political culture of Thatcherism. It 
was a position where the pastoral was connected to the prophetic, whereby the work and 
activities of the local parish and Christian charities were integral in shaping the Church‟s 
social witness.  In some cases, it involved direct political negotiation (like during the miners‟ 
strike), in others it concerned the promotion of specific policies (in respect to social security 
and taxation) but, more often than not, it involved the language of generalities, namely 
Christian values, which the Church believed should direct political choices. Underlying this 
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was a cohesive understanding of society, which linked the poor with the affluent, the priest 
with his community and the established Church with the nation.  
The majority of the Church‟s energy and efforts were directed at countering the 
ethos and policies of Thatcherism.5 Scholars have since questioned whether Thatcherism 
was a coherent ideological project, rightly pointing to the way in which the government 
could be philosophically inconsistent and overwhelmingly pragmatic. Yet for the Church, 
the tendency was to see the government as pursuing a coherent vision which represented a 
complete break with the postwar years of consensual politics. Much of the exchange was 
therefore framed around the specifics of Thatcherism, yet the Church‟s social critique was 
also in response to broader fears, including the loss of national confidence in the wake of 
decolonisation and de-industrialisation, increasing diversity and individualism, and the crisis 
in social democracy; concerns that Mrs Thatcher capitalised on rather than created. 
Anglican emphasis also changed with the times. In the first half of the decade Church 
leaders focused on the problems of poverty and unemployment and the related issues of 
industrial strife and public sector reform. As the „Thatcher Boom‟ began to take hold in the 
latter part of the decade, so Anglicans shifted their attention to critiquing materialism and 
the widening gap between the rich and the poor. Taking a thematic approach and broken 
down into four sub-headings, this chapter will seek to sketch out not only the precise 
contribution of the Church but also the political, theological and sociological origins of this 
stance.  
 
I. Poverty in Thatcher’s Britain 
The series of political and economic crises that had afflicted Britain from the late 1970s 
triggered what could be termed a „state of the nation debate‟, whereby politicians, academics 
and commentators were all engaged in a discussion about which direction the country 
should take. Even in the early 1980s, it was not evident that the politically vulnerable Mrs 
Thatcher had all the answers, only that there were grievous questions to be faced. As the 
social ramifications of widespread unemployment and economic recession were laid bare 
through rising dole queues, inner city rioting and strikes, the issue of urban poverty became 
a particular concern for the political elite. The publication of Peter Townsend‟s Poverty in the 
UK in 1979 and the Black report on Inequalities in Health in 1980, as well as TV 
documentaries such as Breadline Britain, all pointed to the widespread social deprivation in a 
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nation undergoing harsh economic change.6 These concerns were only to intensify as the 
Conservative government pursued its policy „of rolling back the state‟ by cutting social 
service budgets and refusing to bail out failing industries to protect jobs. By the early 
eighties unemployment stood at three million while an estimated 8.6 million were living on 
supplementary benefit, a rise of 60 per cent between 1979-1983.7  
The urban riots of 1981 revealed how easy it was for these tensions to boil over into 
violence especially with the additional grievance of police harassment galvanising Britain‟s 
Afro-Caribbean community. The spring and summer of that year witnessed the most 
serious rioting in mainland UK in the twentieth century. The Brixton riots in April were 
followed in July with major disturbances in Liverpool, Bristol and Manchester. And on the 
10th of that month, known as „Britain‟s night of anarchy‟, violence had spread to Southall, 
Birmingham, Preston, Wolverhampton, Hull, Ellesmere Port, Reading and Chester. The 
newspapers were awash with images of blazing fires, aggressive youths lobbing petrol 
bombs and injured defenceless policemen, as the government publicly dismissed the 
insurgents as a collection of hooligans, looters and Marxist agitators.8 Nonetheless, the 
Home Secretary Willie Whitelaw, convinced that the specific issue of police-community 
relations in Brixton needed to be addressed appointed a commission, headed by Lord 
Scarman to look into the issue. The Labour party had called for the remit of the report to 
be broadened, but in the end its focus was confined to police conduct and only lightly 
touched on the underlying tensions such as youth unemployment, which in areas such as 
Brixton was estimated to be over 60 per cent.9  
From the windows of Lambeth Palace the Archbishop of Canterbury could see the 
fires of Brixton raging and nowhere did the discussions about the urban disturbances 
assume more importance than in the Church of England. At a local level, priests attempted 
to act as reconcilers to ease tensions; the Anglican parish of St Matthew‟s Brixton and the 
local Council of Churches for example, played a pivotal role in restoring trust within the 
community between the Afro-Caribbean population and police.10 In Liverpool, David 
Sheppard, and Catholic Archbishop Derek Worlock, demonstrated their commitment in 
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practical terms (establishing a Law Centre in Toxteth) and also in prophetic terms, by 
dispelling the characterisation of the rioters as trouble-makers and asserting the legitimacy 
of the revolt as a response by those bearing the brunt of de-industrialisation.11 Writing in 
the aftermath of the riots, Worlock considered he was „almost the only non-political voice 
which can be raised at the moment and people appear to be listening.‟12 The newly 
appointed government „Minister for Merseyside‟, Michael Heseltine sought to draw on the 
knowledge and expertise of the churches in Liverpool, meeting with the two leaders on 
several occasions. After one such gathering, Heseltine wrote a letter of thanks to Worlock:  
 
The meeting that I had with you and the other church leaders was one 
which I found extremely valuable because the views expressed were 
among the most disinterested which I heard, while being based on well 
founded information and a clear view of the problems and the needs of 
the area.13 
 
Heseltine‟s sentiments were genuine as fruitful relations between the government‟s 
Merseyside Task Force and the two spiritual leaders of the City would subsequently prove.14   
The sense of social crisis felt in the aftermath of the riots however prompted the 
Church of England hierarchy to ponder whether it could or should be doing more in the 
inner cities. This topic became even more pressing when CA Director Rev. Eric James 
wrote a letter to The Times highly critical of the Church which he deemed was in danger of 
retreating to suburbia and abandoning its responsibilities in the inner cities where it was 
needed most.15 It was under these circumstances then that the Archbishop of Canterbury 
agreed to set up the Faith in the City commission. Made up of both lay and ecclesiastical 
figures, appointees included a head teacher, a trade union representative, the deputy leader 
of Sheffield City Council, professors of Sociology and Industrial Economics and two urban 
bishops.16 Anglican lay-member Richard O‟Brien, who had recently been sacked as head of 
the MSC by Norman Tebbit, was appointed its chairman.17 Following in the footsteps of 
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Rowntree and Booth, the commission went „slumming‟, staying in over thirty towns and 
cities across England, holding public meetings and listening to clergy, community leaders 
and residents of the inner cities.18 The purpose of this, as the commissioners explained, was 
„to see for ourselves the human reality behind the official statistics.‟19 This „reality‟ was 
vividly set out in the final document, which described „the shabby streets, neglected houses, 
sordid demolition sites of the inner city…..obscured by the busy shopping precincts of 
mass consumption.‟20  
While it was admitted that the decline of Britain‟s cities had long-term origins, the 
commission held back from fundamentally questioning the philosophy behind the large-
scale public spending of the postwar years, and instead focused on the ethos and policies of 
the Thatcher administration. The incumbent government‟s emphasis on the market, its 
commitment to low taxation, cuts in welfare and housing, as well as its decision to prioritise 
inflation over jobs were all subjected to moral scrutiny. The dominant picture painted in the 
report was of a „two nations‟ Britain, whereby social and economic changes had 
disproportionately hit the poor whose fate was being compounded by the Conservative 
government‟s supposed blind ideological investment in the free-market. The report 
concluded by offering twenty-three recommendations to the government including a 
revision of the taxation and social security system, job creation schemes and increased 
funding for local councils and central urban programmes. The commission also presented 
an honest and somewhat unflattering account of the Church‟s urban ministry and put 
forward thirty-eight suggestions for its improvement, including the establishment of a 
Church Urban Fund to target resources to deprived parishes, a Commission for Black 
Anglican Concerns and greater assistance and training for urban clergy and its non-
stipendiary support.21 This critique of the Church‟s own state of affairs was important, for 
in the words of BSR Chairman John Gladwin, it avoided the impression that the 
commission was „throwing choice bricks at government from behind its well-defended walls 
of piety.‟22  
Writing in 1987, Labour MP Frank Field judged Faith in the City to be a „first-class 
piece of work‟ but one which „could have been produced by any group of well-intentioned 
individuals‟. „What should have made it special‟, he opined, „was its theology…..The report, 
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for example, begins, not with an appropriate scriptural reference, but with a reference to a 
Government white paper.‟23 Field was not the only one to question the coherence, 
motivation and logic of the Church‟s political theology during these years. Some felt it 
lacked doctrinal cogency, while others suspected that it was politically rather than divinely 
inspired.24 Church leaders persistently claimed that their position was rooted in a „theology 
of the poor‟, yet to what extent was this true and is it possible to detect any other influences 
at play?   
The Faith in the City document owed a great deal to a sociological understanding of 
relative poverty. This was a theory that social deprivation should not be measured in 
„absolute‟ terms such as nutrition or income, but in relative terms, of what was deemed 
acceptable living standards in a particular society.25 This approach was explicitly adopted in 
the Faith in the City report, as the commission made clear: „Poverty is not only about 
shortage of money. It is about rights and relationships; about how people are treated and 
how they regard themselves; about powerlessness, exclusion and loss of dignity‟.26 Given 
that sociologists A.H. Hasley and Ray Pahl were members of the Faith in the City 
commission it is perhaps not surprising that the document displayed such influences. This, 
however, was just one example of the deployment of sociological theories of poverty, 
citizenship and power in Anglican literature. The appropriation of these ideas by 
theologians and clergymen generated much criticism from those in conservative quarters 
who deemed it as a further indication of the increasing secularisation of Christian thought.27 
In truth, clergymen drew on this literature in order to expand and contemporise historic 
notions of Christian compassion and social concern. Moreover, the cross fertilisation 
between theology and sociology was not a recent phenomenon, its roots dated back to the 
first half of the twentieth century and was embodied in the figure of R.H. Tawney who was 
hugely influential in shaping both disciplines. Peter Townsend acknowledged as much in a 
speech in 1985, when he praised the Church for adopting a „socially orientated meaning of 
poverty‟, which was entirely appropriate given that the sociological values of „equality of 
treatment and equality of respect‟ had emanated from Christian principles.28 
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This harnessing of a relative theory of poverty to Christian notions of fellowship 
reflected a desire to move beyond traditional concepts of paternalism and charity.  For as 
the Rev. John Atherton, author of The Scandal of Poverty recognised, a theology of the poor 
must concern the rights of citizenship and not just a Christian compassion for the hungry 
or needy.29 The shift to an interrelated concept of poverty meant locating the fate of the 
underprivileged in the context of the affluent, or in the words of Atherton, understanding 
why „Etons and Harley Streets will always mean Liverpool 8s and Grunwicks‟.30  
This was especially salient at a time when images of „absolute‟ and „relative‟ poverty 
were juxtaposed in the public consciousness with unemployment and social deprivation at 
home and famine in the developing world. As the commission explained:  
 
Poor people in Britain are not of course as poor as those in the Third 
World. But their poverty is real enough nonetheless. For poverty is a 
relative, as well as an absolute, concept. It exists, even in a relatively rich 
Western society, if people are denied access to what is generally regarded 
as a reasonable standard and quality of life.31 
 
Given that the Thatcher government tended to cite the example of „real‟ poverty in the 
developing world as evidence that poverty no longer existed in Britain, the distinction in 
Faith in the City was therefore an important one.32 It was especially resonant within a 
Christian context, for as Church Times journalist Patrick Duggan pointed out, Faith in the City 
would prove a wake-up call for the Christian community which, in more recent times, had 
unduly directed its Christian concerns abroad: „It is ironic‟, he stated, „that Christians and 
non-Christians who have given generous support to charitable and religious organisations 
like Oxfam and Christian Aid, have remained oblivious to the impoverishment of whole 
communities barely a few miles away from their own homes.‟33 Faith in the City therefore 
succeeded in presenting relative poverty in Britain as a pressing moral challenge that 
demanded attention from both the government and the public. 
 Many traditionalist Anglicans however, deemed the Faith in the City report as a 
testament to the infiltration of radical Marxist theology in the Church. It was no accident 
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that an unnamed cabinet minister had labelled the document as „pure Marxist theology‟ 
when it was published.34 This was an act of political scaremongering designed to fuel 
Anglican fears about the radicalisation of their Church rather than an accurate description 
of its theology.35 In truth, neither Faith in the City, nor much else that emerged from the 
Church during this period, demonstrated any significant debt to liberation theology. 
Certainly there were some radical clergy, such as those who belonged to the Christian 
Organisations for Social, Political and Economic Change (COSPEC) network, who 
believed that this strand of theology offered both the Church and the proletariat salvation 
from secular oppression, yet COSPEC remained very much a fringe element.36 Mainstream 
Anglicanism did however appropriate some of the language and emphasis of liberation 
theology. The term „bias to the poor‟ was widely used for example, yet this was because it 
was a convenient tag line, which summed up the Church‟s renewed focus, rather than a 
reflection of a deep-rooted investment in the principles of liberation theology. David 
Sheppard was one such bishop who drew upon this language, even naming one of his 
books Bias to the Poor. As he explained, the phrase neatly articulated the challenge that 
poverty posed to the Church and dismissed outright its Marxist implications.37 The 
prevailing view amongst the Anglican elite was that liberation theology was uniquely tied to 
the particular circumstances and politics of South America, and of limited validity to the 
situation in Britain. As Rev. Anthony Harvey, theological consultant on the Faith in the City 
report later surmised, liberation theology acted as „an illustration rather than a motivation‟ 
for social Anglicanism in the 1980s.38 
Much more prevalent was an emphasis on the non-partisan discourse of community 
and citizenship and a reaffirmation of „one-nation‟ bound in Christian unity and fellowship. 
Theoretical notions of equality and social justice therefore were always justified in terms of 
being of universal benefit for the commonwealth of the nation. Addressing the Synod in 
1984 during a debate on the morality of economics, the Archbishop of York, for example, 
believed that the „real moral heart of just distribution‟ and „equality‟ concerned the 
„common good‟; a Christian notion of citizenship which called upon all to „contribute rather 
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than participate in society‟.39 This sentiment was echoed in the same debate by the Bishop 
of Lincoln who argued that the Church had a duty to highlight the plight of those „alienated 
from confidence in the common weal‟.40 This was a discourse, which traced its lineage back 
to Temple and specifically positioned the wellbeing of the poor as central to national 
harmony and stressed the interrelationship between classes rather than the Marxist notion 
of the isolated proletariat.41  
It has already been noted that one of the key aims of Christian social thought in the 
1980s was to abandon a paternalistic and moralistic mould of Christian charity and to adopt 
a more robust notion of Christian social concern based on the values of equality and social 
justice. This was a plea made time and time again by theologians, activists and Synod 
members such as the Dean of Bristol who in 1984 spoke on behalf of many of his fellow 
Anglicans when he affirmed: „What is needed of us I believe, both as a Church and as 
Christian individuals, is a real solidarity with the poor that goes beyond general benevolence 
or even sacrificial giving. We need a kind of Christian style of life which recognises the 
structural relationship between our affluence and their poverty.‟42 This reflected an age-old 
fear about the patronising nature of Christian charity, but also a genuine desire for the 
Church to renew its social purpose and theology at a time when the poor were being 
increasingly marginalised in Thatcher‟s Britain. This ambition – to break free from 
paternalistic discourses of poverty – proved decidedly difficult to achieve however.  In Faith 
in the City, for example, the „poor‟ operated as the subject of the discussion rather than the 
target audience:  
 
by any standards theirs is a wretched condition which none of us would 
wish to tolerate for ourselves or to see inflicted on others. ….They are 
trapped in housing and in environments over which they have little 
control. They lack the means and opportunity – which so many of us 
take for granted.43  
 
Here the distinction between „us‟, (the affluent) and „them‟, underlies how the poor were 
not seen as actors in their own emancipation and that the possibilities for change lay firmly 
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in the hands of affluent Britain.44 This outlook was also evident in the remarks by Prof. 
John Pickering, member of the commission, during the Synod debate on the report: „it is in 
our hands, our hands as managers, as union members, as educators, as members of 
voluntary associations, indeed as ordinary citizens‟ to influence the political direction of 
debate.45 It was not evident therefore that the Church had successfully established a 
theology which demonstrated a „solidarity with the poor‟ and it was thus easy to dismiss 
Faith in the City, as many did, as yet another exercise in the long history of „elite 
spectatorship‟.46 
It must be understood however, that the main purpose in all this was to counter 
New Right‟s conceptualisation of poverty and dependency culture. During the 1970s, those 
on the Right, influenced by social theorists in America, had begun to argue that state 
support indirectly fostered a cyclical and debilitating form of poverty, which exacerbated 
rather than relieved the problem.47 These ideas became mainstream with the election of the 
Thatcher government where traditional Tory-paternalism was replaced with a belief that a 
reinvigoration of self-responsibility rather than extension of welfare was the best means of 
achieving social mobility. The Church saw its central task as challenging Thatcherite 
individualism by reinforcing the collective Christian obligation of society.  Thus Anglican 
leaders could be seen publicly countering the government‟s denigration of strikers, welfare 
claimants and rioters by presenting them as citizens with legitimate grievances.  In this way, 
the Church did act as an important mouthpiece for the underprivileged and voiceless in 
society, even if this operated on a representative rather than empowering level.  As Paul 
Skirrow admitted during the proceedings of the national CAP conference in 1987: „The 
Church will never be the voice of the poor; but with its continual influence and access to 
power…. can still be a voice for the poor, speaking to the nation‟s conscience.‟48 Faith in the 
City succeeded in doing just this, for unlike the Scarman Report, it uncovered the 
widespread social deprivation that prevailed in urban areas with high unemployment. While 
its empirical observations were important, what made it stand out was the way in which it 
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presented this situation as a moral challenge to the Thatcherite orthodoxy. Much of the 
source and strength of the Church, therefore, came from the spiritual thrust behind its 
position. Thatcherism was not simply denounced as unworkable or wrong, but morally 
reprehensible and unchristian.  As the CAP newsletter stated in 1989: „Christianity…...is 
about the gift, and fact, and promise of community. It would be difficult to find an ethos 
more antithetical to Christianity than that encapsulated in the PM‟s notorious observation: 
“there‟s no such thing as society.”‟49  
 
II. The Welfare State 
If poverty was the central issue that galvanised Anglican bishops, commentators and 
Christian activists groups then it was the politics of state welfarism around which their 
outlook was framed.50  One of the defining characteristics of neo-Conservatism was an 
ideological objection to a large bureaucratic welfare state, which those on the right argued 
overburdened the nation‟s economy and the individual taxpayer, and created a cycle of 
poverty rather than solving it. As the free market economist Ralph Harris forcefully argued 
in 1971, the welfare state was „anything but a gift horse. Rather it is a lame nag harnessed to 
an outdated bandwagon……the sovereign people should pull hard on the reins, ask for 
their money back and get off the overcrowded monstrosity.‟51 Public spending actually 
increased under Mrs Thatcher, yet this does not take away from the fact that these years 
signalled an important ideological shift in understanding about the values and policies that 
should guide Britain‟s welfare system.52  
As has already been noted, the 1970s disillusionment with the welfare state was not 
confined to those on the right, for many on the left (albeit for different reasons) had also 
become increasingly sceptical of the state‟s ability to alleviate social inequalities.  Anglican 
churchmen in the 1970s had shared this disenchantment with bureaucratic centralism, 
advocating a mixed economy of welfare whereby the voluntary, private and state sectors 
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would all act as suppliers of support.53  Yet in the eighties, in the face of the Thatcherite 
onslaught on welfarist values and the imposition of widespread cuts on public services, the 
Church of England emerged as one of the leading defendants of statutory aid.  
In 1982 the Social Policy Committee held a residential meeting in an effort to 
coordinate the Anglican response to the growing crisis in welfare.54 Setting up a working 
party, it sought contributions from voluntary organisations, clergy, dioceses and laity on the 
subject.55 The conflicting response this consultation generated serves as a useful reminder 
of the shear breadth of opinions within the Church of England. Most Anglicans were of the 
view that the welfare state was an embodiment of Christian values, yet there was noticeably 
less faith in its bureaucratic reality. Some argued that it had bred a culture of entitlement 
rather than independence; others highlighted that the welfare state had eroded the bedrock 
of a Christian society, the family; whilst some pointed to the way that centralisation had 
destroyed community and the voluntary impulse in society. There was a consensus that the 
Church should take a lead in marshalling a public defence of welfarism, but there was little 
agreement as to how this should be undertaken. Some proposed that the Church needed to 
speak in terms of specifics rather than generalities, while others warned of the dangers of 
such an approach.56 
The working party collated its findings in a 1986 publication entitled Not just for the 
Poor: Christian Perspectives on the Welfare State reinforcing a belief in the „vision, if not the 
detail, of the postwar settlement‟ which, it argued, stemmed from a core Christian ideal: 
„Our Christian understanding is that, not just within the Christian community but within 
society as a whole, “we are members of one another.”‟57 The report also made pointed 
remarks about the unchristian nature of the government‟s „individualist philosophy‟ which 
had exacerbated divisions within society and created „a socially disenfranchised sub-class‟ of 
benefit claimants.58 The following February, the Synod debated the report, passing a 
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resolution affirming that the state should continue to act as the primary provider of welfare 
services.59 
Not just for the Poor was more than just a tepid endorsement of the welfare state it 
was a Christian vindication of Beveridge‟s original vision. This assertion of the Christian 
principles underlying statutory welfare became the standard Anglican response to Mrs 
Thatcher‟s welfare policies, be they cuts in expenditure or the introduction of market 
principles into state services. The Bishop of Durham, speaking in 1989 in response to the 
government‟s plans for the NHS, articulated this position most forcefully when he 
proclaimed: „much has gone wrong, but were the undertaking and intentions in themselves 
wrong? Was the message false, the message, that is, that we as citizens acknowledge together 
some responsibility for one another?‟60  The Bishop christened the NHS, along with state 
education, social security benefits and pensions, as „practical sacraments‟, representative, he 
stated, „of the sort of society we desire to be‟.61 Some went even further, such as the Rev. 
Eric Saxon, who in an article in Crucible, described health and social workers as „the other 
laity‟, who in his opinion were performing the Church‟s mission as much as those working 
within the internal ecclesiastical structures or charities.62  
Time and time again, Anglican leaders, clergy and activists emphasised the fact that 
a welfare system, to which all citizens contributed and benefited from, was an expression of 
national unity and Christian intent in British society. In the BSR‟s response to the proposed 
1985 Social Security Bill, for example, it condemned the proposed replacement of the 
existing grants system with a social fund (credit which claimants would eventually have to 
pay back), arguing that the new regulations would destroy the historic connection between 
citizenship and welfare rights and would effectively transform the state into a loans 
company.63 As the BSR made clear, the scheme corrupted the principle of social citizenship 
and re-established Victorian notions of „deserving‟ and „undeserving‟ poor, which the 
welfare state was supposed to have removed. Churchmen also condemned the Conservative 
government‟s commitment to lower taxation and the encouragement of „opting out‟ from 
state to private services, deeming both as a threat to the contributory and universal basis of 
citizenship. A reduced state and a reliance on individual responsibility, was both a 
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philosophy and praxis, which left the poor exposed and encouraged a selfish attitude 
amongst the affluent middle-classes. During a summer meeting of the SPC in 1988, for 
example, in the wake of the government‟s plans to introduce an „internal market‟ within 
public services, it was agreed that the Church needed to uphold the principles of 
„entitlement to benefit by virtue of citizenship‟ and refute the government‟s portrayal of 
social security „as taking from others‟.64 The Church, therefore, along with their allies in the 
poverty lobby, explicated an alternative model of citizenship than that promulgated by the 
Thatcher government. This was one which refuted the characterisation of welfare 
dependents as scroungers living off the hard-working tax-payers (an idea that Thatcherites 
and the right-wing press vigorously advanced) and centred on reminding affluent Britons 
that they profited in equal measure from state support through levy-breaks and benefits 
such as the mortgage tax relief (a point which was rarely acknowledged by the press and 
government).65 As we shall see in the following chapter, one of the main aims of the 
Church‟s mission was to reinvigorate the altruistic and moral will of the middle classes, out 
of a genuine fear that they had been seduced by the Thatcherite ethos of individualism and 
this perception of taxation and welfare dependency. At the hub of all of this, however, was 
an understanding that government policies and the impact on the citizenry threatened to 
completely undermine the altruistic and therefore Christian basis of Britain‟s social 
democracy. 
The Anglican defence of the welfare state in the 1980s can be largely explained by 
the Church‟s historic involvement in its formation. This was not simply a distant legacy, but 
a deep personal and spiritual attachment for those clergy who assumed the leadership of the 
Church in the 1980s and had developed their faith and political outlook during the 1940s. 
The Bishop of Durham, David Jenkins for example, has cited the moment when he heard 
William Temple speak at the Royal Albert Hall as one of the defining moments of his 
ministry.66 This was also a point made by Eric Saxon in his 1986 article in the Crucible: 
„clergy of my generation, who remember the 1930s and the efforts of local churches in 
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those days of high unemployment and little public welfare, saw in the Beveridge Report the 
answer to our prayers.‟67  
This influence is palpable if one surveys the Anglican literature from the 1980s, for 
the language and ideas of Temple, Beveridge and their contemporaries completely dominate 
Anglican sermons, speeches and reports.68 Tellingly, neither the other Christian 
denominations nor the secular lobby groups demonstrated such an ideological or 
theological commitment to the postwar settlement.69 This world of corporatism, full 
employment, the NHS and the welfare state was not only a political environment in which 
the Anglican leaders felt comfortable, but also one which their forebears had helped create. 
In defending the welfare state against the New Right, the Church was therefore defending 
its own historical legacy. When confronted with a Prime Minister who questioned these 
policies and the principles behind it, the Church of England rallied to its defence and 
assumed an almost evangelical impulse in an effort to keep these values alive.  
Given this ideological investment in the welfare state, Anglicans took a rather 
sceptical view of Mrs Thatcher‟s vigorous promotion of the voluntary sector, charity and 
philanthropy. For the Prime Minister, the non-profit sector and associational culture 
exemplified precisely those values of self-help and enterprise that she held so dear. As she 
enthused in a lecture to the Women‟s Royal Voluntary Service in 1981: „I believe that the 
volunteer movement is at the heart of all our social welfare provision. That the statutory 
services are the supportive ones underpinning where necessary, filling the gaps and helping 
the helpers.‟70 Statements such as these received a lukewarm reaction from Church leaders 
who felt compelled to remind both the public and the government of the moral and 
financial limitations of the voluntary sector. In the same year as Mrs Thatcher‟s address to 
the WRVS, the Bishop of Liverpool, for example, speaking in the Lords argued that it was a 
political fantasy to assume that voluntary organisations could substitute public services. 
Sheppard proposed that a belief in the state as the main provider of welfare reflected „an 
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important moral principle‟ in the country which superseded any individual or 
communitarian voluntary effort.71 The Bishop also aimed at dispelling Mrs Thatcher‟s 
Victorian and idealised portrayal of philanthropy and voluntarism, by explaining how the 
modern third-sector was now fully professionalized, hired paid personnel and, with a large 
number of local authority contracts going to non-profit organisations, was inextricably tied 
to the public sector.72 Above all, church leaders remained reluctant to endorse the 
government‟s encouragement of charity organisations, especially as they suspected that the 
real motivation was because the third sector were seen as a cheap alternative to state 
investment. In this way, it was the Church, rather than the sector‟s own umbrella body, the 
National Council for Voluntary Organisations, which proved to be the most effective 
spokesperson for the third sector at a time of growing expectation and pressures.  
The Church adopted a somewhat similar position in respect to the Conservative 
government‟s promotion of charitable giving. At the height of the „Thatcher Boom‟ the 
government declared its intention to turn a wealthy nation into a giving nation, confident 
that a payroll-giving scheme and a reduction in income tax would stimulate citizens into 
performing their charitable duty. These policies were met with a resounding chorus of 
disapproval from Church leaders who condemned the Chancellor for incorrectly prioritising 
charitable-giving over an aim of redistribution through taxation. The Bishop of Manchester 
in a substantive letter to the Church Times outlined what he believed to be the correct 
Christian path: „Of course individual charity will always have an important place in society. 
It is not however morally superior to action in the political field which is absolutely vital – 
and often far more effective – if greater justice both within and outside our nation is to be 
achieved.‟ Quoting the slogan of the 1930s hunger marchers – „Damn your charity, we want 
justice‟ – the Bishop concluded:  
 
One of the most powerful Christian arguments for a democratic system 
in which many points of view can be heard is that it gives citizens the 
opportunity of rising above narrow, short term self interest and trying to 
love and care for their neighbours. How Britain as a nation spends it 
national wealth is deeply related to the great imperatives of the Gospel. 
Public provision through taxation in the fields of health, education, 
social services and overseas aid are major means by which a better and 
fairer society can be achieved.73 
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This was a theme taken up by his fellow prelate David Sheppard a year later at a meeting of 
the Liverpool CAP group. According to Sheppard, „charitable giving‟ was „discriminate‟ and 
„dictated by preferences and prejudices‟, whereas taxation was „indiscriminate‟ and a „greater 
example of collective giving‟ and „belonging to one body‟.74 These words were not only 
aimed at the government, but also at the general public, for in an age when marathon 
telethon appeals could generate twenty-four million pounds in twenty-four hours, Anglican 
leaders felt obliged to remind the nation of the relative limitations of charity and of the 
reasoning and moral justification for progressive taxation.75  
With the Prime Minister consciously evoking a Victorian and largely evangelical 
vision of voluntarism and charity, the Church found itself in the rather strange position of 
arguing against it. Church leaders were pushed into reasserting the case (which many 
believed had been fought and won in the mid-twentieth century), that a collectivist state 
was the fairest, most humane and closer to the Christian ideal than the Victorian reliance on 
charitable, entrepreneurial or individual efforts. The Bishop of Durham certainly saw it in 
these historical terms. Delivering a lecture in 1984, Jenkins explained that the political 
debate was essentially a battle between two legacies – although he left the audience in no 
doubt as to which one Christians should endorse:  
 
To give up the central concerns of the welfare state and the Beveridge 
Report because we have run into difficulties is sheer faithlessness and 
inhumanity. To return to the ethics of nineteenth-century entrepreneurial 
individualism is either nostalgic nonsense or else a firm declaration that 
individual selfishness and organised greed are the only motivations for 
human behaviour.‟76  
 
Historian Frank Prochaska has proposed that „the evocation of a voluntary and 
philanthropic ethics drummed up by Margaret Thatcher fell on deaf ears‟ because „such 
sentiments were being voiced in a world that had lost its Christian underpinnings.‟77 But, as 
we have seen, Anglicans promoted the welfare state as a demonstration of Christian 
neighbourliness while at the same denounced Mrs Thatcher‟s rhetoric on Victorian self-help 
and charity as immoral and unchristian. A Christian vision of institutionalised welfare did 
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not of course destroy the religious impulse for voluntarism and charity, but the latter had 
been significantly undermined in the public domain, not because of the decline of 
Christianity, but because statism had been resolutely sanctioned with a Christian outlook.  
             Margaret Thatcher‟s standing and authority owed a great deal to a specific and 
highly politicised reading of modern British history; one that deemed the postwar years as 
an unmitigated disaster and heralded the nineteenth century as the blueprint for an 
illustrious, industrious and virtuous nation.78 The Church of England challenged this 
historical narrative by arguing the very reverse; rejecting claims that Victorian values were 
instinctively righteous and heralding the Biblical basis of the postwar vision of statutory 
welfare and social citizenship. It was this position however, which meant that the Church of 
England leadership became pigeon-holed by the press, government and even some laity as 
„Butskellite men‟ championing a political vision that was outdated and redundant. As 
Jonathan Redden, a lay Synod member and surgeon from Sheffield complained, the Church 
leadership was blindly prejudicial to any reform of the NHS because it viewed the service as 
„an extension of the Kingdom of God, whose constitution is written on tablets of stone‟ in 
a belief „that the 11th commandment is “Thou shalt not change the National Health 
Service.”‟79  As Rev. Digby Anderson had observed, members of the liberal elite (including 
the Church) displayed an almost fanatical faith in welfarism to the extent that they tended 
to reduce the debate about public services into a false dualism between the state and the 
free market.80 Mrs Thatcher‟s third election victory in 1987 seems to have triggered an 
acknowledgement of this within ecclesiastical circles.81 In his last speech in the Synod as 
Primate, Robert Runcie reflected that although the Church had been „saying important 
things‟ in the 1980s, it could be accused of „framing them in the sort of collectivist language 
which has been thought to be discredited in many of the areas where new things are being 
thought. I cannot emphasise and agree with that enough.‟82 Although Anglican attachment 
to postwar collectivism may have provided the inspiration for the Church‟s stance against 
Thatcherism, ultimately it proved stifling. Church leaders were imprisoned by a nostalgic 
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view of politics and found it hard to grapple with the new political consensus that was 
emerging, especially from 1987, as Mrs Thatcher once again succeeded at the polls and the 
Labour party began to embrace the social market economy. 
 
III. Work and Industry  
Discussions about poverty and welfare provision were closely linked to widespread 
concerns about national deindustrialisation and mass unemployment. The Conservative 
government‟s strategy had been to relinquish the postwar commitment to full employment 
and state support for insolvent industries as a way of safeguarding low inflation; a policy 
which it pledged would eventually bring about the necessary stimulation and modernisation 
of the British economy.83 The initial effect of this however was a sharp rise in those out of 
work, particularly in the industrial heartlands of the North and the Midlands.84 On the eve 
of the election of 1983, unemployment stood at over three million and was to remain 
consistently high throughout the decade, reaching a peak of 3.2 million in 1986.85 In the 
context of world recession, the effect of digital technological innovation on manufacturing, 
and changes in work patterns (including the rise of part-time employment and increasing 
numbers of women entering the workplace), this situation seemed to have little hope of 
improving. The image of the picket line which characterised the seventies was soon 
replaced with that of the dole queue in the eighties, with the frustrations of the unemployed 
epitomised in Boys from the Blackstuff  Yosser‟s infamous plea: „gissa a job‟.86 Commentators 
and historians have since questioned how the Conservatives were able to maintain power 
during a period of such extreme unemployment. At the time, Chancellor Lawson had 
confidently asserted that: „economically and politically, Britain can get along with double-
digit unemployment‟.87  Nonetheless, the government did attempt to alleviate the problem 
by investing over £200 million into the MSC, which had a remit to set up local employment 
initiatives, chiefly by channelling funds to the non-profit sector.  
Christian organisations enthusiastically embraced this opportunity forming the 
ecumenical group Church Action with the Unemployed in 1982 to coordinate and 
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encourage parishes and local church councils to apply for MSC monies.88 In 
Wolverhampton for example, a partnership between the diocese of Litchfield and the MSC 
resulted in the establishment of a Youth Training Centre for sixty trainees. Some even acted 
as managing agents for the government‟s Community Programme like the Bristol Churches 
Group which was in charge of a budget of 1.5 million pounds and ran twenty different 
schemes.89 By 1984 over 100 Church-led MSC funded projects had been set up across the 
country, consisting of YTS programmes, Community Programme grants and business 
initiatives, signalling a new era of collaboration between the churches and the state at a local 
level.90 
Aside from practical support, Anglican leaders added their voices to the rising 
chorus of opposition from the media and political parties on the government‟s 
unemployment record.91 Faith in the City was an important document precisely because it set 
out in graphic detail the social effects of widespread unemployment, highlighting the 
particular struggle of the long-term unemployed, ethnic minorities and school leavers. 
Reiterating William Temple‟s statement that unemployment was „the most hideous of our 
social evils‟, the commission painted a dismal picture of unemployed Britain:  
 
We have been confronted time and time again with the deep human 
misery – coupled in some cases with resentment, in others with apathy 
and hopelessness….“Give me back my dignity” was the heartfelt plea 
from one man – made redundant, and with no prospect of a job – at one 
of our public meetings in the North-West…..We wonder whether some 
politicians really understand the despair which has become so 
widespread in many areas of our country.92  
 
 
Challenging Norman Tebbit‟s „get on your bike‟ mantra, the commission argued that the 
decline in industry and employment opportunities meant that it was simply „unrealistic‟ to 
assume that the residents of cities could migrate to find work.93 For the Church, the issue 
of unemployment was not simply a point of policy or economics, but a challenge to faith. 
As the Bishop of Durham elucidated in a lecture in 1985, the social ramifications of 
economic decisions was not an „emotive‟ and a „wet‟ question, but one which was necessary 
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in order to formulate a proper assessment of the „structural deficiency or inefficiency‟ of 
the government‟s agenda.94 In this way, Church leaders positioned themselves as uniquely 
placed to offer moral insights into political decisions.  
Mrs Thatcher and her ministers repeatedly claimed that in order to reverse 
economic decline, a reassertion of Britain‟s industrial spirit was needed in order to rid the 
nation of its culture of „acceptable idleness‟.95 Employment was thus presented as the 
responsibility of the individual rather than either the state, trade unions or society. This was 
a deliberate evocation of a distinctly religious concept: the Protestant work ethic. Originally 
derived from the Calvinist notion of working for salvation and God, it was famously 
analysed by Max Weber as the source of the successful development of early capitalism in 
Protestant countries in post-Reformation Europe.96 In an era of declining industry and 
when the government had abandoned its commitment to full employment, Mrs Thatcher 
drew upon this notion as a way of legitimising her reassertion of entrepreneurial spirit and 
individual responsibility for work. Analysing this discourse, one Christian commentator 
recognised that the work ethic was self-consciously being appropriated by Mrs Thatcher 
and her ministers for political means, for whereas once the doctrine had meant that the 
„individual was personally responsible for his eternal destiny‟, he was now being told that he 
was „responsible for his earthly destiny. Self-help was the name of the game‟.97 The issue of 
the work ethic had been addressed in a pamphlet by the BSR before Mrs Thatcher had 
come to power, in which it argued that in an age of mass unemployment the Protestant 
work ethic was a redundant and divisive model for it imposed an unchristian demarcation 
by upholding work as a righteous pursuit and labelling those out of work as either idle or 
worthless.98 Addressing this theme at the height of the unemployment crisis in 1983, David 
Sheppard went even further by proposing that Britain needed to come to terms with the 
fact that full-employment was no longer a reality and that the onus for this situation should 
not fall on the individual. In his view, a redefinition of the Protestant work ethic was 
necessary, one which framed employment not as a requirement of citizenship but a response 
to it. The problem with the government‟s approach, Sheppard concluded, was that it 
completely subverted this understanding, by viewing people as commodities of the system 
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and incorrectly assuming that individuals were in control of their own means of 
production.99  
These musings on the redefinition of the Protestant work ethic for a post-industrial 
age reflected the widespread fears in the early eighties about the future of employment and 
industry in Britain. Yet it also points to the way in which the Church found itself having to 
engage with Mrs Thatcher on a doctrinal level in refuting the Protestant justification for 
capitalism. As CAP Chairman Peter Naish later complained in 1988: „The present 
government has stolen much of the traditional value of the language of Christianity and is 
using concepts such as “freedom”, “choice” etc. to produce policies, which bring in their 
opposites‟.100 In Naish‟s opinion, the main aim of Christian social prophecy therefore must 
be to counter this false appropriation of the Gospel.101  
If the Conservative government saw high unemployment as an inevitable result of 
an economy in transition, then industrial relations and union practises was an area it 
believed it had a responsibility to regulate in order to aid this modernisation. The reform of 
the trade unions and the abandonment of a corporatist industrial policy was justified in 
order to make the economy more competitive and productive.102 For the Church, the issue 
of unions and industrial politics was a topic that required careful thinking.  The wave of 
strikes which had brought the country to a standstill in the late seventies had, according to 
theologian Duncan Forrester, resulted in the unions squandering „their moral credit‟ 
revealing them to be consumed by militancy and partisan interests at the expense of the 
community and the greater good.103 Broadly in line with this, the BSR in the late seventies 
had produced a number of pamphlets for parishioners which questioned the democracy of 
strikes and advocated the curtailment of union power.104 The Church‟s position dramatically 
sharpened in the eighties however in the context of mass redundancies and the 
Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 which imposed restrictions on the closed shop, strikes, 
secondary picketing and membership. The Church came to increasingly defend the rights of 
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the unions that were now operating in an uncertain economic climate and dealing with a 
government that was clearly hostile to an unionised workforce.105  
 Industrial strikes occurred frequently during Mrs Thatcher‟s first years in power, in 
the steel industry, NHS, civil service and transport sectors, yet it was the miners‟ strike 
(1984-5) in her second term which proved to be the defining moment for industrial 
relations during her premiership.106 With the government fully prepared and determined for 
a full confrontation with the miners, the task of closing economically inefficient pits was 
always going to result in a damaging and protracted conflict. Yet hopes of a speedy 
settlement between the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the National Coal 
Board (NCB) were soon dashed as the battle increasingly focused around the unyielding 
personalities of Arthur Scargill at the NUM, Ian MacGregor at the NCB and Mrs Thatcher. 
The year-long dispute seemed unending, as pits became sites of violence and harassment 
between riot police and picketers, and between strikers and working miners, whilst the local 
communities suffered under the severe financial constraints resulting from the striking 
workforce.  
Under such heated circumstances, the Church of England (along with the other 
Christian churches in Britain) felt compelled to enter into this divisive and damaging 
dispute. This was most prominently and effectively demonstrated at a local level where the 
church‟s network of industrial chaplains, voluntary organisations and local parishes 
orchestrated their efforts into aiding those communities blighted by the strike. Many of the 
support groups and soup kitchens were based in church buildings manned by the laity and 
clergy wives for example, a contribution, which often goes unmentioned in left-wing 
accounts of the episode.107 According to an internal memorandum produced by the BSR 
written at the end of the dispute, this activity had „led to new alliances being forged‟ to the 
extent that „the participation of the church is now welcomed by people and groups who 
hitherto would have had little time for it.‟ It had also had the effect of instilling a sense of 
political consciousness, giving rise to „a new awareness of the indivisibility of the „pastoral‟ 
from the „social/political‟ amongst the clergy.108 This involvement thus gave the Church 
credibility and purpose in areas where historically it had been lacking and allowed the 
Anglican leaders to speak with a degree of legitimacy on behalf of the mining communities.   
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 In the first six months of the strike, however, Church leaders refrained from making 
any public statements on the dispute. This policy of „silence‟ generated criticism from some 
quarters especially as violence erupted between picketers and policemen at pits such as in 
Orgreave in June 1984.109 A sermon by the Bishop of Durham at his enthronement 
ceremony in September however, threw the Church into the centre of the conflict. Speaking 
in his capacity as the spiritual representative of a community blighted by the strike, Jenkins 
offered a vindication of their cause:   
 
They are desperate for their communities and this desperation forces 
them to action. No one concerned in this strike, and we are all 
concerned, must forget for one moment what it is like to be part of a 
community centred on a mine or a works when that mine or works 
closes. It is death, depression and desolation.110 
 
Jenkins attacked the government for its unwillingness to coordinate a compromise between 
the NCB and NUM, believing that Mrs Thatcher‟s labelling of the strikers as the „enemy 
within‟ was evidence that the government was unable to „give hope in the very difficult days 
we are faced with‟.111 Jenkins also called for the resignation of NCB Chairman Ian 
MacGregor, whom he controversially (and incorrectly) denounced as an „elderly imported 
American‟.112  
The sermon met with rapturous applause from the congregation and received 
universal praise in the Durham community where the local free newspaper the Wear Valley 
Advertiser reprinted it in its entirety. Jenkins‟ words had propelled the Church into the centre 
of a political minefield. Amidst mounting criticism, the Archbishop of Canterbury hastily 
issued a letter of apology to MacGregor on Jenkins‟ behalf, however, this did nothing to 
appease those Anglicans who felt that the Bishop had inappropriately used a spiritual 
occasion to make a political statement.113 Although Jenkins‟ had called for a fair settlement 
to the dispute, his sermon was interpreted in the press and by the government as 
championing the miners‟ cause. Journalist Ronald Butt‟s reaction was typical when he 
surmised that „Between the lines of his sermon, political prejudice elbowed aside both 
charity and the genuine compassion that is based in understanding.‟114 This accusation of 
political bias was not helped by the fact that the prelate followed up his sermon with an 
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open letter to Energy Secretary Peter Walker in which he accused the government of 
making a „virtue of confrontation‟ and of having little understanding of „what a community 
is and what a country is‟.115 Jenkins was beginning to gain a reputation as a turbulent priest, 
while the Church more generally was characterised as siding with the unions. The Economist 
wryly noted that this solidarity with the strikers was possibly down to the fact that the 
Church could sympathise with an institution that was also suffering from a rapidly depleting 
membership.116 In truth, however, Jenkins‟ sermon was not a particularly sophisticated or 
even controversial analysis of the situation, but an instinctive Anglican reassertion of the 
centre ground and an endorsement of the corporatist industrial policy that had defined the 
postwar decades – even if his rather loose language suggested otherwise.117 
It was left to the Archbishop of Canterbury to clarify the Church‟s position on the 
strike. In an interview with The Times in October 1984, Runcie set out his desire for the 
government to initiate a settlement and condemned both the intransigence of the NUM and 
the NCB. While he denounced the violence of picketers, Runcie argued that this 
disobedience had its roots in the combative and uncompromising positions on both sides, 
for it was the „abuse, the cheap imputation of the worst possible motives, treating people as 
scum in speech, all this pumping vituperation‟, which had escalated the disagreement into 
disorder.118 He also linked the government‟s conduct during the strike with its handling of 
the unemployment crisis, concluding that harsh and radical economic change, however 
necessary, could not simply be bulldozed through in the name of efficiency and profit. 
Persuasion, compensation and compassion were needed in order to ease the transition and 
to preserve the national community.119 Runcie‟s comments inspired Baptist minister Paul 
Rowntree Clifford to write a letter to The Times praising the Archbishop for successfully 
turning the issue of the strike into a fundamental „questioning‟ of the government‟s „values 
and priorities‟.120  
The subtlety of Runcie‟s position was to a certain extent lost amidst the hyperbolic 
polarities of the tabloid press, but it was clear that his aim had been not to engage with the 
intricacies of the dispute, but to outline the damaging ramifications for the body politic.121 
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However, as the Bishop of Sheffield recognised, the Church‟s appeal for a settlement, 
although correct, went against the current political grain: „Compromise (like appeasement) 
has become a dirty word.….Those of us who like to hear both sides of an argument, who 
can recognise good in each other and believe it worthwhile to strive for a workable truth 
through compromise, can seem pretty feeble. But we are right.‟122 The tendency, whether in 
the print or in the pulpit, was for church leaders to condemn both the harsh tactics of the 
NCB and police, as well as the illegality of the NUM‟s approach and its failure to hold a 
national ballot. With the right-wing press and Mrs Thatcher presenting the miners as a self-
interested militant mob – „a scar across the face of the country‟ as Mrs Thatcher put it – the 
Church leaders were keen to remind both its own congregations and the public that the 
miners were fighting for their community and not just a higher-wage packet. Writing in his 
diocesan newsletter for example, the Bishop of Sheffield urged his parishioners to take a 
sympathetic view towards their fellow Yorkshire men: „we must admire the courage, 
sacrifices and common purpose of the Yorkshire miners as they struggle for what they 
believe is right.‟123 For the Bishop of Lincoln, the miners were an exemplary demonstration 
of the defence of community in an age of capital: „Their solidarity and endurance have 
helped the rest of the nation to see that materialism is not the only motivating force in 
people‟s lives.‟124 The country hardly needed reminding of how serious and damaging the 
dispute was, yet where Runcie and others proved themselves remarkably effective was as a 
non-partisan voice calling for reconciliation, in a lengthy battle largely defined by unyielding 
positions and personalities.125   
What is less clear is whether Church leaders held much sway with their parishioners, 
or the general public on all of this. If the letters pages of The Times are anything to go by, 
there was a great degree of discontent amongst the laity about the Church‟s public 
intervention. One disgruntled parishioner from Hertfordshire wondered doubtfully whether 
Runcie had similar words of comfort for „the majority of working taxpayers‟ who were the 
real victims of the „brick-throwing mob and a self-centred trade union bureaucracy‟.126 
Whilst another parishioner writing to the Bishop of Manchester in response to the bishop‟s 
sympathetic piece in his diocesan newsletter attacked the prelate for presenting his own 
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personal partisan opinions as the official view of the Church.127 Although these letters only 
offer a limited insight to the breadth of opinion amongst the laity on this matter, they do 
serve as a gentle reminder of how the realm of secular politics had the potential to raise 
tensions between Church leaders and their flock as much as, if not more than, ecclesiastical 
issues.   
 One man who was particularly interested in the Church‟s interventions was Arthur 
Scargill, who, in late 1984, when the dispute was reaching its critical phase, issued a 
statement welcoming dialogue with the churches to help the negotiations.  Scargill‟s 
invitation no doubt had political motivations, but it was one duly answered by Britain‟s 
Christian leaders. Thus in November, an ecumenical delegation which included Archbishop 
Habgood, Derek Worlock and the Bishop of Lincoln, met with NUM representatives at the 
Archbishop of York‟s Bishopthorpe palace.128 At the press conference after the meeting, 
the delegation put the onus on the NCB, making clear that a negotiation was possible if the 
government and MacGregor were willing. This statement however, prompted Peter Walker 
to write to Archbishop Worlock accusing him of being manipulated by Scargill:  
 
Whilst not a member of your church, I endeavour to take a Christian 
approach to this problem. I am very concerned when I see not just your 
church but my church being used by a person who is not only in total 
disagreement with the Christian faith, but is in close association with 
governments of powers passionately opposed to the Christian faith and 
who has certainly used methods which any Christian should condemn.129  
 
If Walker believed that the Church was being used as a political pawn by the Marxist atheist 
Scargill, then this was not how the Church saw it, for during the next three months senior 
church representatives from all denominations in Wales, Scotland and England, met with 
the NUM and even Walker himself, in a concerted effort to bring about a settlement.130 All 
of this clerical activity yielded little results, yet the desire and willingness of both the NUM 
and the government to talk to the churches and to get them on side illustrates the continual 
credibility attributed to religious leaders, especially the Anglican bishops. Public opinion 
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was incredibly important during the dispute and thus it is also probable that both sides 
recognised the possible leverage that the churches might have in this respect.131  
 That church leaders were viewed as publicly useful is most pertinently demonstrated 
in the appointment of David Sheppard, Derek Worlock and Howard Williams (then 
Moderator of the Free Churches) to head the TUC‟s charitable Miners Hardship Fund in 
November 1984.132 Separate from the Miner‟s solidarity Fund (whose monies directly 
supported the strike), the Hardship Fund was a public appeal for the communities and 
mining families whose funds went on supporting free canteens, provisions for families, 
local women‟s support groups and resources for children.133 The ethos of the Fund was 
described by Howard Williams, Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council in 1985:  
 
It is not about merit or blame; it is not about reward or revenge. Quite 
simply it would be wrong to let hardship prevail. Your gifts are needed 
to create community once again and build on the splendid mutual aid 
which testing times achieved. They will help to nourish friendship, to 
reconcile those who are at enmity and to strengthen those human bonds 
without which no village or town can live…..nor our country.134 
 
 
Clearly, the involvement of these three Christian leaders in the MHF is an example of how 
the churches operated as symbols of national unity and reconciliation in an era of upheaval, 
functioning just how John Habgood had envisaged, as pivotal „struts and beams‟ in society 
holding it together.135 This was especially true of Worlock and Sheppard, who, because of 
their successful partnership in easing tensions in sectarian Liverpool, personified exactly 
those values which the TUC hoped would inspire donations.136  
 Churchmen however, found that their role in the Hardship Fund was frequently 
misconstrued as a political act. Ian MacGregor had politely but rather boldly proposed that 
in order to avoid such accusations, donations should be put towards the legal costs of 
working miners fighting the unions in the courts; an idea not likely to find favour amongst 
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its founders, the TUC.137 Derek Worlock remained acutely aware that the press were keen 
to present his involvement as support for the NUM leadership, writing to the solicitor of 
the Fund to relay these fears.138 Some Christian laity were certainly of the view that the 
MHF amounted to their spiritual leaders endorsing Scargill. One churchgoer in a letter to 
the Bishop of Manchester for example, advised that religious leaders should be preoccupied 
„trying to fill our churches‟ rather than supporting a man who „does not believe in the 
Church or any of your bishops‟.139 Yet clearly the appeal did resonate with large sections of 
the public, (Christian and otherwise) for in its first three months the Fund had raised over 
£900,000. One parishioner wrote to Worlock informing him that he had sold his shares in 
the recently privatised British Telecom and donated the proceeds to the Hardship Fund; a 
symbolic, albeit minor victory of sorts for the churches in their battle against Thatcherite 
values.140  
As the strike was coming to an end, a meeting was held at Lambeth Palace attended 
by BSR officials and ecumenical leaders to assess the Church‟s response to the episode.141 It 
was agreed that any subsequent press statement should emphasise the Church‟s 
contribution in the local communities, for this would be „most readily appreciated‟ by the 
public and correctly convey „the feeling that church leaders are aware of the local pains and 
problems‟.142  This serves as a worthy demonstration of how the „local‟ efforts of the 
Church was believed to reinforce its position on the national stage.  While the Church‟s 
work on the ground was important, the role of its leadership was equally as valid and was 
especially welcomed by those on the moderate left. As the industrial editor of the Daily 
Mirror appreciated, the clergy‟s intervention was one which „the government know they 
cannot, and dare not, ignore.‟ He continued: „Their lamps shining brightly with an 
innocence that is both sobering and inspiring in a world grown cynical under the pressure 
of so much claptrap from so many other quarters.‟143 The Labour party leadership had 
found itself in a compromising position during the dispute, wishing to support the strike 
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but also cautious of associating too closely with Scargill‟s radical and undemocratic policies. 
The churches‟ attempts at reconciliation, its operations within communities and the 
religious leaders‟ involvement in heading up the MHF, together demonstrated the religious 
organisations in Britain injecting something distinctive and significant in a dispute 
engineered and dominated by extreme positions and polarities.  
In particular respect to the Church of England, strong parallels can be made 
between its involvement in the miners‟ strike and its role in the General Strike of 1926 
when it had made a similar plea for a settlement. In that instance, the Church‟s intervention 
was deemed politically compromising and controversial, to the extent that Lord Reith had 
refused to broadcast the Archbishop‟s Davidson‟s statement.144 The comparison with 1984 
not only suggests a continuity in the Anglican approach to industrial relations, but also 
points to the way in which the reaction to Church involvement in such affairs had not 
significantly wavered in more secularised times.145 The keenness with which Peter Walker, 
the TUC and even Arthur Scargill entered into dialogue with the churches during the 
miners‟ strike, demonstrates that, in moments of national crisis, the institutional churches, 
and especially the Church of England, still had a part to play, and moreover, this 
intervention was still deemed contentious and important rather than irrelevant and 
ineffectual. 
 
IV. The Market and Wealth Creation   
Writing to Woodrow Wyatt in 1988 Mrs Thatcher complained of what she considered to be 
the unfair and inconsistent criticisms emerging from ecclesiastical quarters: „The Church 
keep saying we must relieve poverty and when we do, they say we‟re making everybody 
materialistic‟.146 This accusation coming as it did in the second half of the decade had some 
validity for as Britain‟s economy began to revive, churchmen refocused their energies into 
berating the new culture of credit, debit and consumerism and identifying the fractious and 
ever-widening gap between the rich and poor. Britain‟s economy had by the mid-1980s 
entered a new hyper-capitalist phase, triggered by the deregulation of City finance, the 
privatisation of state industries, and the housing and consumer credit boom.  The garish 
display of money was in vogue and came to be personified in the quintessential Thatcherite: 
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the Yuppie.  If „gissa a job‟ had epitomised the struggles of the early eighties, then comedian 
Harry Enfield‟s catchphrase „Loadsamoney‟ replaced it as the slogan for the new materialist 
age.  Old problems of unemployment and poverty continued to persist especially in the 
North, Wales and Scotland, yet churchmen were disposed to link this situation with the 
rising prosperity in the South as a way of highlighting the moral dilemma that came with 
greater affluence.  The Bishop of Manchester, for example, speaking in the Lords in 1988, 
mounted an assault on the materialistic culture of the „Thatcher boom‟, which in his view, 
was a sign of the degeneracy of the nation‟s religious ethos:  
 
   I believe that the fair distribution of resources within a nation is vital to 
its spiritual health. I believe it to be utterly wrong and misguided thinking 
to imagine that one can have a nation which is spiritually healthy when 
one has large numbers of millionaires……Both on the international and 
on the domestic scene our real problem is not just the problem of the 
poor; it is the problem of the rich.147 
 
Leading Anglicans could be heard condemning the bloated wages of City bosses (which in 
some firms had more than quadrupled between 1979-1986) and more importantly speaking 
out against a regressive taxation system which benefited the highest earners.148 When in 
1988, Chancellor Nigel Lawson cut the top rate of income tax from 60p to 40p in the 
pound and the basic rate by only 2p, it was universally condemned by Church leaders as a 
misguided and flagrant move to reward the rich at the expense of the poor. Nor did 
churchmen share the government‟s enthusiasm for „trickle-down‟ economic theory; the 
idea that those at the bottom of the pile would eventually benefit from increasing national 
wealth. According to David Sheppard, there had been no automatic transference of 
freedom and opportunity, for prosperity had merely resulted in the poor hankering after 
new material goods such as houses and TVs, which could only be obtained through credit 
and were often purchased instead of more essential items.  Speaking at a lecture in 
Liverpool in 1989, Sheppard affirmed: „economic growth in an increasingly unequal society 
does not eliminate poverty, but recreates it in new forms.‟149 This new culture had 
inevitably given rise to a rapid growth in loan sharks preying on council estates and in 
communities unable to get legitimate forms of credit. In one such area in Liverpool the 
situation had become so acute that the local priest established a credit union in his parish. 
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Even more damaging, Sheppard argued, was how this wave of „popular capitalism‟ – 
exemplified in rising homeownership and the credit boom – had corrupted the relationship 
between the individual and the state.150 As has already been analysed, citizenship was a 
favourite theme for the Church, which underscored its statements on welfare provision and 
poverty. And so it also provided the framework for its discussions on wealth, with the 
ever-widening gap between rich and poor portrayed as damaging to the communitarian 
ideal and a threat to the religious integrity of the nation.  As the Bishop of Southwell had 
warned the House of Lords as early as 1984, the government‟s single-minded emphasis on 
individualism and wealth creation would have disastrous and ungodly consequences: „We 
could become a rich country without a soul and in consequence become a very vicious 
society.‟151 This portrayal of materialism as ungodly was hardly a novel idea, what was 
different was the way in which the Church inherently linked this to Thatcherism and 
denounced the economics, culture and lifestyle of this political order as „selfish‟ and 
„unchristian‟. The Church was not the only voice forwarding such arguments, yet this 
uncompromising judgement from the nation‟s spiritual leaders proved especially influential 
in solidifying popular perceptions of the 1980s as the „me‟ decade and instilling the view 
that Thatcherism was an idolatrous doctrine which had rid the nation of its collective 
altruistic ethos. The predilection amongst those on the right was to argue that it was the 
„permissive‟ 1960s when British society had cast itself adrift from its Christian moorings. 
Anglican leaders, on the other hand, came increasingly to argue that it was the 1980s, with 
the growth of materialism, social injustice and the break-up of the Christian foundations of 
Britain‟s social democracy, when the nation‟s religious heritage was being irredeemably 
undermined.   
At the root of Mrs Thatcher‟s ambition to liberalise the British economy was an aim 
to revitalise the nation‟s industrial values, as she declared in 1981: „economics is the 
method, the object is to change the soul.‟152 Hugely influential in shaping this outlook was a 
thesis put forward by historian Martin Wiener, who argued that Britain‟s economic decline 
originated in the adoption of gentry and anti-materialist principles by the industrial classes 
in the nineteenth century which had had a lasting and damaging impact, sapping the nation 
of its entrepreneurial spirit and giving birth to a culture of anti-industrialism.153 In its 
election manifesto of 1987, the Conservative party defiantly proclaimed that it had solved 
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this problem by successfully reinvigorating the economy and overseeing a fundamental shift 
in the nation‟s values. „We have fostered a spirit of enterprise‟, it stated, „For the first time 
in a generation this country looks forward to an era of real prosperity and 
fulfilment…..What matters is the feel of the country – the new enthusiasm for enterprise, 
the new spirit that Britain can make it, that we can prosper with the best.‟154 While Christian 
capitalists stressed the religious basis of this „new spirit‟, the Church, in contrast, persistently 
argued the opposite, much to the frustration of some Anglican laity and the government. 
According to Home Office Minister John Patten in 1989, the established Church of the 
realm, in an age of national prosperity, had a duty to endorse rather than simply condemn 
this new culture:  
 
I do not believe that at the moment we have a theology coming from any 
of the Churches …..which is appropriate for the climate of success that 
we have in Britain in the late 1980s. I do not believe that the Church has 
yet used a rhetoric appropriate when talking to a nation which is 
increasingly comfortable, but which should not be complacent.155 
 
Although the Church was never likely to proselytise a „theology of prosperity‟, there were 
concerns within the Church that its leadership was allowing its anti-materialist values to 
entirely condition its response to Thatcherism. As has already been suggested, mainstream 
Christianity in the twentieth century had become increasingly sceptical and critical of global 
capitalism. Martin Wiener in his historical narrative had rightly positioned the Church as 
one of the leading organisations that had rejected the progress of industrial capitalism. 
Wiener cited Tawney‟s work as evidence of the deep-rooted „moralistic and anti-
materialistic radicalism‟ within Christianity.156 As we have seen, this was a tradition, which 
was pursued with even greater gusto in the eighties. This was confirmed by Peter Morgan, 
Chairman of the Institute of Directors, who, in a speech in 1990 on the culture of anti-
industrialism amongst the British Establishment, singled out the Church as one of the main 
offenders:   
 
The enterprise culture is an alien concept for the established church. It 
takes no pleasure in wealth creation. Unfortunately, these establishment 
attitudes are also held by many of the middle classes. They hope that the 
„80s will prove to have been a nasty one-off experience which can be set 
aside in the „90s. In the meantime they have deployed all the propaganda 
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methods at their disposal – the classroom, the pulpit, the press, the stage 
and broadcasting channels – to characterise the „80s as a decade of greed, 
to brand the successful as materialistic, and to denigrate individualism. 
For them the distribution of wealth is a noble activity – creating wealth is 
mucky and squalid.157 
 
Morgan‟s opinions cannot be easily dismissed. As an active Anglican, member of his parish 
council and stewardship advisor to Guildford Cathedral, he had no doubt experienced these 
„propaganda methods‟ first-hand.158 Nor was Morgan alone in warning the Anglican 
leadership against this approach. Malcolm Grundy, in an article urging the Church to 
endorse the government-sponsored „Industry Year‟ initiative, foresaw that the Church‟s 
unremittingly hostile attitude towards capital could potentially alienate its more affluent 
members. „If the principal Christian denominations cannot affirm the ways in which most 
people in this country earn their living‟, Grundy cautioned, „then is there any surprise that 
God is seen as an optional interest on the edge of life‟.159 These antagonisms were raised in 
the Synod, where lay members castigated their leaders for ignoring their concerns. As James 
Pringle from St Albans complained in 1986: „may I remind the Synod that comfortable 
Britain and urban priority Britain …both need a saviour? That the Gospel is for rich and 
poor?‟160 He continued: „the country is waiting to be told that Britain‟s problems are not 
primarily social or economic but moral and spiritual, that the failure is not with the 
structures but with man.‟161 The accusation was not only that the Church was more 
preoccupied with temporal rather than spiritual matters, but also that its emphasis on social 
concerns hinted at an inherent class bias against its core middle class membership. As if to 
quell such criticisms, Archbishop Runcie dutifully marked Industry Year with a service in St 
Paul‟s Cathedral while the Bishop of Oxford penned a book entitled Is there a Gospel for the 
Rich?162  
It was both easy and convenient for the government, the press and some laity to 
typecast the Church as anti-capitalist especially when pitted against the evangelical fervour 
of Christian economic liberals of this period. Yet the Church‟s fruitful relationship with the 
City of London suggests that this portrayal is a little simplistic. When Faith in the City was 
published it was more or less dismissed by the right-wing press, however, its message of 
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compassion and concern was awarded a favourable review in the Financial Times.163 Interest 
from the banking community in the project led the Dean of St Paul‟s to establish a meeting 
group for businessmen and clergy, headed by the commission‟s chairman, Sir Richard 
O‟Brien. City financiers were taken on „slumming‟ visits to urban areas, while the meeting 
group addressed themes well beyond the confines of the report, from social entrepreneurial 
activities to business ethics through to probity and investment responsibilities; issues which 
would later come to be known as „corporate social responsibility‟.164 That the City of 
London was willing to engage with the Church points to the moderate nature of the 
Anglican position on global capital. It was not an uncompromising and fundamental 
critique of the system, but a clear message that capitalism needed to operate within a 
compassionate and restricted framework in order to guarantee its benefits for the whole of 
the nation.  
One of the principle accusations made time and time again was that the government 
was implementing economic theory with little consideration of the moral or social 
consequences. The Bishop of Lincoln had ventured such sentiments in a debate in the 
Synod on economics in 1984, stressing that: „economic theories cannot be made to 
symbolise a whole philosophy without doing damage. The whole of life cannot be 
motivated by market forces. Working people are not just “costs.”‟165 In the same debate, 
David Jenkins remarked that the dogmatic and zealous tone that free-marketeers spoke 
about the „salvation‟ of the market was comparable to the way that Marxists articulated 
communist utopianism, for both amounted to a „total abdication of moral responsibility.‟  
 
It is no answer to say: “But this is the only way forward.” This is as 
dogmatic as the claims of Marxist socialism….the costs of any policy are 
part of the grounds for judging it, and possibly of opposing it. A faith 
about economics or about politics which insists that all sorts of social 
costs and personal sufferings are justified now because we are surely 
right, the world is like this, and this is the only realistic programme, is a 
false faith, in fact verging on idolatry.166 
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Political or economic convictions, be it Monetarism or Marxism were consistently 
denounced by church leaders as irrational, foreign and against the anti-intellectual 
inclinations of the British people. The Church, therefore, judged its unique role as injecting 
a moral dimension into discussions about economic theory, as the Faith in the City 
commission explained:  
 
It must question all economic philosophies, not least those which, when 
put into practice, have contributed to the blighting of whole districts, 
which do not offer the hope of amelioration, and which perpetuate the 
human misery and despair to which we have referred. The situation 
requires the Church to question from its own particular standpoint the 
morality of these economic philosophies.167 
 
Whereas economists and politicians opposed economic liberalism on the grounds of 
rational political argument, the Church judged it on a distinctly Christian concept of man 
and social justice. As we shall see, the fact that the Church failed to grasp the full 
complexities of economic change and refused to accept that Conservatives could equally 
claim a Christian basis meant that its moral questioning of Thatcherism was ultimately 
limited. Nonetheless, as the decade drew to a close, with the market crash and home 
repossessions, bankruptcy and unemployment rising once more, Anglican predictions that 
the „Thatcher economic boom‟ was all false expectation and had come at a severe cost to 
the common good, seemed vindicated. 
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   CHAPTER FOUR  
           Mobilising the Moral Will of the Nation: Church, Parties and Voters  
 
         „It is an important dimension of the Church‟s contribution to the life of society to be involved in 
“consciousness raising”, that is in producing critically informed people who can bring to bear the 
insights of the Gospel in creative and farseeing ways, who are thus better equipped to be citizens of 
the earthly city.‟ Paul Ballard, Crucible, 1985.1 
 
    „[The] average Anglican preaching today is rather like Guardian readers talking to Telegraph readers.‟  
                                                        Anonymous Anglican priest, Yorkshire Post, 1983.2 
 
The Church of England‟s foray into politics in the 1980s stemmed from a belief that 
Christians could contribute valid and moral reflections on public issues. As we have seen, 
this decade saw Anglicans vocalise their concerns about the ideological direction of the 
government and reaffirm what they considered to be the essential political values of a 
Christian society.  This chapter takes this analysis further, firstly by showing how the 
Church disseminated its message to the parishes.  During this decade Anglicans became 
increasingly concerned about the loss of public altruism particularly amongst the middle 
classes whom they feared had been seduced by Thatcherite individualism. Therefore a 
major preoccupation for the Church and Anglican activists was to bring about a 
reinvigoration of the moral will of the nation by educating its parishioners and the general 
public on the nature of poverty, encouraging social activism, and informing voters of the 
moral choices to be faced at the time of elections. Because of this activity, the Church was 
often charged with playing party-politics. The second section of this chapter, therefore, will 
seek to locate the Church‟s statements within the partisan context of the 1980s, showing 
how the weakness of the Labour party was a crucial factor in the prominence of the Church 
and revealing how, despite being labelled otherwise, Anglicans tended to reflect the non-
partisan centrist values of the liberal Establishment rather than explicitly party political 
views. Finally this chapter will end by assessing the impact of the Church‟s opposition to 
the Thatcher government, analysing its successes and its shortcomings, and determining 
whether it was based on a Christian vision of politics and society which was no longer a 
reality.  
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I. The Church’s Educational Mission  
In April 1984, the Bishop of Liverpool was given the opportunity of fifty minutes of 
uninterrupted prime-airtime on the BBC to deliver the organisation‟s annual Dimbleby 
lecture. The title of his talk was „The Other Britain‟ in which the Bishop drew upon the 
experiences of the socially deprived within his diocese to press home his concerns about 
poverty within the nation. The intended audience for Sheppard‟s evocative address was not 
the Conservative administration or the studio audience (which one commentator described 
as the „wet government in exile‟), but „comfortable Britain‟: the largely middle-class audience 
tuning in at home which amounted to 4.7 million viewers.3 Society, Sheppard contended, 
was currently divided into two halves: „middle Britain‟ i.e. the comfortable and wealthy, and 
„other Britain‟, the poor and unemployed who disproportionately resided in Britain‟s run-
down and dilapidated cities. Stressing that the corporate ethic was the dominant message of 
Christianity, Sheppard condemned what he saw as the prevalent culture of self-interest 
amongst the middle classes, who remained ignorant of the social inequalities within society 
and seemed content to allow the situation to continue. Sheppard acknowledged that he 
himself was a member of „comfortable Britain‟, but claimed that this made him uniquely 
qualified to deliver such an address: „I am criticising what I both understand – and love‟. He 
concluded by urging „comfortable Britain‟ to respond to the pressing „moral challenge‟ of 
poverty that confronted the nation.4  
Sheppard‟s public plea received a warm reception from both Anglicans and the 
general public, with the BBC receiving 106 letters of support (compared with only twelve 
that were critical), as well as thirty-eight financial donations from viewers. The Liverpudlian 
writer Alan Bleasdale wrote to the Bishop thanking him for speaking on behalf of his 
community and making a stand „with the dignity, grace (no pun intended!) and such shining 
compassion for all those pawns in the game. They need you, and thank God you are here.‟5  
For many urban clergy, Sheppard‟s lecture had especial meaning, for it demonstrated their 
Church leaders articulating the problems they encountered on a daily basis in their parishes. 
As the Rector of Wigan enthused in a letter to Sheppard: „As a priest I felt a bit more 
relevant than I have for some time‟, adding that it was befitting that such a provocative 
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speech had been broadcast during Holy Week: „you should have entered on a donkey, and 
there should have been pigeons to release and a few spare tables to overturn!‟6 Sheppard‟s 
lecture did not enjoy a favourable reception from all quarters however, with the right-wing 
press particularly scathing in its assessment. The Daily Mail disapproved of the fact that in 
„the climax of the Christian year‟, the Bishop had been given a gold-plated opportunity to 
proselytise the Revelation to millions, yet he had used the occasion to „talk about housing‟.7 
The Daily Telegraph rallied to the defence of „middle Britain‟, the target of Sheppard‟s speech 
and incidentally the paper‟s main readership: „Christ died for them, too: and this Easter it 
would be good to hear Bishop Sheppard say so.‟8 Taking a different view, John Junor of the 
Sunday Express dismissed Sheppard‟s lecture as another example of priestly moralising for 
which there was little public interest and which was best reserved for the pulpit: „Why the 
hell then do millions have to have inflicted upon them this dreary drip droning on for 50 
minutes of prime time on BBC TV?‟9  
There was nothing that was particularly new or radical in Sheppard‟s lecture; it 
echoed much of what he had outlined in his Bias to the Poor published a year earlier and 
which was soon to feature in Faith in the City. Nonetheless, the speech is an important 
demonstration of how the Church attempted to communicate its message to affluent 
Britons. For as much as the Church‟s prophecy was addressed to the government, the 
majority of the Church‟s time, energy and effort was focused on informing and seeking to 
influence the public, particularly „middle Britain‟, where the Church believed it could have 
the greatest impact.10 As has already been demonstrated in the last chapter, the Church saw 
its public prophetic role as one of scrutinising political choices and philosophies in light of 
Christian doctrine, yet this was coupled with a belief that this message needed to be 
disseminated to „comfortable Britain‟; the linchpin on which the nation‟s social democratic 
system supposedly hinged. Tellingly, the Anglican leadership seemed to have a somewhat 
vague notion of who precisely made up this group. Clearly they were distinct from the 
„poor/working class‟, but often „churchgoers‟ was used interchangeably with the „middle 
classes‟ in Anglican publications and speeches, with no clear differentiation between the 
two. „Comfortable Britain‟, „affluent Britain‟, „suburban Christians‟ and the rather scornful 
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term „BUPA parishioners‟ were also deployed.11  Such a loose taxonomy reflects the degree 
to which the Church believed that it still had an influence amongst the broadly-defined 
middle class, irrespective of whether they were regular churchgoers or not, while it also 
reflected a genuine desire to make its appeal as wide as possible.  
At the root of this educational strategy was a belief that the Church was in a unique 
position and had a special duty to inform „comfortable Britain‟ about social disparities 
within the nation and to rekindle their Christian sense of altruism to the poor.  Speaking at 
the House of Lord‟s debate on Faith in the City in 1987, David Sheppard deliberately tied the 
idea of „one nation‟ with that of the body of Christ and the custodian role of the established 
Church, in order to declare that: „The symptoms in these urban priority areas, reflect a 
disease in the whole body...we believed our task to be, as one might say in Biblical terms, 
that of being a watchman, restating the vision of one body and one nation, and warning 
those in comfortable Britain of what we had seen and heard.‟12 This obligation became the 
chief priority for Church leaders and activists during the 1980s, who believed that 
„comfortable Britain‟ was the key audience if the divisions within the nation were to be 
healed and Britain‟s social democratic legacy was to be salvaged.  This mission had the 
backing of Anglican theologians too. Reflecting on the role of the Church in modern 
society, theologian R.H. Preston considered that the Church‟s aim must be to nurture a 
„spirit of self-criticism‟ amongst its members in a personal as well as sociological capacity. 
The latter would be achieved by making affluent citizens understand how „their own well-
being depends upon mutual co-operation‟ with the rest of society.13 Returning to this theme 
five years later in 1988, Preston, adopting a more politicised tone, declared that it was the 
Church‟s duty to reignite the „political will to share wealth‟ and to persuade affluent Britons 
to see beyond „the short-sighted, divisive, penny pinching attitudes of the present 
Government‟.14  
Thus one of the primary goals of Faith in the City was educative. This was confirmed 
by David Sheppard in a letter to the Chief Rabbi soon after its publication: „it is rightly 
aimed at suburban Britons, who all too easily seem to blame those who have been left 
behind.‟15 And this is clearly evident in the tone of the report. „The Urban Priority Area is of 
our own making‟, the commission affirmed, „The combination of our private preferences 
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and the ramifications of our political choices are returned to us here as the geographical 
dimension of an unequal society.‟16 For Joe Hasler, a Children‟s Society community worker 
from Merseyside, proof that the Church‟s prophecy was „aimed at the rich‟ was made 
blatantly obvious by its axiom to „remember the poor‟, a point, which Hasler wryly noted, 
the poor themselves did not need reminding of.17 David Sheppard, however, framed it in 
slightly more positive terms, that of fostering a dialogue and understanding between the 
powerless and powerful in society; a mission he himself embraced with evangelical zeal. 
„Those of us, who know the reality of poverty in Britain today‟, he urged in a lecture in 
1989, „owe it to the rich and comfortable – our brothers and sisters – to tell them about the 
actual experience of people, who belong to the same body, the same marching regiment, the 
same nation.‟18 As the above analysis suggests, although the Church declared that it was 
acting as the „conscience of the nation‟, it was in fact operating as the „conscience of the 
middle classes‟.  
The importance accorded to enlightening „comfortable Britain‟ was not confined to 
the ecclesiastical hierarchy but was also embraced by Christian organisations and pressure 
groups.  As early as 1979, the Christian Action committee had agreed that it should focus its 
work on challenging the entrenched „white middle-class mentality‟ within the parishes.19 
CAP, on the other hand, had been formed precisely out of a desire to encourage 
parishioners to „understand the operations of the structures in our society that manufacture 
poverty‟ and to enable people „to take action themselves to advocate change‟.20 This, it 
judged, could not be achieved simply by protestations by bishops, for it was crucial to 
disseminate the message at a local level. CAP‟s stated aim was to bring about what they 
termed as „the conscientisation of the Church‟, and its literature was entirely geared towards 
equipping Christians with the knowledge and conviction to campaign against injustices 
within their community and beyond.   
The majority of Anglican pamphlets, sermons and speeches therefore were focused 
on reawakening the altruistic spirit of the middle classes out of a genuine fear that they, like 
the Conservative parliamentary party, had lost faith in the collective idea of the nation. 
According to the Bishop of Manchester, Britain no longer believed in the „spiritual value of 
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equality‟ for politics had once again returned to age-old rival class interests.21 In his view, 
the popular mandate, which had given birth to the welfare state, had dissipated and had 
been replaced by political disillusionment in the 1970s and Thatcherite individualism in the 
1980s. The Bishop‟s historical account was partly true. The 1970s had seen growing disquiet 
amongst the middle classes who became increasingly frustrated with trade union militancy, 
high taxation and inflation. As a response, this decade had seen the birth of extra-
parliamentary groups such as the National Association for Freedom and the Middle Class 
and The Ratepayers Associations.22 The formation of such organisations was interpreted by 
many to reflect (amongst other things) the middle-class disenchantment with Edward 
Heath‟s Conservative party. And so when its new leader, Mrs Thatcher would come to talk 
of protecting her „people‟, it was the interests, prejudices and values of this section of 
British society to which she was referring. 
Moreover, statistical evidence pertaining to the loss of public altruism had been 
revealed in an EEC survey conducted in 1976. The poll had shown Britons to be less 
sympathetic towards those at the bottom of the social scale than their European 
counterparts, with 43 per cent of UK respondents believing that the poor were responsible 
for their own circumstances (compared with a European average of 24 per cent).23 The 
survey was quoted in numerous publications (including Christian literature), as evidence of 
the popular disillusionment with state welfarism.24 Anglican activists therefore believed that 
the best way to counter the Conservative government‟s cuts in public expenditure was to 
tackle the root of the problem; namely the electorate‟s dismissive attitude towards the poor 
and its loss of faith in statutory aid.25 
One of the chief characteristics of the New Right thinking was the way in which it 
broke away from postwar conceptions of social citizenship. As Mrs Thatcher neatly 
surmised in 1987: „when you have finished as a taxpayer, you have not finished as a citizen‟, 
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revealing a belief that an intrusive and expansive state engendered a passive citizenship.26 It 
was the principle of liberty, Mrs Thatcher argued, rather than obligation or dependence that 
should define man‟s relationship with government.  This served as the philosophical 
underpinning behind Mrs Thatcher‟s pledge to ensure that citizens retained as much of 
their income for themselves and her commitment to downsizing the public sector. 
Conservative policies, such as the „right to buy‟, positioned the state as an enabler and 
fulfiller of aspiration and independence, while the introduction of market principles into the 
welfare system aimed at repositioning the citizen as a „consumer‟ of services.27  
The Church channelled all its efforts into countering this new model of citizenship, 
urging taxpayers to think of themselves as contributors not consumers and affirming the 
discourse of social rights and responsibility through political institutions. As the Faith in the 
City commission proclaimed: „we must continue to strive to develop a society in which the 
political structures enable all its citizens to share adequately in the economic development 
of the nation.‟28 In a tone reminiscent of T.H. Marshall and William Temple, Church leaders 
asserted that welfare was the key social right which enabled a participatory citizenship, while 
the payment of taxes, especially by affluent Britons, was the greatest obligation that citizens 
could perform in society.29 Thus in the age of Thatcherite individualism when the very 
concept of society and the word „public‟ („public investment‟, „public service‟ etc.) was being 
denigrated, the Church was reinforcing this understanding not only as the basis of 
community and citizenship, but also as the fundamental essence of Biblical doctrine. „In a 
world and society of different classes and races,‟ Faith in the City asserted, „it is important 
that the Church should teach and demonstrate what “belonging” to society as a whole can 
mean, and to provide guidance and example on tolerance, acceptance and altruism in a 
plural society.‟30 The twofold aim of the Church‟s message to „comfortable Britain‟ 
therefore, was to encourage them to link their own prosperity with the prevalence of 
poverty and for them to consider their own political views in light of the Christian values of 
justice and compassion.  
If this was the ambition, then what form did this educational mission take? The 
1980s saw the Church produce an impressive array of literature directed at parishioners, 
outlining the key theoretical and theological issues on welfare and poverty, backed up with 
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facts and figures and suggestions as to how Christians could help. A CAP leaflet from 
1987, for example, listed several ways that churchgoers could highlight the problem of 
poverty in their local community, from lobbying councillors to engineering their own 
publicity stunts.31 More imaginative methods of enlightening churchgoers were also 
developed. The Christian Unemployment Group from South Yorkshire, for example, put 
together a board game for parishioners. ‟24 Steps‟ had participants moving through each 
stage of a family‟s experience of unemployment including the selling of the car, relationship 
breakdown, moving home and investigation from the DHSS. Advertised in the Crucible, it 
promised to „cut through the lies, the myths, the sheer ignorance of so many‟ and „bridge 
the chasm between the comfortable and afflicted‟. „This game is one such bridge – between 
“the winners” and “the losers” in our society,‟ it claimed, „We pray it may be used to open 
the ears and minds of many.‟32  
The publication of Faith in the City saw this local conscious-raising activity escalate to 
new heights with Archbishop Runcie‟s pledge that the report would be „debated in every 
parish in the land‟. A „link-up‟ programme partnering wealthy parishes with those in 
deprived areas was established, a Faith in the City officer was appointed in each diocese and a 
shortened version of the report for the laity was produced, which soon sold over 60,000 
copies.33 Local churches were sent a copy of a documentary entitled, Does Anyone Care, 
about two communities in Birkenhead and Sunderland which detailed how Church money 
had been invested in these deprived areas. A professional theatre company was also 
commissioned to perform a play in parishes, which was „designed to promote interest in the 
inner city issues and to stimulate giving.‟ The production received a glowing review from 
the Bishop of Oxford, who described it as a „superb drama, wonderfully acted and 
containing the right mixture of humour and challenge‟.34 
One of the recommendations in Faith in the City had been the establishment of a 
Church Urban Fund (CUF) with the joint aim of fundraising for inner city projects and 
alerting the laity to the problem of urban poverty. The CUF Fund was marked with a 
ceremony in Westminster Abbey, while a specially commissioned prayer was read out in 
every parish in the land blessing the work of the CUF.35 Each diocese was designated with a 
fundraising target, with most of the donations expected to come from parishioners. The 
Oxford diocese, for example, aimed to raise £1.5 million, five per cent of which was to be 
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donated to Church Action on Poverty.  In York, charitable donations had generated 
£30,000 by July 1988 and quickly trebled to £90,000 within six months. Here fundraising 
was combined with Faith in the City awareness days run by the Mother‟s Union (with 
attendances often exceeding 200), while the City of Hull had their own Faith in the City 
group led by Evangelical Coalition for Urban Mission (ECUM). The prelates also did their 
part. In 1988, delegates from the Lambeth Conference put together the Bishop‟s Cookbook, a 
collection of recipes, including the Bishop of Aba‟s Nigerian Spinach Soup and the Bishop 
of Dover‟s wife‟s „Never Fail‟ Sponge Cake, which raised over £20,000 for the Fund.36  
According to Church leaders, all this fundraising and educational activity was about 
generating Christian concern and was explicitly non-party political. As the Canterbury 
diocese CUF newsletter spelt out, the CUF was „a practical demonstration that the Church 
is concerned for people who live in our Inner Cities. Our motivation is not political but to 
support those who live and work in areas of deprivation.‟37 As the following piece from the 
York diocesan newsletter illustrates however, there was a very fine line between what 
constituted an „educational‟ and „political‟ message. Readers were asked to consider the 
following issues relating to poverty:  
 
First examine your own experience by trying to answer three questions:  
Am I by conviction an individualist (stand on your own two feet) or a 
corporate person (let‟s share the burden)? 
Who is the poorest person I know? 
How did I measure that poverty?38 
 
 
The seemingly non-partisan language only thinly disguised the relevance of these questions 
to the party politics of the day, with the Thatcherite notion of standing on one‟s own two 
feet positioned in contrast to the Christian impulse of sharing the burden. It was clear that 
the point of all this activity was not simply to inspire benevolence, but to encourage 
parishioners to reassess their political priorities. One lay member of a Christian study group 
from Surrey, for example, wrote to the Bishop of Liverpool enthusiastically enquiring how 
his „large middle class, well-resourced suburban church‟ could respond „to the challenge of 
Faith in the City‟. In his reply, Sheppard informed him about the link-up programme but 
stressed that „substantial changes of attitude and policy‟ within his parish were what was 
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required.39 Therefore, although the Church may have presented its message as educational, 
there was little doubt that it had a distinctively political edge. In the eighties, the Anglican 
laity were also subjected to a similar „educational‟ programme in respect to poverty and 
trade in the developing world, with both charities and the BSR producing a vast array of 
literature, videos and courses alerting parishioners to the situation.40 To a certain extent 
however, this issue, unlike domestic poverty, did not overtly conflict with partisan loyalties 
and was thus more easily definable as a legitimate subject of Christian concern.  
A close examination of the CUF in the diocese of Winchester provides an 
important insight into the style, methods and some of the problems that the Church 
encountered in preaching this message to its middle-class laity.  This diocese, which had the 
lowest unemployment rate in the country (four per cent), one of the highest levels of 
Anglican church attendance and was a stronghold for the Conservative party, exemplified 
David Sheppard‟s notion of „comfortable Britain‟.41 That widespread poverty posed a 
specific challenge for this area of Britain was publicly admitted by the local suffragan 
Bishop who stated in its diocesan synod in 1988: „we live in a prosperous and privileged 
part of England, but with urban decay and human need brought to our notice, we cannot 
reconcile such conditions with our conscience…which ultimately affect us all.‟42  
The diocese of Winchester was assigned a fundraising target of half a million pounds 
and this challenge initially received an enthusiastic response from the laity, inspiring the 
very best aspects of Anglicanism‟s voluntary and civic tradition. Lady Prideaux, for 
example, raised funds for the CUF by selling her home-made red church kneelers, while 
clergy wife, Mrs Virginia Sutherland, organised an open day for visitors to view her 
„English Vicarage Garden‟.43 Some of the initial funds from Winchester were channelled 
into housing a vicar in Newcastle. Reporting on a visit to this parish for the diocesan 
newsletter, Winchester Churchman, suffragan Bishop Hassan likened the area to a „Third 
World mission field‟.44 His description of this work in missionary terms, however, was not 
exactly the kind of challenging dialogue which David Sheppard had been advocating, for it 
depicted the urban poor as distant creatures needing help and redemption rather than 
                                                 
39
 LCA, SP, UPA Box, Faith in the City file, Letter from parishioner (name withheld), 18 April 1986 and 
David Sheppard‟s reply, 9 May 1986.  
40
 In the early eighties, dioceses organised a course on the Brandt Report dealing with international 
development and trade. An educational pack was produced by the BSR which contained a cassette tape, a 
trading game and a summary of the report.  
41
 Hampshire had one of the highest figures for church attendance in the country: Peter Brierley, 
‘Christian’ England. What the 1989 English Church Census Reveals (London, 1991), p.65.  
42
 Winchester Churchman, No.303, June 1988, p.7-8. 
43
 Ibid., No.304, July 1988, p.8; No.305, August 1988, p.7. 
44
 Ibid., No.284, November 1986, p.2. 
 110 
prompting Winchester‟s affluent to assess their own prejudices and priorities. By 1988, with 
only £20,000 raised, there were concerns that the CUF had not sufficiently rallied the 
Winchester laity to the cause. Local clergyman Michael Robinson, writing in the Churchman, 
considered that this was because there was a suspicion about the political motivations of 
the CUF and general a fear that too much money was being spent on „social and 
community projects and too little on the saving of souls‟.45 Robinson attempted to quash 
these misconceptions by reminding parishioners of the responsibility that came with 
privilege and of the spiritual credibility of the CUF‟s „mission‟. Tellingly, Robinson also 
suggested that the Church should extend the appeal to non-churchgoing „goodwill types‟, 
perhaps conscious of the fact that they would not have any concerns about the theological 
basis of the CUF that some committed churchgoers clearly did.  
This case study of the CUF in Winchester reveals the difficulties that the Church 
faced when it sought to mobilise its affluent constituency. Incidentally, Faith in the City had 
been sold in a slightly different light in Winchester than it had been on the national 
platform. Firstly, poverty was portrayed as more of a threat to family life, rather than as an 
injustice. Secondly, the Church‟s role in the inner city was marketed as an opportunity to 
evangelise the Gospel as well as a means of alleviating social distress.46 This was obviously a 
subtle ploy to appeal to the sensibilities and priorities of the Winchester Anglican 
community. A quick browse of the Churchman however, also reveals that it was not simply 
that the laity were sceptical about the Church‟s social mission, but that they had an 
altogether different set of priorities concerning their Church. In the letters pages of the 
Churchman, for example, there was hardly any reference to Faith in the City, the miners‟ strike 
or the crisis in welfare, instead internal ecclesiastical issues such as the „unbelieving bishop‟ 
affair, the revision of the Prayer Book and the ordination of women debate completely 
dominated.47 This is reinforced by the fact that in the 1985 elections for the Synod, only 
one Winchester member campaigned on what might be termed the „social Gospel‟ ticket, 
with the majority of the candidates canvassing on a pledge to oppose a female priesthood.48 
This hints at a traditionalist/liberal spilt between the laity of Winchester and the Anglican 
hierarchy, yet it also points to diverging views on the role of the Church; was it an 
institution preoccupied with its own affairs or one that should demonstrate an outward 
responsibility for the whole nation? 
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This tension was not unique to Winchester. Throughout the 1980s, numerous 
opinion polls pointed to the fact that there was widespread disapproval amongst the laity 
concerning the Church‟s intervention in politics. A survey conducted by the Industrial 
Christian Fellowship in the early eighties for example, found that well over half of 
respondents (64 per cent) did not believe that the Church should be involving itself in 
industrial and economic matters.49 Debates in the General Synod also indicated a growing 
discontent amongst a significant minority of clergy and laity who disagreed with the 
Church‟s political direction.50 The Church‟s educational mission clearly had conflicting 
results; inspiring a mixture of anger and anguish, as well as enthusiasm and hope in the 
parishes, yet it was to prove even more controversial when Church leaders directly 
addressed the laity‟s political choices at election time.  
 
II. Dog-collars and Democracy: Christian Voters and Elections 
During elections, the Anglican clergy always pursued a cautious line, wary of not being seen 
to endorse one particular party, although the tone and content of their statements implicitly 
suggested that a vote for the Conservatives was incompatible with a Christian conscience. 
Writing in his diocesan newsletter during the 1983 election campaign for example, the 
Bishop of Winchester asked Christian voters to consider each party‟s stance on issues such 
as poverty, unemployment, international aid, housing, immigration and nuclear arms, urging 
Anglican voters not to think in terms of  „which of these promises will make me most 
comfortable?‟ but „which of these comes nearest to what is morally right and just.‟ 
Recognising that his diocese largely comprised of dye-in-the wool Tories, the Bishop 
advised his flock that they „should never be blindly loyal to the party they have always voted 
for in the past‟ affirming that „whenever people are guided by their religious beliefs there 
should be no safe seat for any party‟.51  The Bishop‟s words were on the surface suitably 
non-partisan, neither explicitly endorsing nor condemning a specific party, yet his words 
implied that any vote cast in light of the Christian faith would certainly not be a vote for the 
Conservatives and probably a cross for the SDP.  
Not all churchmen were as discreet.  In 1985, soon after the publication of Faith in 
the City, in a heated televised discussion with Norman Tebbit, David Sheppard suggested 
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that it was impossible to be a Christian and vote Conservative.52 What had been inferred in 
the report was now an unequivocal statement by a senior bishop of the Church of England.  
Sheppard subsequently received a barrage of letters from Conservative-voting Anglicans 
castigating him for his arrogance and political bias. „I am a Tory, but not a so-called „wet‟ 
Tory‟, wrote one gentleman, „so that must make me right-wing, and apparently, in your eyes 
I am no longer Christian.‟ He advised the Bishop to concentrate on „matters of prayer 
rather than those of the ballot box‟.53 The Kensington and Chelsea Conservative 
Association was equally concerned, warning in a letter to the suffragan Bishop of Stepney, 
that bishops should refrain from making political statements that risked alienating the 
Church‟s only loyal adherents.54  
The Kensington and Chelsea Conservative Association had a point. Figures on the 
political affiliation of Anglican laity reveal that they were overwhelmingly Conservative 
voters, especially amongst the Church‟s most active adherents. A survey from the early 
eighties revealed that 62.3 per cent of committed Anglican worshippers classified 
themselves as Conservatives and in the 1987 election this figure remained solid with 63 per 
cent of Anglicans supporting the Conservative party (compared with 43 per cent of the 
general public).55  These Conservative leanings were also reflected in the Synod, with 55.3 
per cent of the House of Laity, Tory voters.  Tellingly, there was a significant difference 
between laity and the clergy, with only 27 per cent of House of Clergy supporting the 
Conservative party with the majority favouring the SDP.56 These figures suggest that there 
was a certain degree of truth in the claim made by one astute vicar from Yorkshire, that the 
„average Anglican preaching today is rather like Guardian readers talking to Telegraph 
readers‟.57  
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The Church hierarchy were fully aware that their political stance put them in direct 
conflict with the majority of their parishioners. Sheppard and others however, believed it 
was their duty to readdress „comfortable Conservative-voting Britain‟ whom they feared 
were sacrificing their Christian principles for their political preferences. And yet, these 
Anglican Conservatives voters (who were invariably on the traditionalist wing of the 
Church) believed with equal passion that the ecclesiastical hierarchy were the ones allowing 
their secular political leanings to dictate their interpretation of Christian doctrine.  For a 
significant section of the laity then – those middle-class, Anglican Tories residing in 
„comfortable Britain‟ – the breach between their Church and party felt distinctly personal, 
for it appeared that these two institutions, which had always been complementary 
allegiances, were now in direct conflict.  
As the 1987 election approached however, there was real hope within the Church 
and in the revived Labour party, that the public had grown weary of the Conservative 
government and that, after eight years of Mrs Thatcher in power, there was a desire for 
change within the country. More importantly, there was a sense that Christianity and more 
specifically the Church, could prove a pivotal force in the election. The Guardian religious 
correspondent Walter Schwarz dubbed 1987 as a „moral election‟, one in which voters 
would be confronted with the key question: „are the human costs of Thatcherite progress 
acceptable in a society whose deepest values are still based on Judeo-Christian ethics?‟ 
Schwarz judged that all the Christian churches, because of the moral weight of their leaders 
and their substantial resources at ground level, had the potential to sway voters. An outright 
moral condemnation of Thatcherism would help convince the public that there was no 
moral ambiguity when it came to a decision at the ballot box. For Schwarz, the churches‟ 
contribution could prove more influential than pressure groups and more substantial than 
the political parties: „Plenty of politicians and pundits will be arguing that Thatcherism 
doesn‟t work…..The churches can do better, with more effect, just by pointing out that 
Thatcherism is wrong‟.58  
Schwarz had been right to label 1987 as the „moral election‟ for it is striking the 
consideration given over to Christian themes and issues during the campaign – an aspect 
that had been largely absent from the previous election in 1983. All three political parties 
appeared willing to claim the moral and Christian supremacy of their policies.59 Faith in 
Politics, published on the eve of the election, provided MPs from each of the main parties – 
Conservative John Gummer, Labour‟s Eric Heffer and the Alliance‟s Alan Beith – an 
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opportunity to appeal to Christian voters and offer a Christian vindication of their policies. 
Alan Beith‟s contribution, in which he labelled Thatcherism a secular doctrine and a 
diversion from the distinctly Christian tradition of „wet‟ Toryism, was a blatant attempt to 
convince wavering Conservative voters to switch to the Alliance. The book, which featured 
Anglo-Catholic Heffer on the extreme left and evangelical Gummer on the right, was 
testimony to the sheer range of political opinions within Anglicanism and also 
demonstrated the deep-rooted theological precepts, which underpinned politicians‟ religious 
and political beliefs –  views, they were confident would resonate with the electorate.60  
Christianity, it seemed, had become a highly politicised issue during the election. 
The BBC was especially concerned that its religious output did not compromise the 
Corporation‟s impartiality.  Head of Religious Broadcasting, David Winter, has recounted 
how he was warned by executives not to allow „some lefty bishop‟ to rant on Radio Four‟s 
morning religious segment, Thought for the Day. According to Winter every sermon was 
scrutinised, each speaker was cautioned and all content „kept so scrupulously to genuinely 
religious topics that someone unkindly remarked that if they kept this up people might 
think it was a Christian programme‟.61  
Meanwhile all the Christian churches were busy injecting a „spiritual‟ dimension into 
the campaign.62 The British Council of Churches organised numerous hustings through 
local inter-church councils, although Conservative Central Office reportedly advised 
prospective Tory candidates to stay away because of the unfavourable reception they would 
likely face at such meetings. Christian pressure groups were also active. COSPEC, for 
example, issued a statement entitled „How can a Christian vote Conservative?‟ which 
pronounced that: 
 
Another term for Thatcher will undoubtedly mean more poverty, more 
suffering, more violence in our cities, more racism, more nuclear 
weapons, more unemployment, more homelessness….How can any 
Christian possibly vote for a party with this record in Government?63  
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CAP adopted an equally forthright tact and in alliance with CPAG and the Low Pay Unit, 
organised local meetings and generated media interest to ensure that poverty featured 
prominently on the election agenda.64 While both CAP and COSPEC were undoubtedly 
preaching to the „converted‟, it was the church leaders who had the greatest potential to 
reach out to a broader constituency. In the run up to polling day, David Sheppard issued a 
statement entitled „Moral issues to face at the General Election‟ in which he argued that the 
poor alone did not have the electoral power to bring about change and that their fate was 
heavily reliant on „comfortable Britain‟, whom he entreated to think beyond their own 
sectional interests.65 What this amounted to, of course, was an appeal not to vote 
Conservative. 
The 1987 election result proved not to be the one most Christian activists had been 
praying for. Derek Worlock summed up these feelings of disappointment in a letter to 
former CAP chairman John Battle, who had successfully gained a Labour seat in the House. 
Worlock lamented that Battle‟s election was „one of those small shots of good news on a 
rough day‟.66 The Church‟s appeal to middle-class consciences had not persuaded them to 
abandon the Conservatives. Mrs Thatcher managed to secure the support of over half of 
the middle classes, as well as 36 per cent of the working class vote.67 For the Bishop of 
Manchester, the Conservative landslide was proof that „self-interest‟ rather than „faith‟ had 
prevailed at the ballot box:  
 
One of the gravest threats to democracy must surely be a situation 
in which „comfortable Britain‟ continues to vote firmly for policies 
which exclude a large minority of our citizens from the benefits 
others enjoy.68 
 
These concerns were not confined to the Church, but were also felt by non-governmental 
organisations. Poverty campaigner Paul Whiteley, writing in the aftermath of the 1987 
election, considered that there was „no longer the same willingness to listen to reformers 
that existed amongst „middle England‟ in the 1960s‟ and concluded that campaigners 
needed to change their tactics and make appeals to „self-interest‟ rather than „moral 
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indignation‟.69 This assumption of the decline of middle-class altruism was rather 
exaggerated and overdramatic, yet both the bishop‟s and Whiteley‟s comments do 
demonstrate the genuine fear amongst liberal reformers in the eighties. In the aftermath of 
1987, many social activists seemed resigned to the fact that Mrs Thatcher had successfully 
remodelled British society in her own image and had created a nation of Thatcherites.  The 
1987 election result appeared to be a turning point, which ensured that Thatcherism would 
be permanently imprinted onto the political and psychological landscape of the nation. 
With changes to the socio-economic make-up of British society, such as the rise in 
homeownership, increasing affluence and the decline of the manufacturing working class, it 
appeared (in 1987 at least), that there would be no turning back.70 
  
III. The Church of England and Party-Politics  
John Gummer MP, writing in Faith in Politics in 1987, sought to make a clear distinction 
between a legitimate application of religious belief to politics and the „party political stance 
dressed up as Christianity‟ then being offered by the Church of England.71 Accusations such 
as these, namely that the Church was being run by a load of „communist clerics‟ proved a 
useful way of discrediting the Church to its Conservative members, but these labels were far 
from accurate.72 In order to understand the precise contribution of the Church however, 
there is a need to locate Anglican political involvement within the specific party-politics of 
the decade.  It is only through such a contextualisation, that the position and significance of 
the Church‟s political intervention can be properly assessed.   
There is little doubt that the polarisation of party politics in the 1980s forced the 
Church to inhabit the middle ground and extol the centralist values of unity, community, 
and consensus, which was then largely absent from political discourse. The shift to the right 
by the Conservatives was paralleled by a fundamentally more serious issue, namely the 
internal strife within the Labour party, which for a large part of the decade, disabled its 
leadership from acting as an effective parliamentary opposition. The 1970s had prompted 
an ideological crisis within the Labour party between the left and the right which would 
take more than a decade to resolve.73 In the 1980s, divisions over the EEC and nuclear 
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rearmament, as well as the excesses of municipal socialism, union militancy and the 
conflicting priorities of industrial socialism in the north and metropolitan socialism in the 
south, meant that it was easy for Mrs Thatcher to dismiss the Labour party as ineffectual, 
outdated and promoting specific class interests which had little appeal to the mainstream. 
The portrayal of „Loony Left‟ figures such as Ken Livingston, Arthur Scargill and Derek 
Hatton in the press, fuelled the perception that the Labour party was completely unfit for 
government and this was reflected at the ballot box, with the decade seeing the party‟s 
worst electoral results since the interwar period.74  
The weakness of the Labour party at this time convinced many clergyman that the 
Church needed to step into the breach. As The Times editorial confirmed in 1984, Labour‟s 
civil war and its battle with political extremism had left a „vacant ground‟ which „bishops 
plainly feel a moral obligation to occupy‟.75 Former Bishop of Southwark, Ronald Bowlby, 
reflecting on events twenty years later, also considered the Labour party‟s failures crucial to 
explaining the Church‟s prominence during these years:  
 
There was a sense that the Labour party was in such disarray that 
they were not offering a voice of conscience of what was going 
on…..there wasn‟t any sort of constituency that was offering the 
kind of critique that in normal circumstances one might expect 
from any party in opposition – this was in our thinking. Who is 
going to speak for the voiceless?76 
 
As Bowlby‟s comment implies, it was not only that the Labour party was ineffective but 
also that the Christian and ethical socialist tradition had all but been abandoned by the 
party‟s leadership.   
The influence of Christianity, particularly Nonconformity, in the early formation of 
British parliamentary socialism is widely accepted. This legacy continued to live on in the 
postwar period, with Prime Minister Harold Wilson claiming that British socialism owed 
„more to Methodism than to Marxism‟ and overseeing the formation of the Christian 
Socialist Movement in 1960.77  Yet under the leadership of Michael Foot and Neil Kinnock, 
the ethical and largely Christian ethos of Labourism gave way to a more secular and indeed 
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radical outlook.78 This change largely explains the general indifference of the Labour Party 
towards the Church in the 1980s. Faith in the City received a lukewarm endorsement, but the 
general view was that while the Church‟s intervention was well-meaning and welcome, it 
was essentially too moderate to merit serious consideration.79 Tellingly, Labour MPs did not 
expend half as much energy engaging with clergymen as  Conservative members did.80 
There were of course notable exceptions, such as Frank Field, but very little support or 
interest emanated from the Labour leadership. In fact, the most fruitful conversations came 
from those on the far left of the party, chiefly the anglo-catholic Eric Heffer and low-
Churchman, Tony Benn.81 Despite being on opposite sides of the theological spectrum, 
both Benn and Heffer believed in the revolutionary nature of the Christian message and 
were in agreement that the Church needed to completely disassociate itself from temporal 
power in order to live-out the radical message of the Gospels.82  
 Some Labour MPs were of the view that the party‟s abandonment of its Christian 
ethical heritage was one of the chief reasons for its ideological and electoral difficulties in 
the 1980s.  Speaking at the CSM‟s Annual Tawney Lecture in 1981 (the year the SDP had 
been founded) Frank Field reminded the audience of Tawney‟s important legacy for the 
party.  According to Field, Tawney‟s central premise – that „morality was superior to 
dogma‟ – was the defining ethos of the party, which had historically separated British 
radicalism from the more extreme forms of socialism on the European continent. Field 
urged his fellow MPs to remember this maxim in these fractious times.83 Tony Blair 
advanced a similar argument when he became leader of the party in the 1990s. Writing in 
1996, reflecting on the problems of the Labour movement in the 1980s, Blair concluded 
that „the Left got into trouble when its basic values became divorced from [this] ethical 
socialism in which Christian socialism is included.‟84 Incidentally, as the party sought to re-
establish itself as a centrist political force in the 1990s, it‟s Christian and ethical heritage 
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became more pronounced and Christian MPs became more prominent.85 This transition 
had been underway as early as 1986 when the Christian Socialist Movement was officially 
affiliated to the Labour party, yet it gathered significant momentum under the leadership of 
John Smith and subsequently Tony Blair; two leaders whose political beliefs were firmly 
rooted in a Christian faith. This inspired a greater interest in the social justice agenda of the 
churches. In the mid-nineties, a group of Anglican bishops began to meet regularly with 
shadow Labour ministers while David Sheppard was also invited to sit on the committee of 
the Institute of Public Policy Research‟s Commission for Social Justice.86 The report, 
published in 1994, directly drew on Faith in the City and would eventually act as the 
foundations for New Labour‟s social agenda once in office.87 Interestingly, however, 
Sheppard turned down the offer, fearing that his association with the report would be 
deemed a political act and align him too closely with the Labour party.88 At the celebratory 
service for the tenth anniversary of Faith in the City in 1995, Tony Blair spoke in glowing 
terms of the report‟s achievements and in an article for the Guardian penned soon 
afterwards, he made a direct connection between the New Labour project and what the 
Church had been saying during the 1980s: „the essential challenge posed by Faith in the City 
remains unanswered – do we have the confidence and the ideas as a nation to achieve 
prosperity with fairness in the next century?‟89 The Church had to wait ten years for such an 
endorsement from the Labour leadership, during the 1980s however, it was the newly-
formed SDP with whom the Church seemed to have greater affinity.90  
The formation of the Social Democratic Party, with its promise to offer a moderate 
alternative as a via media in British politics between market economics and state socialism, 
was welcomed by many Anglicans.91 Indeed, the links between the Anglican position and 
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that of the SDP were such that many commentators re-branded the Church as the „SDP at 
prayer.‟ Both the Church and the new party were dissatisfied with the ideological direction 
of politics, both could be defined as left-of-centre, and both saw themselves as defenders of 
the consensus tradition in British politics. The Church and the SDP also generated huge 
media interest quite out of proportion to their membership and coincidently, both suffered 
from internal ructions which would eventually undermine their impact.92  
Yet the connections do not stop there. David Martin has highlighted how the SDP-
Liberal Alliance did have a distinct Christian presence within its leadership with the Roman 
Catholic Shirley Williams, Anglican David Owen, the Methodist Alan Beith and Scottish 
Presbyterian David Steel.93 Moreover, there is evidence of a conscious attempt by the SDP 
to fashion itself as the true inheritors of the Christian reformist political tradition through 
its naming of the party‟s think-tank, the Tawney Society – much to the anger of Labour 
activists.94 These claims to a Christian heritage continued even after the SDP had aligned 
with the Liberals. In the run up to the 1987 election, Alliance man, Alan Beith proposed 
that it was his party, with its appreciation of centrist and consensual values, that provided 
„the most promising opportunity available to pursue those [Christian] values in the political 
sphere‟ and expressed his wish that Christians would make the Alliance „the means of 
expressing their religious faith in the political world.‟95  
Yet not all were convinced that the SDP was the new living embodiment of 
Britain‟s Christian reformist tradition. The appropriation of Tawney‟s name was, according 
to historian and Labour party-supporter Raphael Samuel, „an exercise in generating 
fictitious moral capital rather than the acknowledgment of a spiritual debt‟.96 Samuel 
dubbed the SDP as Britain‟s first „post-Christian party‟ judging that it was nothing more 
than an ideologically confused conglomeration of personalities with a penchant for the 
„patrician politics of the English upper classes‟, which was being transmitted through „flashy 
American media techniques‟. For Samuel, the SDP‟s position as a via media meant in reality 
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that it was a party built on the „pursuit of the arts of government rather than as a struggle 
between darkness and light‟.97  The SDP did not advocate „moral imperatives‟ and instead 
believed that „all the great questions are negotiable, if they can be defused of their 
ideological charge.‟98  Tellingly, exactly the same accusations were launched at the Church 
leadership by both Anglican traditionalists and Conservatives MPs in respect to the 
Church‟s consensual stance on politics and morality. Both the SDP and the Church, 
therefore, faced criticisms from opposite ends of the religious and political spectrum, for 
being ideologically vacuous and motivated by pragmatism and expediency. This hints at the 
way in which both Christianity and politics in this period were locked in a debate about the 
purity and dilution of doctrine.  
In political terms, there were also important parallels in tone and language between 
the SDP-Alliance and the Church of England. Both shared a desire to counter the 
ideological dogmatism then propagated by the two main parties and thus emphasised unity 
rather than class division and negotiation rather than confrontation.  Alliance MPs also 
posited the domestic agenda in the same moralistic language which the Anglican hierarchy 
effectively deployed.  David Owen in a speech to the party conference in 1983, for 
example, argued that one of the chief aims of the party was to persuade the affluent that 
they had responsibilities to those less fortunate in society.99 The Church was a keen 
advocate of Proportional Representation, while the SDP-Alliance  laid particular emphasis 
on the environment and Britain‟s obligation to the developing world; two issues which 
especially resonated with Christians. Moreover, when the SDP was founded, it, like the 
Church, made a point of presenting itself as the „national party‟ above class interest, and 
endeavoured to frame its support base as a coming together of all those disillusioned with 
the direction of Britain.  
  Yet the SDP‟s pretensions of being a „national party‟ were as questionable as the 
Church‟s own self-appointed role as the Church of the nation. In the same way that the 
Church made claim to a national constituency but in reality drew its support largely from 
the middle classes, so did the SDP.  According to Crewe and King, the SDP supporters 
were often university educated, employed in the public sector and were „mildly statist, 
                                                 
97
 Ibid., p.241. 
98
 Ibid., p.243. 
99
 The Times, 13 September 1983. David Owen had also penned a moral justification for compromise:  
Human Rights (London, 1978). Incidentally, David Owen had been taught by Mervyn Stockwood at 
Cambridge and had provided the Foreword to Stockwood‟s book: Mervyn Stockwood, The Cross and The 
Sickle (London, 1978), p.ix-x. 
 122 
mildly conservative, certainly not radical‟.100  Significantly, Crewe and King described the 
party‟s membership as like a „well-heeled suburban church congregation‟ who „seemed to 
think that all one had to do to solve the world‟s problems was to think the right thoughts 
and occasionally write out a modest cheque on one‟s substantial bank balance‟.101 This 
image was not too distant from reality, as figures relating to the partisan affiliation of the 
clergy in the Synod demonstrate; the SDP and Liberal parties were supported by over 60 
per cent of Anglican priests in the chamber.102 
The „Gang of Four‟ founders of the SDP party recognised that they had a potential 
ally in the Church. In January 1981, Shirley Williams wrote to the Bishop of Manchester 
with a copy of the Limehouse Declaration, encouraging the prelate to join the Council for 
Social Democracy.103 David Sheppard, Derek Worlock and Free Church Moderator Michael 
Hollins, were also approached to lend their names to the Council‟s published „Group of 
100‟ – a list of non-political figures and former affiliates of the Labour party who supported 
the initiative.104 The Bishop of Manchester declined however, explaining in a letter to 
Williams that it would be inappropriate for a bishop to be publicly siding with a particular 
party. The Bishop‟s decision had also been motivated by political reasons, for, although he 
agreed with some of the party‟s objectives, he believed that the party was „too middle class 
and too intellectual‟ to generate support amongst the traditional working-class Labour 
supporters and would only spilt the anti-Conservative vote.105 Similar sentiments were felt 
by BSR Chairman Giles Ecclestone, who deemed that the SDP‟s strategy carried much risk 
for it assumed that the electorate was prepared to support „a middle way‟ at a time when 
politics had morphed into „ideological simplicity, slogans and scapegoats‟. He concluded, 
with some regret, that the SDP would have little hope of rectifying the situation.106  
Clearly there was no fixed alliance between the SDP-Alliance and the Church, 
however their philosophical and discursive links are important as they indicate how the 
newly formed third party and the established Church of England operated as upholders of 
the via media in British political life during the 1980s. With the Conservative and Labour 
                                                 
100
 Crewe & King, SDP, p.127. 
101
 Ibid., p.134. 
102
 This figure is the combined percentage of those that supported both the SDP and the Liberal parties: 
see Appendix VIII for full figures.  
103
 MCL, BCP, Z Files, 2/01 Politics, National File, Letter from Shirley Williams, 27 January 1981. 
Although at this stage a new party had not been announced, Williams makes clear that this was the likely 
outcome. For an insight into William‟s understanding of faith and politics, see Shirley Williams, „The 
Church and Politics‟ in Donald Reeves (ed.), The Church and the State (London, 1984), pp.25-37.  
104
 The Limehouse Declaration is reprinted in Crewe & King, SDP, p.93-4.  
105
 MCL, BCP, Z Files, 2/01 Politics, National File, Reply to Shirley Williams, 3 February 1981. 
106
 Giles Ecclestone, „Facing the Future‟, Crucible, (April-June 1981), p.50, p.51.  
 123 
parties both vacating the middle space, this decade saw the centrist mantle taken up by 
other members of the liberal elite. As David Martin has explained, the Church along with 
the SDP-Alliance, one-Nation Tories, the BBC, some parts of the press and other 
professions provided a crucial bulwark against Thatcherism in the eighties:  
 
These institutions have always managed to keep any extremism in check 
and have usually tamed any signs of ideological dogmatism or intense 
religiosity. They are for the values of liberal education and against the 
technologization propagated by the government. The clergy, the 
teachers, and the social/administrative professions are aligned together 
in the support groups of the upper-middle-class liberal establishment. 
This establishment and the government are now fighting it out for 
control.107  
 
These actors, although motivated by different prejudices and traditions, were united in a 
desire to reinstate the centre ground. Emerging out of the widespread disaffection felt 
towards the body politic in the 1970s, these voices soon crystallised their attack on 
Thatcherism and together offered an important centrist challenge, however moderate and 
disparate, to the Conservative government.  It was characterised by a belief in the inclusive 
and the consensual nature of Britain‟s social democracy and fed into the non-partisan, non-
radical and specifically, non-class based traditions of the British Establishment. These 
values may have been dismissed by those on the right as „wet‟ and by those on the left as 
„patrician‟, however, it was a discourse which had a strong precedent in British political and 
religious history. There is also evidence that those that pursued the centre-ground, did so 
within an explicitly ethical and religious framework. One-Nation Conservatives rooted their 
social concern in Christian ideals just as much as the Alliance.108 Also important was the 
establishment of a non-partisan newspaper the Independent, which quickly surpassed the 
right-wing Times as the Anglican clergy‟s favoured broadsheet and became notable for its 
ethical language and outlook.109 Of all the members of the liberal Establishment, however, it 
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was the Church who proved to be the most important and effective enunciators of the 
centrist position during the Thatcher decade. 
The reason for this has been analysed by historian Brian Harrison who posits the 
Church of England as one of the key reasons for the predominance of consensus and 
centralism throughout British history.110 Harrison situates the emergence of this tradition in 
the sixteenth century and the Elizabethan religious settlement, which, by pursuing the 
doctrinal middle road between Catholicism and Puritanism, „helped to set the tone by 
exemplifying the via media‟. This contribution, Harrison argues, has continued into the 
twentieth century, whereby the Church of England bishops consistently acted as important 
articulators of these values, particularly in respect to class relations. The British political 
system, in Harrison‟s view, is predisposed to centrism chiefly through two means: firstly, it 
is deployed by the two main parties to garner mass electoral support. Secondly, it is pursued 
by those non-political mechanisms of state such as the civil service, the monarchy, the 
judiciary and the Church which act as „institutional pressures towards consensus‟ nudging 
the political debate in this direction at moments when the centre ground has been pursued 
by politicians (like in the postwar years) and, most prominently, when it has been 
abandoned by the political parties (as in the 1980s).111 Harrison was right; although 
individual bishops may have held strong partisan convictions, this was to an extent 
irrelevant, for in tone and content the Church of England remained tied to its centralist 
tradition.112  To a certain extent, therefore, the Church of England was almost predestined 
and predisposed to adopt a liberal and consensual line when confronted with the political 
polarisation of the 1980s.  
This is most pertinently demonstrated in the way in which the Anglican leadership 
denounced political ideology (of both left and right) as amoral and upheld pragmatism and 
consensus as the righteous Christian approach. David Jenkins, for example, in his notorious 
enthronement sermon had condemned the rigidity of both the government and the unions 
as heretical while he had positioned reconciliation as a Christian endeavour: „Mutually 
worked out compromise‟, the Bishop proclaimed, was the „essence both of true godliness 
and of true humanity. Anyone who rejects compromise as a matter of policy, programme or 
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conviction is putting himself or herself in the place of God.‟113 Significantly, Jenkins linked 
liberal political values with liberal Christianity judging that both were correctly based on 
compromise rather than theological absolutes: „We have no right to expect a church which 
will guarantee us infallible comfort‟ or „a Bible which will assure us of certain truth‟, he told 
the congregation.114 Politics, like theology, he pertained, should not be based on 
uncompromising dogma but on continual negotiation. Even if Jenkins was not consciously 
trying to do so, his sermon was an affront to both the conviction politics of Thatcherism 
and the rigid ecclesiastical outlook of the Anglican traditionalists.   
At the time, this non-partisan centrist position seemed to be most successfully 
embodied in the partnership of Anglican David Sheppard and Catholic Derek Worlock in 
Liverpool. The long history of religious tensions in that city meant that their close 
relationship had a particular importance in a community still largely defined by its religious 
make-up. During the 1980s, Sheppard and Worlock‟s role in uniting the areas blighted by 
the riots (1981 and 1985), during the city‟s industrial and council disputes and in the wake 
of the Heysel and Hillsborough disasters, meant that their spiritual partnership became a 
symbol of healing and unity in an era of intense social and political upheaval for the city.115 
Of particular interest here was their intervention during the rates crisis (1984/5) between 
the Labour council and the Conservative government.  
With the red flag flying high from Liverpool City Hall, the Militant Labour-run 
council embodied the kind of municipal socialism that Mrs Thatcher so despised.116  
Tensions between the council and the government had come to a head in 1984 over the 
setting of the rate.  When the council produced a budget with an illegal deficit, the district 
auditors took it to court. The following autumn in 1985, with the coffers completely empty 
of funds, the city‟s leadership decided, in a bold act of political miscalculation, to deliver 
redundancy notices to 31, 000 of its workforce via hired taxis round the city: a political 
stunt which cost them the support of the unions, the Labour party and the city‟s religious 
leaders.  
Worlock and Sheppard had initially supported the council‟s high spending budget 
believing it necessary to channel large-scale public funds into the city‟s deprived areas. But 
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their support soon dissipated amidst the council‟s (particularly deputy-leader Derek 
Hatton‟s) rather cavalier approach to the crisis. In May 1984, both leaders had offered to 
aid the negotiations, believing, with some justification, that they were more likely to receive 
a sympathetic hearing from Whitehall than „Hatton‟s Army‟. While Sheppard and Worlock 
engaged in fruitful dialogue with a supportive Secretary of State, Patrick Jenkin, they 
became increasingly frustrated with the council and suspicious that its leadership were more 
concerned with furthering their own particular brand of socialism than in protecting the 
interests of the city.117 In the wake of the redundancy fiasco, Worlock and Sheppard penned 
a joint piece for The Times outlining how the conflict between the government and the 
Militants was rooted in a dogmatic and divisive politics to the detriment of the citizens of 
Liverpool.118 These sentiments were enthusiastically endorsed by the Liverpool Echo which 
considered that the religious leaders‟ stance would be welcomed by all of those „who put the 
interests of the city above any considerations of political advantage‟.119 It was no 
coincidence that The Times piece was published on the same day that Neil Kinnock was due 
to address his party‟s conference. The Christian leaders, it seems, had correctly judged the 
political mood. Significantly, Neil Kinnock deployed exactly the same language and 
sentiments in his speech to delegates that afternoon, condemning the Liverpool councillors 
for prioritising „rigid dogma‟ over the wellbeing and employment of its workers.120  
Kinnock‟s conference speech marked an important turning point, when the party‟s 
leadership finally asserted its authority over its radical fringe members.121   
Derek Hatton later reflected that, although the council had initially received the 
endorsement of Worlock and Sheppard, „when views polarised, and there was no middle 
ground left on which to stand, we lost their support.‟122 Viewing in terms of an ideological 
battle on which there was no fence to sit, Hatton dismissed the religious leaders for 
cowardly siding with the government when the negotiations came to a head.  For Patrick 
Jenkin, however, there was genuine appreciation for Sheppard and Worlock‟s position. 
Jenkin, always more of a „wet‟ than his fellow Cabinet members, had been prepared to be 
quite accommodating during the rates crisis, despite the hard-line taken publicly by the 
Prime Minister.  He related these feelings of frustration in a letter to Derek Worlock, in 
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which he praised the ecumenical collaboration between Catholics and Protestants in 
Liverpool as a worthy example which politicians should take note of: „The way your clergy 
and congregations are able to work together should be an inspiration to the politicians – an 
inspiration to which perhaps too few of us are ready to pay heed.‟123 Jenkin was not only the 
one to contrast the liberal and consensual spirit between denominations with the rigid 
ideology between political parties in this period.   
Worlock and Sheppard‟s intervention on this occasion could easily be dismissed as 
politically naïve but there was no doubting that it was publicly important, not only because 
of the respect that they were accorded in Whitehall but more importantly the credibility and 
support they maintained within the local community. This is largely down to the fact that 
they were representatives of one of the most religiously-devout cities in Britain.124 When 
Sheppard and Worlock claimed to speak on behalf of the citizens of Liverpool, therefore, 
they were to a degree, speaking the truth.125  Such sentiments are revealed in one letter 
written to Worlock soon after the rates crisis from a Catholic female parishioner residing in 
Liverpool 8, the district at the centre of the Toxteth riots and one of the poorest parts of 
the city.  Labelling herself part of the „real silent majority‟, she praised Worlock and 
Sheppard as the „only champions we have‟ and condemned the lack of fellowship in the 
City and in the nation as a whole: „if there is no legal code there surely must be a moral 
code, what will they answer to God when he says, “but you are your brother‟s keeper.”‟ She 
suggested that Worlock should organise a ceremony of reconciliation, a „open air service of 
all denominations, cultures, creeds‟ to help heal the wounds of „strife and depression‟, 
judging that in times of political crisis, spiritual intervention would provide hope and bring 
people together. It was her religious representative rather than her political representatives, 
it seems, who spoke on her behalf, in both a political and spiritual context.126  
As has been documented in earlier chapters, the Anglican hierarchy consistently 
made claims about its capacity to speak on behalf of the voiceless. Faith in the City was proof 
that they were able to perform this duty with some degree of success, yet the example of 
Sheppard and Worlock‟s in Liverpool suggests that this was only truly achievable in places 
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with a high churchgoing constituency and where sectarian divisions ensured that citizens 
still largely defined themselves by their religious identity. Liverpool, in this sense, was an 
exceptional case, having more in common with Glasgow and Belfast than with other parts 
of the UK. Nevertheless, Sheppard and Worlock in Liverpool had a standing and a 
significance beyond that of David Jenkins in Durham or even Robert Runcie as the 
supreme spiritual representatives, which ultimately points to the limitations of the Church 
of England‟s social witness and its reliance on a „folk Christianity‟ within the nation. 
 
IV. An Assessment: The Church and Political Theology in the 1980s 
The importance of the Church‟s contribution in the 1980s lies not in its impact on policy 
for there is little evidence that its message was listened to by the government, even when 
the bishops directly intervened, as in the miners‟ strike.  Despite mounting criticisms from 
the Anglican prelates, Mrs Thatcher continued to steam roll her way through the reform of 
public services, industry and the economy. Rather, the significance of the Church‟s 
intervention lies in the way in which it subjected government action to Christian scrutiny 
and successfully injected a moral framework into discussions about poverty, welfare and 
wealth creation; a contribution, which was valid, unique and respected. The weakness of the 
Labour party largely explains why the Church emerged as a crucial opposition at a time 
when the political parties were polarised and the values of centrism needed reinstating. As 
the suffragan Bishop of Stepney, Jim Thompson pointed out in a letter to David Sheppard 
soon after the Dimbleby lecture in 1984:  
 
Above all – I‟m proud to be associated with it [Anglicanism] 
wrestling with the great issues…..Compared with the simplistic 
polarities of the politicians, the simplistic slogans of the ignorant, 
and the profit simplistic motives of the Boardroom, your lecture 
was deep and comprehensive……if I get to retirement in 20 years 
time I shall say to my grandchildren (should I be so lucky) that I 
was part of this battle.127 
 
The Bishop was right the Anglican „battle‟ would be remembered twenty years later. Writing 
in 2000, academic and former civil servant, Nicholas Deakin relayed his surprise that the 
greatest resistance to the Thatcher government had come from an unexpected quarter: 
„God came into it, or at least the Church of England did; my first encounter, as an 
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unbeliever, with that church in a militant frame of mind.‟128 Deakin was not the only 
„unbeliever‟ who welcomed this intervention; indeed the Church often received a more 
favourable reception from non-Christians than it did from its own constituency. This 
shared agenda between the churches and the secular left would eventually lead to „valuable 
alliances‟ being forged on issues concerning social justice.129   
Undoubtedly Faith in the City stands out as the greatest example of Christian social 
commentary during this period.130 It fulfilled its aim of alerting both the politicians and 
public to the plight of the nation‟s cities, which is evidenced by the fact that urban poverty 
featured prominently in the 1987 election manifestos of all parties. After the Conservatives 
had secured victory, Mrs Thatcher declared her intention to „sort out‟ the inner cities, 
although this would be through private enterprise rather than greater public investment.131 
Faith in the City performed the function of a Royal Commission in an era when this method 
of enquiry had all but been abandoned by the Conservative government.132 As Lord 
Scarman confirmed in the Lords in 1987: „In the long-run, it will take its place, I believe, as 
a classic description of one of the most serious troubles in British society.133 In the opinion 
of Frank Field, Faith in the City could claim a much bigger achievement, for it had 
successfully punctured the Thatcherite hegemony and forced the electorate „to consider 
that, even if there wasn‟t an obviously acceptable alternative to Thatcherism, one should at 
least be sought.‟134 Field‟s analysis was right; although the Church may have been short on 
solutions, its spiritual objections help mould the public perception of Thatcherism as 
unchristian and fuelled debates about a possible alternative.  
The Church‟s impact can also be seen in the way that Christianity emerged as the 
language of opposition to Thatcherism, deployed periodically by the Alliance, one-Nation 
Tories and eventually the Labour Party. Alan Beith‟s comment in 1989 that the government 
had „adopted the concept of “passing by on the other side” as an objective of public policy‟ 
was typical of the way in which opposition parties tended to draw upon Christian ethics to 
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denounce the proposed moral failings of Thatcherite Conservatism.135 As the Labour party 
embraced the social market economy, so moral (rather than economic arguments) became 
the chief means through which it countered the Thatcher legacy. With Clause IV 
abandoned, „we are our brother‟s keeper‟ became one of the key slogans of the 
reformulation of progressive politics in Britain in the aftermath of Cold War.136  These 
Christian concepts may have been largely divorced from their institutional or even Biblical 
origins, but this language continued to be deployed by politicians in the name of statutory 
welfare and as the rational behind the curtailment of global capitalism. 
That the Church was able to have such an impact in the 1980s was largely down to 
the position it was still granted by the political elite and in the media. Irrespective of 
whether the reporting was supportive, condemnatory or ridiculing, the attention given to 
Anglican affairs in the press was a key factor which enabled the Church to play a part in the 
politics of the 1980s. Equally important was the respect and contact that the Church 
enjoyed with those in Parliament and Whitehall. The bishops had access to the corridors of 
power which no other faiths or pressure groups enjoyed. In terms of numbers, influence 
and scope, the Church of England was a substantive political force; more credible and less 
militant than the trade unions and with a grass-roots support which other voices of 
opposition such as one-Nation Conservatives, the SDP-Alliance or the poverty lobby, could 
only dream of. The fact remained that weekly Church attendances gave the Anglican clergy 
a bigger audience than most newspapers, particularly in the Conservative heartlands. It was 
hardly surprising therefore, that the party‟s leadership took its opposition seriously.  
 Undoubtedly, the Church‟s educational mission directed at „comfortable Britain‟ 
had mixed results, yet as Rev. Anthony Harvey has correctly surmised, these endeavours 
were not entirely in vain. Faith in the City had meant that Christian social activism was no 
longer confined to a small group of left-wing clergy, but became „something in which the 
Church as a whole could feel that it might be involved‟.137 Of equal importance was the 
Church as an agent in civil society. There is little doubt that the Church‟s charitable role and 
responsibilities had modified with the formation of the welfare state. In the opinion of 
historian Frank Prochaska, universal statutory aid had rid parishes and religious voluntary 
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organisations of their raison d‟etre leading to the eventual decline of the social and ultimately, 
the spiritual importance of the churches in postwar Britain. Yet an analysis of the 1980s 
demonstrates the continual vigour of the church‟s pastoral role. Its efforts, be it in the 
mining communities during the strike, its MSC-funded schemes for the unemployed, or the 
role of the local priest in areas affected by the riots, were all a reflection of the substantive 
contribution that the local parishes made in a period of social and economic unrest. The 
welfare state, therefore, changed rather than entirely negated the role of the local parish and 
priest. For still, even in the 1980s, with declining industry and changing public services, it 
represented one of the few but important sources of support in the community, entirely 
independent from the tentacles of the state. The rhetorical emphasis on „community‟, 
„society‟ and „nation‟, therefore, were not empty concepts, but wholly steeped in reality and 
experience. 
Anglican social prophecy was rooted in an understanding that the Church should 
speak out on matters of social injustice rather than adopt a position of silent compliance. In 
this regard, Anglican leaders maintained, however, that it was the role of the Church to talk 
in terms of principles rather than specifics. This drew on William Temple‟s understanding 
of „middle axioms‟ namely that it was the Church‟s responsibility to promote key rights such 
as education, housing and welfare, on which a Christian social order was based.138 Temple 
had believed that it was appropriate for the Church to defend these values, but not to 
advocate the specific means of achieving them. Churchmen soon found that in the 
politically-heated atmosphere of the 1980s, it was almost impossible to talk in vague and 
restrictive terms, not least because Temple‟s middle axioms were inextricably tied to a 
political consensus which was no longer accepted by the political class, the public or many 
within the Church.139 Some Anglican activists, for example, berated their leaders for 
peddling generalities, which they considered an inadequate theological armoury for priests 
working in the industrial heartlands of Britain.140 David Sheppard admitted as much in an 
interview with the Daily Telegraph in 1984: „In many ways I‟d rather stick to general 
principles‟, he stated, „though what then happens is that you are preaching 10 feet above the 
contradiction. You don‟t understand what‟s right or wrong until you‟ve been down into the 
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jungle.‟141 One of the chief reasons for Faith in the City‟s success was the way in which it had 
dealt with the specifics of a political problem, yet one its main flaws was the vague 
theological position underpinning it. In many respects, the Anglican leadership of the 1980s 
failed to formulate a coherent political-theology that took into account the new political and 
secular landscape.142 Despite pressure from radical Christians to go further, the Church 
hierarchy remained steeped in the traditions of social Anglicanism, liberal Establishment 
values and the postwar consensus, and for this reason, its response to Thatcherism 
remained inherently limited. The established Church always had been, and continued to be, 
shaped by its ties to the state and thus remained in personalities, ethos and membership, 
politically middle-of-the-road.  
 A further problem was that the Church‟s prophecy was predicated on an 
assumption that there remained a national Christian consensus centred on socio-democratic 
values. As Paul Ballard and Malcolm Brown have pointed out, this was an implicit 
understanding of the privileged place of Christianity and the Church, as well as an 
expectation that both Christians and „people of good will‟ spoke in common dialogue on 
these matters.143 This presumption was fundamentally flawed however, as it incorrectly 
assumed a political as well as a spiritual unity within British society. Mrs Thatcher‟s period 
in office undermined the political basis of this concept, while increasing secularism and the 
growth of religious pluralism would eventually render the notion of a Christian unity largely 
redundant. Reflecting in 2005, the Rev. Anthony Harvey admitted that this premise had 
perhaps been ill-conceived:   
 
We were being naïve in the sense that it looked as though we could 
preface all that we were saying not only to the Church, but the nation on 
theological grounds. That would be extremely questionable now, but 
perhaps it was questionable then.144  
 
According to theologian Duncan Forrester, the Church found itself defending values which 
were no longer accepted in society, while at the same time its leadership seemed unwilling 
to directly address the problems caused by increasing secularism.145 Modern social 
Anglicanism, Forrester unwillingly concluded, had been an attempt to shoehorn Christian 
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values around the new secular climate, rather than challenging the new values of 
contemporary secular society.146    
In theoretical terms, Forrester was right. Yet his analysis does not give due 
consideration to the actual players involved in this process. For the generation of clergy of 
the 1980s, socio-democratic values were religious and not simply political convictions. Any 
analysis of the speeches, sermons and literature from this period demonstrates how these 
values were not conceived as a political consensus, but as a moral consensus on which the 
future of Christianity in Britain would be determined. Such sentiments were conveyed in a 
memo produced by BSR committee member, Dr Michael Bayley soon after the 1987 
election. Bayley reflected that Britain had undergone a „sea-change‟ in national values in the 
eighties with the „solidarity‟ of the postwar years having been replaced with a „nineteenth 
century ethic of individualism‟. This transition, Bayley argued, would have serious 
ramifications for the Church and the Christian faith in Britain, for, as the „communal and 
broadly Christian values had been taken out of the political structure,……religion was now 
only a matter for the private sphere.‟147  
Historians such as Hugh McLeod and Callum Brown have shown how the social 
and cultural shifts of the 1960s marked a sharp turning point in the religious history of the 
nation, triggering the secularisation of British society and the collapse of the public and 
private influence of Christianity. Moral philosophers, such as Alasdair MacIntyre, in a 
similar vein, have argued that the moral unity of British society had been eroded in the 
1960s to the extent that Christian values were now at variance rather than in tune with 
British societal values.148 This analysis points to the way that important sections of the 
established Church still believed that Christian values remained at the centre of the nation‟s 
politics, with the Thatcher years witnessing the renewed prominence of the Church as it 
rallied to protect these principles. This, however, was to be short-lived, representing what 
could be deemed an „Indian summer‟ for public Anglicanism, as the Church gradually 
realised that these values and approach were no longer tenable in a politically and religiously 
reformed nation.  
As political philosopher Raymond Plant has correctly analysed, the weakness of the 
Anglican critique of Thatcherism was not only due to a strict adherence to an out-of-date 
religio-political outlook, but also because Anglican prophecy increasingly took its 
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inspiration from secular sociological theories. In an essay written in 1985, Plant wondered 
what was precisely „theological‟ about the Church‟s prophecy, which in his view, amounted 
to a simplistic reinforcement of more powerful and complex political theories:  
 
It is not clear what the Church is adding, for example, to a theory 
of redistributative justice of its own, and one is left with the 
despair of feeling that one is looking for the odd bit of theological 
backing for one‟s political preferences which are held on quite 
other grounds.149 
 
Expanding on this theme at a meeting of the BSR in 1988, Plant informed delegates that 
whereas the New Right philosophy had an „internal coherence‟, the Christian social thought 
being used to counter it was theologically and philosophically weak.150  Plant was right, the 
Church had wheeled out an outdated vision rather than generating a considered theological 
redress to the New Right. It was also guilty of exaggerating, simplifying and sometimes 
misrepresenting Thatcherism. This is a point which sociologist Ray Pahl, member of the 
Faith in the City commission, has also since acknowledged:  
 
The radical right had a much more coherent intellectual framework 
than we had granted it, and we should have taken that full 
on…..we assumed that all right-thinking people would come round 
to our position if only we expressed it clearly enough. That was a 
failure.151 
 
One of the deficiencies of social Anglicanism in the 1980s was its refusal to accept that 
those on the right were also arguing from a legitimate Biblical basis: a fact, which many 
Christian activists dismissed outright. This ultimately points to the „illiberal‟ nature of liberal 
Anglicanism in the 1980s. It was the tendency to project theo-political values as undeniable 
Biblical truths while at the same time show a complete intolerance to alternative political 
theologies, which so incensed Conservative Anglican voters and the wider traditional 
Anglican movement. As conservative evangelical Rev. Tony Higton confirmed, Church 
leaders were guilty of both providing simplistic answers to complex questions and making it 
almost impossible for those who disagreed to express different views.152  
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All of this was true, yet in many ways it was precisely this intransigency which 
forced many on the Christian right to develop their own theological understanding, for, as 
one commentator observed in respect to the New Right: „Without a vigorous challenge, it 
would have developed no rationale other than expediency. In truth, it is the challenges of 
the Anglican bishops, notably the Bishop of Durham but also the Bishop of Liverpool, 
which have shaped Thatcherism.‟153 
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                                                     CHAPTER FIVE  
       Private Faith and Public Doctrine: The Christian Roots of the New Right 
 
„[The] Uncoordinated conjunction of libertarianism and authoritarianism, scepticism and belief, doctrine and 
resistance to doctrine, high culture and dislike of high culture, economic truth and disdain for economic truth, 
which, under conflicting guidance from Hayek, Oakshott, Butterfield, Leavis, Eliot, Powell and Mrs Thatcher, 
has constituted the New Right of the last twenty-five years.‟ Maurice Cowling, 1990.1 
 
   „it is one thing for the world to reject the standards taught by the Church, another for the     
                        Church herself to surrender those standards.‟ Peter Moore, 1983.2 
 
                         „It was the state that crucified Christ.‟ Robert Key MP, 1988.3 
 
The need to precisely define „Thatcherism‟ has been a major preoccupation for scholars, 
commentators and historians ever since the term was invented.4 Much of this debate has 
centred on whether Thatcherism was a modernised version of nineteenth-century 
Liberalism, an Anglicanised translation of American Neo-Conservatism or simply a 
reflection of the prejudices and aspirations of the Tory grassroots.5  Some however have 
questioned its ideological make-up, arguing that Conservative policy was largely determined 
by pragmatism rather than theory. Despite these conflicting interpretations, there is a 
consensus that Thatcherism combined the doctrines of economic liberalism with a socially 
conservative agenda.6 The aim here is not to rehearse these arguments but to shed further 
light on the nature of Thatcherism by examining it through the lens of religion. The 
Christian inspiration behind the New Right and the importance of Christian doctrine to Mrs 
Thatcher has scarcely been examined by scholars and historians. Although comparisons are 
frequently made between the Right in Britain and America during this period, the religious 
parallels, which are admittedly less obvious, are frequently overlooked.  It is assumed that the 
legitimisation and support that the Republican Party received from evangelical Christian 
churches was not enjoyed by the Conservatives in secular Britain.7 The task of this chapter is 
twofold; firstly, to show how Christianity was central to the revitalisation of the New Right 
in Britain, and secondly, to demonstrate the challenge that Conservatism posed to liberal 
Anglicanism in this era.  
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The British Conservative movement has always been a conglomerate of influences, 
ideas, policies and personalities, and in this regard, the New Right, which emerged in the 
seventies, was no exception. This chapter will therefore begin with a dissection of the 
various factions which constituted the conservative revival in British public life in the 1970s, 
from the cluster of Conservative academics debating philosophy in the common room of 
Peterhouse College, Cambridge to the suburban middle-class women (and men) who made 
the annual trip to the AGM of Mary Whitehouse‟s National Viewers‟ and Listeners‟ 
Association. These groups may on the surface seem worlds apart, yet in fact they shared 
definite aims, ideas and grievances, not least a traditionalist rather than liberal perspective on 
the Christian faith.8 The second section of this chapter will focus on the Conservative 
parliamentary party, showing how Christian Conservatives sympathised with the New Right‟s 
critique of liberal Anglicanism and how they pursued traditionalist Anglican causes in 
Parliament.  The aim is to demonstrate how the conflict between Church and the 
Conservative party did not simply concern politics, but involved diametrically opposed views 
on morality, theology and ecclesiastical authority and, therefore, was inherently linked to the 
existing schism within Anglicanism between traditionalists and liberals.  
 
I. Christianity and the New Right in Britain  
During the 1970s Conservatism in Britain re-grouped, re-ordered and re-discovered itself, 
intellectually, culturally and finally, politically, with the defeat of Edward Heath and the 
election of Margaret Thatcher to the leadership of the Conservative party in 1975.  As 
historian Maurice Cowling on the right and Stuart Hall on the left recognised, this period 
witnessed a paradigmatic shift in the cultural and intellectual milieu, which was a response to 
a series of events and concerns.9 Most significant in political terms was the economic crisis, 
which eventually saw proponents of economic liberalism achieve prominence within the 
party. Other extraneous factors included a concern about „permissiveness‟ inspired by the 
cultural revolution of the 1960s, uncertainty about Britain‟s place in the world post-
decolonisation and the deemed threat that immigration posed to a traditional and cohesive 
notion of Englishness. This was a mindset therefore which linked the social and moral with 
the economic and legal out of a desire to reformulate man‟s relationship with the state. It 
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was conceived therefore, that the joint forces of collectivism and the „new morality‟ had 
given individuals too much personal responsibility in the private sphere and too little 
independence and liberty in the political domain.10  Though Cowling and Hall differed on the 
virtuousness of this re-branding of Conservatism, both were of the opinion that the 
„Conservative turn‟ of the seventies paved the way for Thatcherism in the eighties.   
 In order to explain the precise interrelationship between Christianity and those on 
the right, the „New Right‟ here is separated into five different groups. The first category is 
what will be termed the „New Right intelligentsia‟; those Conservative thinkers based at 
universities and journalists in the right-wing press. The second is the moral conservative 
movement; groups which pressured successive governments to enact greater restrictions on 
private morality. Third, are the economic liberals; those economists and commentators who 
were avid promoters of the free market, but independent of the Conservative party. Fourth, 
we have a faction which is rarely included in analyses of the New Right, but which shared 
many of its characteristics; the Anglican traditionalists. Their internal battle with the 
Church‟s liberal leadership would also greatly condition the Conservative party‟s engagement 
with ecclesiastical affairs in the 1980s. The fifth and final group is the Conservative 
parliamentary party, which, when in power, incorporated (sometimes unsatisfactorily) these 
various influences, under the project of Thatcherism.  
  
New Right Intelligentsia 
During the 1970s there emerged a small, but extremely vocal group of journalists and 
academics, who through their ideas and public prominence, bolstered the intellectual 
credibility of the conservative movement and provided the philosophical backdrop to 
Thatcherism. This group had no fixed membership, though a number of figures could be 
said to belong, including academics John Casey and Maurice Cowling, political philosophers 
Michael Oakeshott and Roger Scruton and journalists T.E. Utley, A.N. Wilson, Spectator 
editor Charles Moore and Sunday Telegraph editor, Peregrine Worsthorne.11 Many of these 
were members of the Conservative Philosophy Group, an intellectual forum based at 
Peterhouse, Cambridge, which was attended by many Conservative MPs and even some 
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clerics.12 Some of them came to be known as the „Young Fogeys‟, so called because of their 
old fashioned dress and their conservative cultural tastes. The broadsheet right-wing press 
provided the channel through which their views filtered into the mainstream, although their 
principal vehicle was The Salisbury Review, a journal founded in 1982 and edited by Roger 
Scruton.13  
These intellectuals and journalists made a direct appeal to tradition in response to 
the perceived failure of modernism; an approach they applied not just to politics but also to 
culture, education, architecture and religion. In essence, theirs was a romantic view of 
conservatism inextricably tied to England.  Most, but not all, shared a Whiggish 
understanding of the organic and harmonious nature of the English constitution. This 
stemmed from an appreciation of the English custom of social and political order, which 
was believed to be exemplified in the Conservative party.  Suspicious of notions of human 
progress or promises of abstract political theory, they were particularly interested in 
countering leftist notions of equality and social justice.14 This was combined with a tangible 
sense of England (rather than Britain), which naturally conditioned their attitudes towards 
the EC, immigration, the end of empire and the nationalist causes of Britain‟s Celtic 
fringe.15 These were ideas however considered in intellectual pursuit, and were far from 
being conceived as a practical political vision.  
Mrs Thatcher would eventually come to draw on their idyllic nationalism, yet 
despite this clear influence, her government received a mixed reception from these public 
intellectuals. Broadly in sympathy with Mrs Thatcher‟s emphasis on individualism, anti-
collectivism, patriotism and anti-liberal elitism, they were less comfortable with her 
government‟s libertarian ethos. As philosopher Roger Scruton explained, the difference 
between a libertarian and a conservative was that for the former the individual took 
precedence above anything, whereas for the latter, the individual could only flourish within 
the context of the social order.16 Scruton had highlighted a key point, for, as we shall see, 
the tension between the libertarian and conservative components of Thatcherism would 
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continually be a source of conflict within the right throughout the 1980s.17 The New Right 
intelligentsia were also concerned with Mrs Thatcher‟s prioritising of the market, fearful 
that unbridled global capitalism would bring about irrevocable changes to the nation‟s 
landscape, culture and psyche. Generally speaking however, these public intellectuals 
viewed Mrs Thatcher to be pursuing a line in keeping with the Conservative tradition and 
their own philosophical priorities.  
The main bête noire of the New Right intelligentsia was what was termed „secular 
liberalism‟.18 It was this prevailing orthodoxy, they argued, which had dominated 
Establishment thinking and produced the three main disasters of postwar British politics: the 
social-democratic consensus, the „permissive‟ legislation and progressive education. For 
Maurice Cowling, secular liberal thought was embodied in the discipline of sociology, a 
subject governed by fleeting fashions and devoid of intellectual rigorousness.19 What 
Cowling and others most objected to was the inherent dogmatism within secular liberalism; 
the idea that, despite its „liberal‟ credentials, it was on the contrary both uncompromising and 
inflexible. For these reasons, Cowling and others envisioned their cause against the 
orthodoxy of secular liberalism, rather than as a reintroduction of the former status quo.20  
Most, but not all, of this group were Anglicans (of the anglo-catholic variety) and 
were united in an understanding that faith operated as an essential source of authority, values 
and civil association within society, necessary for the preservation of the social order.21 It was 
thus deemed appropriate that Christian principles should be embodied in British law and its 
constitutional expression realised through the established Church. The major obstruction to 
this, they believed, was the way in which the liberal ecclesiastical hierarchy had embraced the 
culture of secular liberalism at the expense of the Anglican tradition.22  Many within the New 
Right intelligentsia, therefore, shared the frustrations of Anglican traditionalists and were 
opposed to the modernisation of the liturgy, the ordination of women, and the Church‟s 
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progressive political outlook. Throughout the 1980s therefore, the Church hierarchy (and 
some Catholic prelates) were on the receiving end of quite personal attacks from right-wing 
commentators, especially in The Spectator.  
This critique of liberal Anglicanism owed much to Edward Norman‟s thesis on how 
the modern Church had gradually moulded itself around contemporary secular culture. This 
process, Norman judged, had seeped into all areas of Church life, including its governance 
and ministry and especially its politics.23 Norman‟s judgement on modern Christianity, which 
was disseminated to a national audience in 1978 through his BBC Reith Lectures, was 
extremely influential and, as we shall see, the essence of his argument was rehearsed time and 
time again by traditionalist Anglicans, Anglican Conservative MPs, the moral lobby and New 
Right intellectuals on practically every occasion that liberal Anglicans sought to implement 
changes to the Church‟s ministry or speak out on political issues.24 By the end of the 1980s, 
the consensus was that liberal Christianity had not heralded a new dawn for the Church and 
had instead produced a liturgy and worship which repelled rather than attracted the laity, a 
liberal theology which questioned the fundamentals of the Christian faith, and a politicised 
prophecy which owed more to sociology and socialism than Scripture. This was of course, 
an interpretation beset with generalisations, flaws and inaccuracies, but it remained a 
particularly forceful argument with which to attack the Church leadership. 
 
The Moral Lobby 
The New Right‟s intellectual critique of the secular liberal elite was to find popular 
expression in the grassroots moral conservative movement. The emergence of this crusade, 
as Andrew Holden has shown, preceded Mrs Thatcher‟s leadership by some ten years or 
more, for the backlash against the „permissive legislation‟ was underway soon after the 
Royal Assent to these Acts had been granted.25 The most notable and the largest in terms of 
membership, was Mary Whitehouse‟s National Viewers‟ and Listeners‟ Association, which 
was founded in 1965 and promptly achieved a membership of over 300,000.26 This was in 
addition to pro-life groups, such as SPUC opposed to the 1967 Abortion Act and the 
Festival of Light (FoL), an evangelical Christian organisation, which combined missionary 
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activity with campaigns against obscenity and pornography.27 The FoL‟s high point came in 
the form of two mass rallies held in London‟s Trafalgar Square in 1971 and 1973, both of 
which were attended by over 20,000 people and attracted the support of prominent lay 
Christians including the chairman of the Synod‟s House of Laity, Sir Norman Anderson, 
the evangelical industrialist Sir Fried Catherwood, and Catholic anti-obscenity campaigner 
„Lord Porn‟ Longford.28 The moral movement attracted support from all Christian 
denominations, however, it drew most of its strength from evangelical Christianity, which 
was undergoing a renaissance in this period. The FoL in particular should be seen as part of 
this evangelical revival, although only one aspect of it.  For just as evangelicals such as FoL 
were evoking the pietistical tradition of individual conversion, others, such as David 
Sheppard, as we have seen, were rediscovering the social implications of the Word.  
Moral conservative groups continued to flourish under the more favourable climate 
of the Thatcher administration in the 1980s, which saw Catholic mother and anti-
contraception campaigner, Victoria Gillick, nearly stealing Mary Whitehouse‟s crown as the 
figurehead of the moral purity movement in Britain. Campaigning groups of this kind were 
hardly a new phenomenon in British history.29 Organisations such as the NVLA, however, 
were specifically in response to legal and social changes of the 1960s, in a belief that the 
liberalisation of the law and the prevailing counterculture had unleashed a wave of moral 
and sexual depravity that was corrupting the nation‟s youth and destroying the social fabric 
of society.  Their missionary efforts, therefore, were to a large extent, directed at legislators 
rather than the populace with the rationale being that restrictive laws guiding ethical 
conduct were essential for keeping society‟s moral virtue in check. Moral campaigners such 
as Whitehouse, Gillick and Lord Longford obtained a prominence in public life not seen 
since the nineteenth century, with the popular press instrumental in heightening the sense 
of a „culture war‟ between conservatives and liberals over the nation‟s moral code. It was 
thus Christian lay figures such as the Anglican Mary Whitehouse rather than Christian 
leaders, who became the mouthpiece of moralism in this period.  
 Notable for their mainly middle-class membership, these moral campaigns, not 
surprisingly, became a vehicle for promoting middle-class values of self-restraint, 
respectability and self-reliance. They are therefore part of the much wider story of middle-
class activism which exploded in the 1970s and whose political disillusionment Mrs 
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Thatcher would later tap into.30 Nor can the feminised character of these campaigns be 
overlooked.31 Whitehouse and Gillick both presented themselves as pious guardians of the 
sacred home; an image not-so dissimilar to Callum Brown‟s concept of a Christianised 
„feminine piety‟ which prevailed in the pre-1960s era.32  This respectable and rather discreet 
middle-class maternal activism proved an alluring contrast to the aggressive working-class 
masculinity on show at the picket lines or the brash ostentatiousness and radicalism of the 
feminist movement in this period. And it was precisely this persona that Mrs Thatcher 
would come to make her own; that of the middle-class suburban housewife, armed with 
handbag and a practical knowledge of household economics, determined to kick the ruling 
elite into shape.  
The moral lobby successfully fashioned itself as populist, anti-intellectual and anti-
Establishment, while its style of activism was self-consciously amateur in both tone and 
delivery.33 Like the New Right intelligentsia, the target for moral conservative groups was 
the secular liberal elite, who, they claimed, had ushered in the „permissive‟ legislation against 
the will of the socially conservative majority.34 As Victoria Gillick understood it, her battle 
was with the „secular humanist philosophy‟ of the Establishment and her success at 
generating support led her to conclude that „it was we, the people, who were now making all 
the running.‟35 The claim of a popular mandate by the moral lobby was dubious to say the 
least. Nonetheless, this juxtaposing of a liberal elite set against the popular will of the nation 
(also propagated by Enoch Powell on immigration) was a thread running throughout the 
discourse of the New Right and the traditionalist Anglican movement, and one Mrs 
Thatcher would excel in articulating to the electorate.36  
 In the aftermath of the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, the moral lobby came to 
increasingly link the nation‟s moral decay with its financial decline.  Monetary inflation and 
economic mismanagement seemed to have their parallels in delinquent behaviour and 
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excessive debauchery, which could only be resolved by financial and moral restraint. As Mrs 
Whitehouse insisted in a letter to Mrs Thatcher in June 1978, „the will to beat inflation‟ was 
„dependent upon the character of the people‟ which was „moulded in the home‟.37 In the 
1960s, consumerism and materialism had been viewed as much as a threat as collectivism 
by the moral lobby, and yet, by the end of the 1970s a belief that collectivism, 
„permissiveness‟ and national decline were all inter-linked, became the prevailing view 
within the moral conservative movement and indicated the ever-closer alliance between the 
moral lobby and the Conservative party.38  
Although they may have welcomed the Conservative victory in 1979, Britain‟s moral 
crusaders were to experience a somewhat frustrated relationship with the government over 
the course of the next decade. As Martin Durham and more recently, Andrew Holden have 
shown, for all Mrs Thatcher‟s public protestations about moral rectitude and family values, 
this rhetoric rarely translated into law. Her government did little to reverse the legislation of 
the 1960s and, in some cases, such as divorce, liberalised the regulations even further.39 Far 
from undertaking a „moralist offensive‟ on „permissive‟ Britain, Mrs Thatcher granted few 
concessions to the moral lobby.40  More often than not, the initiative came from 
backbenchers, as in the case of abortion reform, with the Prime Minister sometimes 
refusing to give these bills the necessary parliamentary time. According to Victoria Gillick, 
who fought an unsuccessful battle with the government over the issuing of contraception to 
under-age girls, the Conservative party‟s discourse on family values was nothing more than 
„electioneering humbug!‟41 Nor did these moral groups receive much support from those 
within the New Right. Economic liberals tended to air on the side of personal freedom, 
while many New Right intellectuals found their puritanical moralising slightly distasteful.42 
Anglican traditionalists on the other hand, were not only greatly in sympathy, but made up 
the majority of their members.  
                                                 
37
 Churchill College Archives, Margaret Thatcher Archive, 2/2/1/36, Letter from Mary Whitehouse, 
Valerie Riches, S. Cotson, Peter Dawson, and Ann Whitaker, 26 June 1978.   
38
 Andrew Holden has shown how the link between the moral lobby and the parties was not always as 
clear cut, especially in the 1960s, where moral campaigners found ample support amongst Nonconformist 
Labour members as well as Conservatives: Makers and Manners, chs.4-6. 
39
 Holden, Makers and Manners; Durham, Sex and Politics. 
40
 Durham, Sex and Politics, conclusion. 
41
 Quoted in Andrew Holden, Makers and Manners, p.226, from Victoria Gillick, A Mother’s Tale, 
(London, 1989), p.210.  
42
 See „In God‟s Name do we Moralise too much?‟ Daily Telegraph, 22 December 1986, in Moore & 
Heffer (eds.), A Tory Seer, p.178-9.    
 145 
Their support base in the parishes reflected the fact that a Christian motivation was 
at the root of the moral conservative movement.43 The original manifesto of the NVLA, for 
example, had begun with the declaration: „We women of Britain believe in a Christian way 
of life‟ and had listed those institutions in society, notably the BBC, which were threatening 
the religious and moral fibre of the nation.  The FoL, on the other hand, engaged in old-
style missionary activity, with the aim of winning over converts to the united causes of 
moral purity and faith in Christ. The Christian orientation of the moral movement is 
perhaps an obvious observation. Of more significance however, was the sense of 
frustration concerning the Church hierarchy‟s silence on these issues. There was a 
perception that religious leaders, especially the Anglican bishops, had embraced the moral 
relativism of the 1960s and were shying away from proclaiming Biblical notions of godly 
conduct.  Those within the moral lobby, therefore, saw themselves as occupying a space in 
the public domain that the Church had vacated; by campaigning for legislative change on 
obscenity and sexual regulation and proclaiming moral certainties which their spiritual 
leaders seemed reluctant to declare. Whitehouse and others not only objected to the 
Church‟s supposed lack of leadership on these issues, but also its unwillingness to publicly 
endorse their campaigns, which tended to receive a much more favourable reception in 
Parliament than in the Synod.44        
Historians of this movement have potentially downplayed the extent to which these 
campaigns were as much a reaction against the Church‟s apparent support of the „new 
morality‟ as it was against the „new morality‟ itself.45  Mary Whitehouse, therefore, frequently 
accused the Church of England leaders of having more in common with left-wing 
humanists than active Anglicans. During her Blasphemy trial against Gay News in 1977 for 
example, Whitehouse was concerned by the lack of support from the one institution she 
assumed she could rely upon: „I came under enormous attack from just everybody – dons, 
religious leaders, the media people. I was completely overwhelmed by the extent of the 
opposition, and the silence of the Church.‟46 The muteness of the Church leaders on such 
matters contrasted with their outspokenness on political issues, a point Whitehouse made 
ten years later in a speech in Liverpool in which she challenged the city‟s religious leaders, 
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David Sheppard and Derek Worlock, to condemn moral depravity with the same 
earnestness that they spoke out against social deprivation.47 The Director of the FoL was 
equally dismayed by the lack of support his organisation received from the Church: „it was 
the silence that worried us so much. The Church leaders right down to parish level seemed 
ignorant of or unwilling to face the facts of moral decay. Although they were the people 
who had the tools for identifying and combating it.‟48 These grassroots Christian campaigns 
had in part grown out of their Church‟s adoption of a more liberal line, and were thus a 
reflection of the underlying schism between reformists and traditionalists within 
Christianity. Although the moral lobby were highly critical of the churches, they directed 
their energy and campaigns towards Parliament, an indication of where they felt the real 
influence lied and to an extent, an acknowledgement of the increasing secular nature of 
British society.  
 
Economic Liberals 
The intellectual debt that Thatcherism owed to philosopher Frederick Hayek and economist 
Milton Friedman was widely recognised at the time and has been by historians since.49 The 
influence of economists and thinkers much closer to home has also been acknowledged. 
Important in this respect was the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), led by Lord Harris of 
High Cross, which had been advocating economic liberalism since the 1950s and in the mid-
1970s finally found its ideas being listened to by the Conservative leadership. Closely 
connected to the IEA was the Social Affairs Unit (SAU), established in 1980, and headed by 
Anglican clergyman Rev. Digby Anderson, which produced a series of pamphlets applying 
free market principles to social issues such as poverty, social security and education. Another 
think-tank, one directly aligned to the Conservative party, was the Centre for Policy Studies, 
which was established in 1974 by Conservative MP Keith Joseph and political analyst Alfred 
Sherman with the explicit purpose of converting the party to economic liberalism.  
Proponents of the market economy rooted their arguments in the sovereignty of 
liberty, which they proposed should determine a policy of minimal government 
interventionism in both the public and private realm. Central to this, was a belief that greater 
capital would eventually „trickle-down‟ to the poor, which was deemed to be a more effective 
method of ensuring a reduction in poverty than a re-distributative state. Ideologically 
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opposed to centralised government, economic liberals argued that rather than bringing about 
greater stability and fairness, the state merely slowed down the mechanism of wealth 
creation. The neutral market, in contrast, enabled citizens to exercise their self-interest while 
at the same time contributing to the common good. According to economic liberals, the 
Keynesian approach to economic management had strangulated the British economy, 
created a cumbersome and ineffective state, an over-powerful and disruptive trade union 
movement, and most disastrously of all, had fostered a dependency culture which had rid the 
British people of their industrial and entrepreneurial spirit. In their view, the priority of 
successive governments of maintaining mass employment had resulted in excessive levels of 
public expenditure and given rise to uncontrollable levels of inflation. Economic liberals 
proposed that curbing inflation by controlling the government money supply was essential, 
even if this resulted in widespread unemployment. The broader aim, economic liberals 
argued, should be to re-inject the principle of freedom back into Britain‟s economy, the state 
and its people. Not that there was uniformity about the precise implications of this 
philosophy; many disputed the responsibilities and size of the state and the degree to which 
the market should be regulated. Nonetheless, even if they differed on the details, there was 
an agreement on the fundamental causes and its remedy. 
Historians and commentators have long disputed the extent to which Mrs Thatcher 
implemented these ideas and it is not the place to answer this question here. Nevertheless, it 
can be said that even though political expediency may have prevented Mrs Thatcher from 
enacting the more extreme aspects of this doctrine, there is little doubt that her 
administration signalled a sea change in attitudes towards the governance of the economy 
and that Thatcherism was more or less defined by its adherence to the doctrines of 
economic liberalism. 
 Advocates of the market economy did not simply argue from a rational basis of 
effectiveness and efficiency, but frequently made claim to its moral, and often Christian 
credentials. As has been already alluded to, the Christian churches since the late nineteenth 
century had adopted an increasingly critical view of the virtues of industrialisation and, to an 
extent, had successfully undermined the perception that capitalist and Protestant values were 
naturally entwined. During the 1970s, economic liberals, armed with a renewed confidence 
that they alone had the solutions to Britain‟s woes, engaged in an intellectual pursuit to 
counter this moral denigration of capitalism by asserting its Christian basis.50 Drawing on its 
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nineteenth century precedents and building on the work of Hayek‟s critique of socialism and 
Milton Friedman‟s concept of individual freedom, the aim of this endeavour was twofold.  
Firstly, to refute the then widespread assumption of the moral superiority of egalitarianism 
and socialism, and secondly, to assert the Christian basis of the market economy.51  
This is not to say that all economic liberals were Christian, but rather to argue that 
there were important individuals whose writings on Christianity and capitalism directly 
shaped Thatcherism and subsequently the Conservative party‟s response to the Church. 
Brian Griffiths, an Anglican, who had held a post at City University, London and was an 
academic advisor to the Bank of England, was a notable figure. His lectures on „Morality and 
the Marketplace‟ delivered in 1980 had caught the attention of Mrs Thatcher, who made him 
her special advisor and eventually head of her policy unit.52 Also important was Lord Harris 
of High Cross at the IEA, who described himself as a „stumbling member‟ of the Church of 
England. Harris believed in the Biblical heritage of economy liberty and was particularly 
critical of what he considered to be the Church‟s naïve endorsement of a Christianised 
state.53 Both Griffiths and Harris entered into direct dialogue with the Church of England 
and regularly attended meetings at the BSR.54 
 On what Scriptural and theological basis did Christian economic liberals justify the 
market economy? The Revelation, they judged, operated on a concept of individual liberty, 
for God had bestowed on man free will to choose the path of righteousness or damnation. 
They considered that as man‟s relationship with God was defined by liberty, so this principle 
should also condition man‟s relationship with the state. Central to this theological outlook 
was an emphasis on the doctrine of original sin, which was positioned in contrast to the 
secular socialist utopian view of man and the state.  Lord Harris, for example, linked public 
choice theory with the inherent sinfulness of man in an effort to debunk the socialist myth 
of the exalted state. In Harris‟ view, an all-encompassing state did not further the common 
good but was mainly for the benefit of the post-Lapsarian bureaucratic class running it.55 The 
collectivist and benevolent state was therefore dismissed as a heretical fantasy as it assumed 
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the inherent goodness of humanity and promised the recreation of God‟s Kingdom on earth. 
Lord Harris and others did not shy away from informing the Church that its faith in 
collectivist solutions was misplaced for it incorrectly located sin within institutional and 
societal structures rather than in the individual. As one commentator writing in a SAU 
pamphlet pointed out: „The Churches would be on firmer ground if they stopped assuming 
that social evils can always be cured by intervention and that politicians somehow escaped 
the fall or have recovered the perfection of Eden.‟56 Behind these rather polemical words 
was a genuine belief that both politicians and churchmen needed to recognise the fallibility 
of the state and refocus their attention towards fallen man.  
For Christian economic liberals, whereas the state prevented man from carrying out 
his God-given liberty, the market on the other hand, because it operated as a neutral space 
(what Adam Smith famously called the „invisible hand‟), enabled man to exercise his moral 
free will. According to Lord Harris, the market was the most effective and natural system to 
operate in a fallen world because it worked with, rather than against, sinful man and thus 
enabled him to choose his own lifestyle, for good or ill.57  Where the Church had a role, 
Harris believed, was in nurturing and persuading man to execute his will for godly 
purposes.58 According to economic liberals, freedom rather than equality was correct 
fulfilment of Biblical doctrine. Many also discounted the notion of a Scriptural basis for 
social justice arguing that although the Bible explicitly referred to man‟s charitable duty, there 
was no clear scriptural endorsement for equality. The Church hierarchy‟s anointment of such 
values, they concluded, derived not from Scriptural evidence, but class-consciousness, more 
specifically middle-class guilt rather than Christian altruism or faith.59  
Christian economic liberals were more likely to be from the evangelical rather than 
the high-anglican tradition and showed only a mild interest in internal Anglican affairs such 
as the ordination of women or the „unbelieving bishop‟ incident. They were however, deeply 
involved in the political dialogue between liberal Anglicanism and the New Right. In 1984, 
the Rev. Digby Anderson and Lord Harris edited a collection of essays entitled The Kindness 
that Kills. The aim of the book was to unpick the ideological and political roots of Anglican 
social commentary which it denounced as an ungodly mixture of sociological ideas and naïve 
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paternalistic compassion. In a direct appeal to the laity, the authors warned against being 
taken in by the message emanating from the pens and lips of their spiritual leaders, for more 
often than not these were:  
 
Sloppy, ill-thought out, ignorant, one-sided, addicted to secular fashions, 
uncritical of conventional „progressive‟ wisdom, hysterical, unmethodical 
in the use of sources and evidence, theologically desiccated and, most 
deplorable, uncharitable to those who disagree.60 
 
These were harsh words, although sentiments which many in our next group would have 
agreed with.  
 
Traditional Anglicans   
Just as the 1970s saw a „conservative turn‟ in the political, moral and economic spheres, so a 
parallel development took place within religion. As has already been set out in chapter II, the 
division between conservative and liberal Anglicans dated back to the religious crisis of the 
1960s and in many ways supplanted existing factions. This break, therefore, added another 
layer of friction over existing tensions, with anglo-catholic traditionalists fearing that liberal 
reformism was destroying tradition and evangelical conservatives anxious that it was at the 
expense of Scriptural authority and the proselytising mission. The dualism between 
traditionalists and modernisers could be felt in all areas of ecclesiastical policy from liturgy to 
politics and a tension that reverberated across the Anglican Communion.61 Within England, 
the 1980s saw the formation of groups such as the evangelical „Action for Biblical Witness to 
our Nation‟ and the anglo-catholic, „Anglican Campaign‟ both of which were manifestations 
of the prevailing dissatisfaction with the ecclesiastical leadership and the direction of the 
Church.62 The large number of publications pertaining to a crisis within Anglicanism penned 
by traditionalists – critiques which often interlinked its theological, moral and political 
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direction – are also testimony to the widespread disillusionment felt by traditionalist 
Anglicans in this period.63 
This division loosely paralleled left/right political boundaries, so whilst reformists 
tended to be on the side of progressive politics, traditionalists shared a political outlook with 
those on the right. Traditionalist Anglicanism proved to be in harmony with the broad ethos 
of the New Right in respect to its aversion to liberalism, its distrust of an elite liberal 
hierarchy, its claims to a populist (lay) mandate, its strict and conservative views on personal 
morality and its appeals to tradition and authority. Therefore, one of the reasons why the 
Anglican traditionalist cause managed to achieve the prominence that it did in the eighties 
was that it had sympathetic and influential allies in both the press and Parliament, not just 
the pulpit.64  
The spilt between traditionalist and reformist Anglicanism reached its apogee over 
the female ordination issue. While liberals believed it was a natural and just extension of 
God‟s priesthood, traditionalists (disproportionately anglo-catholics) contended that it 
demonstrated the Church prioritising secular notions of gender equality over Scriptural 
authority. Anglo-catholics were also particularly concerned that the issue threatened the 
Church of England‟s membership to the Universal Catholic Church. Diocesan and General 
Synod meetings were consumed with this issue and when in 1992 the Measure finally passed, 
it triggered an irrevocable breach with anglo-catholics leaving the Church of England.65 This 
aside, the 1980s witnessed two specific episodes, outlined below, which give a crucial insight 
into the highly fractious state of the Church during this period.  
Traditionalist fears concerning the infiltration of a radical liberal theology within the 
Church seemed confirmed in 1984 when the Bishop-elect David Jenkins denied the 
historical validity of the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection and the miracles of Jesus during an 
interview on TV.  Unlike John Robinson, whose theological views had caused a similar 
outrage twenty years before, Jenkins had not explained his position in a 200-page book, but 
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on TV, where the full complexity of his outlook had been shredded on the editing table.66 
Moreover, Jenkins was about to be elevated to one of the most senior posts in the Church of 
England, the ceremony for which would involve swearing an oath to uphold the principles 
of the Anglican faith. Days after the TV broadcast York Minster was struck by lightening, 
turning the episode into a complete farce, with the press deeming it as God exhibiting his 
wrath on Jenkins.67 
A public outcry followed, with traditional Anglicans from both the evangelical and 
high-anglican wings of the Church calling for the „unbelieving bishop‟ to be deselected.68 In 
their view, the Jenkins‟ episode revealed the extent to which liberal doctrine had permeated 
the Church, for even senior prelates, heirs of the Apostolic Succession, were now denying 
the essentials of Christian belief and promoting views which were „indistinguishable from 
Jehovah‟s Witness and even Hindu belief‟.69 Much of the reaction to Jenkins‟ comments was 
hot air, yet there was a genuine concern, as one group of theologians explained in a letter to 
the Archbishop of York, that this „novel and speculative theology‟ had been uttered by a 
leading primate on television in front of millions which would result in much confusion and 
upset amongst the laity and the non-churchgoing mass.70 Perhaps sensing this, diocesan 
bishops took great care to clarify Jenkins‟ precise meaning to their parishioners.71 Meanwhile 
the House of Bishops hastily ushered out a public declaration affirming their belief in the 
historical reality of the Resurrection, the Virgin Birth and the miracles of Jesus.72 For many 
traditionalist Anglicans, however, the damage had already been done. 
Three years later, in 1987, the Church would experience one of the bleakest episodes 
in its modern history, one, which would further illustrate, in a deeply tragic and rather public 
way, the tensions within Anglicanism. It had been an established custom that the biennial 
Crockford‟s Clerical Directory, a reference book listing Anglican clergy, would feature an 
anonymous preface by an ordained priest. For the 1987 edition, the task fell to Oxford 
theologian and prominent member of the traditional anglo-catholic faction, the Rev. Gareth 
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Bennett.73  His preface, which was published unedited, amounted to a candid and damning 
attack on the leadership of the Church of England. Bennett directed his anger towards the 
„liberal mafia‟ leading the Church, which, in his mind, were deliberately marginalising 
evangelical conservatives and anglo-catholic traditionalists and thereby endangering the 
comprehensiveness of Anglicanism. The Church of England, Bennett contended, was in a 
crisis of identity, for the unitary features which had kept the disparate factions together; the 
Church-state relationship; the Book of Common Prayer; its ministry; and finally, its 
conservative theological tradition, were gradually being eroded. Bennett laid much of the 
blame for this situation on the Archbishop of Canterbury, whom he described as one 
predisposed „to put off all questions until someone else makes a decision for him‟.74 The 
vituperative tone of the piece inevitably meant that the preface would not go unnoticed and 
it was quickly picked up by the national press, while journalists engaged in a witch-hunt to 
uncover the identity of the anonymous author. Fearful that his name was about to be 
revealed, Bennett committed suicide at his home in Oxford.  
 
The Conservative Party 
If these groups – the New Right intellectuals, moral lobby, economic liberals and Anglican 
traditionalists – together constituted the „right turn‟ in British public life in the 1970s, then it 
was the Conservative party led by Mrs Thatcher, which would ensure that there would be no 
turning back. In the aftermath of two election defeats in 1974, the Conservative party, 
engineered by Keith Joseph, underwent a „conversion experience‟, rejecting the consensus 
politics of the past and embracing the principles of economic liberalism and social 
conservatism. In Joseph‟s mind, the ideological foundations of Conservatism had been 
compromised during the postwar years, for the „middle ground‟ that the party had then 
occupied, „had not been a secure basis but a slippery slope to socialism‟.75 Joseph‟s words on 
the perversion of Conservatism paralleled Edward Norman‟s thesis on the corruption of 
Anglicanism; both Church and party, it was believed, had been steered down the wrong 
course which had fundamentally undermined their integrity.  
Thatcherism would draw upon the central threads of New Right thinking, including 
its populism, its anti-elitism, a critical view of liberalism and the state, its disdain for moral 
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„permissiveness‟ and its belief in individual responsibility.76 Significantly, as we shall see, the 
Conservative party also shared the New Right‟s Christian outlook. In ethos, and in some 
cases specifics, the Conservative party led by Mrs Thatcher, sided with the traditionalist wing 
of the Church; refuting not only the leadership‟s progressive political outlook, but also the 
central tenets of liberal Anglicanism including its approach to liturgy, governance and 
personal morality.   
Enoch Powell, who is often credited with paving the way for Mrs Thatcher, is worth 
reflecting upon here as someone who combined these two threads of religious and political 
conservatism.77 A devout Anglican from the evangelical wing of the Church, Powell was a 
recognised Testament scholar who spent his dying days working on a revised translation of 
St John‟s Gospel.78 His views on race immediately put him at odds with the Anglican 
leadership, but this was not the only issue on which Powell positioned himself against the 
liberal Anglican consensus. A fierce defendant of the 1662 Prayer Book, he considered 
female ordination a „blasphemous pantomime‟, had an unflinching (and somewhat 
anachronistic) belief in the supremacy of Parliament over the Church and was deeply hostile 
to any ecumenical alliances with Rome.79 Powell also took a sceptical view of social 
Christianity. In 1969 in a televised debate with Bishop Trevor Huddlestone, Powell asserted 
that their divergent views on race stemmed from „opposing secular observations‟ rather than 
differing religious beliefs, telling Huddlestone that his faith was merely an after-thought in 
this process: „when you are gratified with the conclusions that you arrive at, you dignify them 
as the consequence of Christian belief.‟80  
Powell may have stated that his faith was separate from his politics, yet there is no 
doubt that his political conservatism complemented his religious conservatism in tone, if not 
in content. Like Lord Harris, Powell‟s distrust of utopian visions of the state (and thus large-
scale investment in it) was rooted in a doctrinal appreciation of man‟s imperfect nature, while 
his political faith in liberty stemmed from an understanding of individual free will as the 
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essence of Christianity. Addressing a congregation in South London in 1973, for example, 
Powell tackled the subject of human progress and sin, affirming that the Bible did not 
contain a blueprint for human advancement or optimistic visions on the perfectibility of man 
on earth, for its message was quite the contrary; „it uniformly teaches…that things will get 
worse rather than get better before we are through.‟81 Powell‟s target was both social 
Christianity and socialism with his emphasis of the doctrine of the Fall assuming both sacred 
and secular significance. This emphasis on original sin by traditionalist Anglicans was no 
accident. Edward Norman has argued that this doctrine was the key difference that separated 
Christianity from secular humanism. The contemporary Church, however, had 
accommodated its teaching around this new secularised vision of man, amounting to a 
reformulation of sin which looked to structural forces rather than the individual. While 
Norman and Powell‟s assessments of social Christianity were highly subjective, it illustrates 
how contrasting emphases on individual and corporate sin became the main dividing line 
between the two factions within Christianity. There are obvious problems of attributing 
generalisations to Enoch Powell; for good or ill, he was independent and an exceptional 
figure. Yet there is surely significance in the fact that the man who laid the political 
foundations of Thatcherism, was not only motivated by a strong Christian commitment, but, 
from the 1960s, was articulating the theological differences between liberal Anglicanism and 
the New Right that would come to characterise the Church-state conflict in the 1980s.82  
Even by the late-1970s, it was clear that leading Conservatives had recalibrated their 
party‟s philosophy and more importantly, were drawing on the doctrine of original sin with 
which to do so. As Conservative party historian Stuart Ball has rightly pointed out, the 
notion of original sin had long been a feature of the party‟s ethos, acting as the basis for its 
moral position and its distrust of idealised socialist visions of human progress.83 
Conservative scholar Anthony Quinton, in his exploration of Conservative thought since 
the Reformation, has also judged that British Conservatism was predicated on a notion of 
„imperfection‟ which fuelled its respect for the past and its scepticism towards the radical 
and the new.84  This tradition became much more pronounced in the 1970s as the party‟s 
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leadership sought new ways of addressing the crisis in social democracy and justifying the 
shift in emphasis from the state to the market. In a pamphlet written by Nigel Lawson in 
1980 entitled The New Conservatism, the future Chancellor claimed that original sin was the 
key doctrine which separated the main political parties. Whereas socialism was deemed the 
„creed of utopianism and the perfectibility of man‟, Conservatism concerned „the creed of 
original sin and the politics of imperfection‟.85 Lawson proposed that this belief in fallen 
man manifested itself politically in three ways: firstly it meant a distrust in the idea of 
human progress coupled with a regard for the past; secondly it engendered a scepticism 
towards man-made institutions, particularly the state; and thirdly, it encouraged a belief in 
gradual conservative change. Like Lord Harris, Lawson also drew on the concept of the Fall 
and public choice theory as a way of challenging the false notion of the state as a path to 
societal salvation: „We are all imperfect – even the most high minded civil servant….the 
civil servants and middle-class welfare professionals are far from the selfless Platonic 
guardians of paternalist mythology: they are a major interest group in their own right.‟86 All 
this was a clear exercise in political demarcation; the deployment of the notion of original 
sin in order to distinguish neo-Conservatism from socialism and the Tory party‟s postwar 
mutations. This theological concept may have been divorced from its spiritual context and 
applied to rational political argument, but nonetheless, it had the effect of positioning neo-
Conservatism alongside the party‟s earlier more religious formations and lending a Christian 
fervor and dogmatic coherence to the neo-Conservative ideology. Mrs Thatcher, as we shall 
see in the proceeding chapter, would go on to enunciate these claims with even greater 
alacrity and within a more explicit theological framework.  
Having set out the various components of the New Right and its connection to 
Christianity and to Thatcherism, this thesis will now go on to explore the ramifications of 
all of this for the relationship between the Conservative party and the Church in the 1980s. 
 
II. The Conservative Party’s Critique of Anglicanism   
It is judged that long before Mrs Thatcher came to power, Christianity had ceased to be a 
central component of Conservative party identity.87 As the above analysis suggests, it was 
disillusionment rather than disinterest, which characterised the relationship between the 
right and the Church in the 1970s. The subsequent decade saw a revival rather than a 
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retrenchment in ecclesiastical affairs amongst Conservative parliamentarians. From the mid-
1970s, Parliament became one of the key locations for the traditionalist campaign against 
the liberal Church leadership, with Conservative Anglicans using the opportunity of the 
passing of Church Measures to offer their critical judgment on where the Church was going 
wrong.88 The 1980s saw Parliament twice reject Measures (in 1984 and 1989), and, 
controversially, saw the introduction of a bill on liturgy, which, had it passed, would have 
been legally binding for parishes. The initiative did not come from the Conservative party 
leadership, nor was it a battle that much interested Labour or Alliance MPs, but involved an 
extremely well organised group of Christian Conservative MPs and peers.89 It is difficult to 
put a precise figure on this parliamentary faction, at the very least it comprised of a core of 
about thirty MPs and, at most, it could amass about one hundred members in the 
Commons, over a third of the parliamentary party.90 Although the principal opposition 
came from the Commons (which historically has always been less deferential to the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy) there was also an important cluster of support in the Lords 
including Lord Sudeley and cross-bencher Baroness Cox. Its members came from both the 
evangelical and the high-anglican wings of the Church and included MPs such as lay Synod 
member John Stokes, William Powell, Ivor Stanbrook, Harry Greenway and Enoch Powell, 
as well as those MPs who gained notoriety as „moral crusaders‟ in this period such as Dame 
Jill Knight and Ann Winterton.  
 
Establishment and the Rule of Parliament  
The formation of the General Synod in 1970 had been heralded as a new dawn for 
ecclesiastical autonomy. When in 1974, church officials proposed a further extension of 
Synodical powers to give the chamber full responsibility over its liturgy it was assumed that 
Parliament would willingly grant these powers to the Church. When the Worship and 
Doctrine Measure reached the Commons however, it inspired a fierce reaction from 
Anglican Conservative MPs who perceived it to be a further nail in the coffin to the historic 
principle of Anglican establishment and signalling, in the words of one MP, „the 
denationalisation of the Church of England‟.91 Conservative MPs considered that the 
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ecclesiastical desire for even greater autonomy was symptomatic of the Church‟s 
predilection for reform and its complete disregard for its historic relationship to Parliament. 
For Enoch Powell, a fully „self-governed‟ Church fundamentally altered the foundations of 
established Anglicanism and ultimately resulted in the separation of the Church from the 
nation:  
 
There are still to be considered those millions of men and women to 
whom it belongs – albeit occasionally – and there are still those in 
generations yet to come for whom the comprehensiveness of the Church 
of England will give a religious home, a home in the church, which other 
wise they would not find. The only representatives of that Church of 
England are those who created the Church of England by establishing it 
by law, namely, this House.92 
 
That the Church‟s identity and authority derived from its relationship with Parliament was a 
concept that few clergy would have endorsed.  As we have seen in Chapter II, the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy in the 1980s reconfigured the position of the established Church by 
rooting its legitimacy not in its links to temporal power, but in its role in civil society and in 
providing a spiritual focus for a nominally Christian nation. Anglican Conservatives 
articulated establishment in quite different terms, arguing that it centred on Parliament as 
the crucial mediator between the Church and the people.  In seeking to dissolve this bond, 
Anglican Conservatives argued, the Church was in danger of cutting itself off from the 
populace and undermining one of the central tenets of the English constitution. 
Arguably, both these conceptions of establishment religion were misconceived and 
were defensive responses to the broader secular trends in British society. In the 
Conservative case, it had been a long time since the Church had been fully subservient to 
Parliament, nor did the concept of the Commons as the guardian of popular religiosity bear 
any relation to how the majority of the public perceived Christianity and the Church. The 
purpose behind this argument, however, was to position Conservative Anglicans and the 
traditionalist cause on the side of history at a time when Anglicans were locked in a debate 
about the direction of their Church. Moreover, this appeal to the nation‟s constitutional 
history had an additional resonance for Conservatives for it harked back to a time when the 
Church and party had been in alliance, defenders and protectors of each other‟s interests. 
The Anglican Conservative reaction in fact concealed an altogether different fear: not that 
the Church was distancing itself from Parliament, but that it was distancing itself 
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irrevocably from the Conservative party. As Conservative Anglican MP William Powell 
explained in a letter to a sympathetic Bishop of Peterborough in 1984, the supremacy of 
Parliament was necessary in order to save Anglicanism from „narrow paths‟ and „unwanted 
reforms‟. In his view, the Church needed to regain its spirit not through secular causes or 
ecumenicalism but in an „acceptance of the Royal Supremacy‟.93 Ostensibly, Powell was 
urging the Church to return to its traditional source of power, yet the implicit message here 
was that Anglican Conservatives in Parliament were saving the Church from liberal 
reformism and were redirecting it back to its Conservative roots.   
As the Church‟s doctrinal, moral and political position became more controversial 
and tensions between Church and government more fraught, Anglican Conservatives 
returned to this argument again and again, frequently situating Parliament against the 
Synod. Back in 1974, in the debate on the Worship and Doctrine Measure, Anglican 
Conservative John Stokes had observed that the Synod, in contrast to the Commons, was 
unaccountable and out of touch with its members.94 Fifteen years later in 1989, Stokes made 
an even bolder claim. Reflecting upon his own recent experience as a member of the House 
of Laity, Stokes concluded that it was MPs at Westminster rather than representatives in the 
Synod who „more accurately‟ expressed the concerns of the ordinary man in the pew.95  The 
Synod became an easy target for all those frustrated with the direction of the Church.  In a 
contribution to a book entitled The Church in Crisis, Charles Moore criticised the Synod for 
having all the worst characteristics of „modern secular politics‟ with its obstructive 
procedures, bureaucratic structure and self-serving Synodical class. The existence of a 
separate chamber, he complained, completely undermined the historical concept that „the 
Church of England is the property of the English people (and therefore looked after them 
by their elected representatives).‟96  As Moore‟s sentiments suggest, there was a tendency 
amongst some traditionalist Anglicans (inside and outside the House) to claim that the 
unchurched mass were on the traditionalist side of the divide and felt alienated and adrift 
from liberal Anglicanism. This was a highly contestable assumption. Much more accurate 
was the fact that parliamentary prerogative had assumed new relevance in an age when the 
church was divided. For, as John Gummer spelt out in 1990, the ecclesiastical responsibility 
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of Parliament was to stand up for those „who have been disfranchised by the mechanisms 
of the Church‟.97  
Just as Conservatives did not particularly welcome the Church‟s intervention in 
politics, so clerics were not particularly keen on MPs interfering in ecclesiastical matters. 
When in 1986 Conservative Anglicans demanded regular meetings with the bishops to 
discuss forthcoming Church Measures, the request was refused by the Bishop of 
Southwark. This prompted an angry response from Ivor Stanbrook MP who rebuked: „To 
you, who do not relish democratic argument, it appears we are a nuisance.‟98 Frank Field, 
who sat on the Ecclesiastical Committee, the body that scrutinised Church Measures before 
they were submitted to the House, put such tensions down to the dismissive attitude of the 
Anglican leadership, who expected Westminster to simply rubber-stamp Measures.99 Field 
was no doubt right, but there is also evidence that the Anglican traditionalist faction in the 
Synod were actively in cahoots with Conservative MPs and were seeking to mobilise 
parliamentary opposition against the Church. In 1986 Lay Synod member Kathleen 
Griffiths wrote to Enoch Powell suggesting a meeting between „conservative Synod 
members‟ and MPs in order to coordinate a „common policy‟ to subvert the prevailing 
„ecclesiasticism‟.100 Even though it may never have been formalised, this was to prove an 
extremely effective alliance throughout the 1980s. 
 
Liturgy and Theology  
The first issue on which Anglican Conservatives in Westminster linked up with traditional 
Anglicans was the defence of the 1662 version of the Common Book of Prayer. From the 
early 1960s, the Church had produced three different updated versions of the liturgy, much 
to the dismay of some laity, yet it was the proposal of a further revision, entitled the 
Alternative Service Book, which led a group of Anglicans to establish the Prayer Book 
Society (PBS) in 1975. Dedicated to preserving the use of the 1662 Rite, which it deemed 
the „spiritual birthright of the nation‟, the PBS had by the end of the 1970s established a 
strong support network in the parishes and recruited a considerable number of MPs and 
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peers (mostly Conservative) to fight its cause.101  In a strategic attempt to put as much 
pressure on the Church hierarchy as possible, the PBS amassed an impressive collection of 
signatures from leading figures from Britain‟s military, academic, legal and literary spheres 
in a petition to protect the Prayer Book, which was eventually presented to the Synod.102  
Twenty-nine parliamentarians had signed the document, the majority of whom had 
been Conservatives, including three members of Mrs Thatcher‟s first cabinet.103 Even 
before the petition idea had been mooted, Anglican Conservative MPs and peers were 
agreed that the PBS campaign should be raised within Parliament. In 1978, renegade 
Conservative peer Lord Sudeley, who could trace his ancestral roots back to one of the 
Knights who had murdered Thomas à Beckett, himself engaged in a similar act of defiance 
against spiritual authority by attempting to defend the 1662 version of the Prayer Book. The 
Prayer Book (Ballot of Laity) Bill, as it was known, aimed at allowing each parish to conduct 
a vote to decide which liturgical version they would prefer to be used.104  Sudeley‟s bill was 
controversial, for it was the first time since the Enabling Act of 1919 that Church legislation 
had been initiated in Parliament. As such it was regarded as a dangerous precedent, with the 
then Bishop of London, Gerald Ellison, labelling it „an attack upon the whole system of 
Church government.‟105 Despite support in the House, Sudeley agreed to withdraw the bill 
at the Second Reading stage. Three years later, in 1981, another distinguished aristocrat 
took up the cause, the newly elected Conservative MP and heir to the Salisbury title, 
Viscount Cranborne.106 Fearing the potential constitutional ramifications, the government 
enforced the whip on this occasion, however Cranborne still succeeded in gaining 152 (to 
130) majority in favour of the bill progressing. It was duly introduced as the Prayer Book 
Protection Bill in the Lords later that day, but on mutual agreement by both Houses, the 
bill was abandoned.107 These attempts by Parliamentarians to curb liturgical reform were 
never likely to succeed, but, as the Archbishop of York later admitted, it had „served as a 
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protest‟ and proved much more effective than the petition to the Synod.108 And to an 
extent, a certain victory had been won of sorts, for the combined campaign from Anglican 
parliamentarians and the PBS forced the Archbishop of Canterbury to give his personal 
assurances that the Book of Common Prayer would not be fazed out of the parishes or the 
Church‟s theological training colleges.109  
The defence of the Prayer Book had revealed much about the traditionalist cause 
and parliamentary Conservatism‟s place within it. The campaign had centred on an 
understanding that the 1662 Rite was a central part of the „intellectual and emotional 
scaffolding‟ of the nation‟s religious heritage, in that it connected practising and non-
practising Anglicans, and past and present generations.110 As the Earl of Halsbury explained, 
in a „gimmicky‟ and „uncomfortable‟ age, it was wrong for the Church to subject liturgy to 
such fleeting desires: „there is something timeless about worship, where an actual 
contribution is made by feeling that you are doing exactly the same thing in exactly the 
same way as your longfathers of old.‟111 Yet the idea that the 1662 Rite was somehow 
„timeless‟ was not strictly true, the 1928 Revised Prayer Book had been used widely in 
English parishes for the last fifty years.112 There was far from uniformity between the 
parishes, let alone across successive generations within the Church of England.113 
Nonetheless, this invention of tradition and this evocation of continuity with the past 
demonstrated a common thread between political and religious conservatism. 
 The campaign to protect the Prayer Book was deliberately fashioned as a defence 
of Englishness rather than as an Anglican or even a religious issue. This was done by 
emphasising its literary significance and as a central instrument of popular religiosity, part of 
the „natural furniture of the mind‟ of the nation.114 As one PBS supporter lamented in 1979, 
in an age when „This country has lost an Empire and has not found a role‟ it was an „entirely 
inappropriate time to obliterate the Book of Common Prayer by endless nervous variations 
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and forfeit utterly any way of saying our public prayers in unison.‟115  Similar thoughts were 
echoed by traditionalist Anglican Rev. Peter Mullen, who, in a letter to Enoch Powell in 
1984, spoke of the centrality of Englishness to his understanding of Anglicanism: „Our 
English Church….It‟s that word “English” that counts, isn‟t it? I offer no hostility to 
strangers within our gates, but England is what makes us what we are.‟116 That Mullen had 
interlinked immigration, Englishness and Anglicanism in a letter to Enoch Powell is 
perhaps unsurprising, yet it also signals the way in which traditionalists linked fears about 
national and religious decline. Such references to decolonisation and immigration suggest 
that the campaign was as much a reflection of concerns about the dilution and weakening 
of Englishness than it was about religious liturgy.117  
The next episode over which Anglican Conservatives demonstrated their wrath 
against the Church leadership was over the „unbelieving Bishop‟ affair in 1984. In July, a 
few months after Jenkins‟ notorious interview, MPs were given a forum to vent their 
frustrations in the debate on the Appointments of Bishops Measure. As the last piece of 
House business at the end of the day and with only forty-nine MPs in attendance, it was 
assumed that this minor piece of Church legislation on the election procedure for bishop 
appointees would quickly be granted parliamentary assent.118 The debate was sparsely 
attended (not one Labour MP was present), yet an important cluster of aggrieved Anglican 
Conservatives showed up determined to vocalise their concerns about the „agnostic‟ 
Jenkins.119 At 12.21am the vote was taken and lost, with thirty-two voting against the 
Measure (seventeen voted for it). Although the numbers were small, the result was 
significant for it was the first time that Parliament had dismissed a Church Measure since 
the formation of the Synod in 1970.  
Not content with this victory, aggrieved Anglican Conservatives wrote to the Prime 
Minister to lobby for increasing temporal influence on the Crown Appointments 
Commission, the body which selected the bishops.120 The Jenkins‟ saga, they believed, was a 
result of the Church having too much control over its ecclesiastical patronage, which had 
led to a series of radical appointments all moulded in the Anglican reformist tradition. All 
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the signs were that the Prime Minister did not wish to be drawn into any constitutional rifts 
over the separate powers of Church and Crown. Mrs Thatcher however was aware of the 
potential of „bishop-bashing‟ for rousing the party faithful, as she demonstrated that 
autumn in her conference speech, in which she made derogatory remarks about Bishop 
Jenkins. 
The defeat of the Appointments Measure received a mixed response from those 
within the Church. Canon Buchanan, speaking in the Synod, interpreted the vote as a 
„declaration of war‟ from Parliament.121 The Archbishop of Canterbury, on the other hand, 
clearly thought it prudent to inject some spiritual diplomacy, immediately writing to Enoch 
Powell to ask for a meeting to discuss the matter.122 It is evident, however, that many 
traditional Anglicans welcomed this intervention, interpreting the defeat as a necessary 
flexing of Parliament‟s muscles against an arrogant Church leadership. One reader writing 
to The Times expressed his relief that the English Constitution „possesses those abilities to 
check and restrain which are so irritating to modern prelates and ecclesiastical 
intellectuals.‟123 One lay Anglican wrote to Enoch Powell personally to thank him for his 
interception, judging it essential at a time when church leaders „seem to compromise to get 
into secular matters and to give up its call to draw those things into the spirit of 
Christianity.‟124 Long-time lay Synod member, Gervase Duffield also penned a letter to 
Powell conveying his gratitude confirming that in his experience „the ordinary run of church 
folk‟ were not represented in the church‟s assembly and concluded that „if Parliament does 
not protect them no-one will from those awful ecclesiastical sectarians and their trendy 
ways.‟125 Such letters merely confirmed what Anglican Conservative MPs already knew: that 
they represented the views of a significant and dissatisfied section within the Church.  
If Anglican Conservatives in Parliament were emerging as the defenders of the 
traditional cause then there is ample proof that this was recognised by some sympathetic 
churchgoers. Confident that her predicament would find sympathy with Enoch Powell, one 
female lay Anglican from Birmingham wrote to Powell to complain about her vicar‟s 
wayward practises, which allegedly included prayers for the women of Greenham Common, 
the celebration of Communion by the Vicar‟s wife and the use of the parish for a Muslim 
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funeral.126 In the previous chapter we saw how parishioners in Liverpool believed that their 
spiritual leaders were vocalising their political priorities, however, it is clear that other 
sections of the Christian laity considered that their political representatives, such as Enoch 
Powell, were protecting their religious concerns.  Hence the 1980s saw an interesting 
paradox develop, for just as the Church justly claimed to speak on behalf of the socially 
deprived and those who felt neglected by the government, so Conservative Anglicans spoke 
on behalf of the spiritually deprived who felt detached from their Church and ignored by its 
leaders.  
 
Morality  
In 1989 Conservative Anglicans successfully defeated another Church Measure, a proposal 
to allow remarried or divorced men to be ordained. This had been a contentious issue 
before it had even reached the House, splitting both the Synod and the Ecclesiastical 
Committee.127 When the Measure reached the House of Commons, it was defeated by 51 
votes to 45. Seven months later, the Church reintroduced it (at a more respectable hour in 
the day hence the larger vote) when it passed by 228 votes to 106; but, according to John 
Gummer, only on the „strength of votes from atheists and agnostics‟.128  
The significance of the Clergy Ordination episode lies not in the fact that it was 
initially rejected but in how the debate raised the issue of the Church‟s position on morality. 
This would be a topic, which would inspire even greater interest from Conservative MPs 
than the rather narrow intricacies of ecclesiastics or liturgy. For many Anglican 
Conservatives the Measure smacked of hypocrisy for it directly contravened the Church‟s 
teaching on marriage as a life-long commitment.  Anglican Conservative and moral 
campaigner Ann Winteron was less concerned about the ramifications for the priesthood 
than about what the Measure revealed about the Church‟s moral leadership. Winterton 
considered that the position of the Church was crucial „at a time when the country is 
longing for a strong moral lead‟. While Winterton admitted that MPs may be reluctant to 
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„take on the established Church and to give it a boot up the backside‟, she urged them to 
challenge the „liberal trends on matters of morality‟ and vote against a Measure which made 
a „mockery of the Church‟s teaching‟.129 
One of the chief characteristics of the moral lobby, as we have seen, was the way in 
which it castigated the Anglican hierarchy for its „soft‟ line on morality and these 
frustrations were shared by Anglican Conservatives in Parliament. Historians Andrew 
Holden and Martin Durham have both shown how, during the Thatcher period, the moral 
impetus for legislative change in the Conservative party largely came from a core group of 
backbenchers. Yet, while their Christian motivation is often mentioned, the tendency has 
been to locate this movement within a political rather than a religious context. Those MPs 
and peers who so forcefully pursued moral causes in Westminster – on which the 
reputation of the Thatcher government as moral authoritarian largely rests – were not 
simply inspired by Christian faith, but more importantly, were aligned with the traditionalist 
wing of the Church.130 We must be careful not to overstate this connection, for matters of 
conscience, as has historically always been the case, engaged members of all parties and 
faiths in Parliament in the 1980s.131 Yet there is a definite correlation between those 
Conservatives who supported Section 28, restrictions on abortion and pornography and 
those who took the traditionalist line and voted against Church Measures in this period.132 
Leading members of the moral group within Parliament therefore, tended to be disaffected 
Anglican Conservatives who judged that both Parliament and Church were failing in their 
moral duty to oppose „social permissiveness‟.133 Pressure on the government for greater 
moral regulation was, therefore, couched in an explicitly Christian rather than moral 
discourse and was often coupled with an attack on the Church‟s leadership.  
Speaking in 1981, during the Indecent Displays Bill, Anglican Conservative Sir Peter 
Mills took the opportunity to reflect on what he considered to be the cause of society‟s 
moral degradation: 
 
  I make no apology for saying that I believe that the permissive society 
has gone too far….……I hope that it will not be taken amiss if I quote 
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the Good Book – “Righteousness exalteth a nation.”  We are dealing 
here with a question of righteousness. …. upon which all-else stands, 
there are God's laws. Chip away at the bottom and the whole thing starts 
to collapse – democracy and all that we stand for in this place and in our 
nation.‟134 
 
As Sir Peter‟s remarks suggest, Conservative Anglicans perceived that an ungodly 
„permissiveness‟ had been unleashed when British law had become disconnected from its 
Christian roots, believing that the only way to re-establish this bond was to bring about a 
moral renaissance in society and law.135 Anglican Conservatives deployed similar arguments 
in opposition to their government‟s Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act, which aimed 
at reducing the waiting time for a divorce. Dame Jill Knight, for example, argued that the 
spiritual legitimacy bestowed on the state through the established Church meant that the 
government was duty-bound to ensure that divorce was discouraged.136 Harry Greenway MP 
put it even more forcefully, declaring „this debate is about marriage and God‟s interpretation 
of it, not about man‟s legal interpretation of marriage, because it is a gift of God.‟137 
Traditionalists tended, therefore, to conceptualise sexual ethics in terms of a 
purist/Christian versus a „permissive‟/secular dualism, with the expectation that the Church 
should be taking the lead in reasserting Christian standards. According to Anglican 
Conservatives, the problem was that all too frequently Church leaders appeared to be on the 
„permissive/secular‟ end of this spectrum.138 This frustration was evident in the passage of 
the notorious Section 28 Clause of the 1988 Local Government Act outlawing the 
promotion of homosexuality in schools. The debate centred on the flagrancy of municipal 
socialism, parental rights and the protection of innocent children, and also fed into the 
prevailing anxieties about homosexuality in the wake of the AIDS epidemic.139 Many 
Anglican Conservatives spoke of their support for the clause in respect to the maintenance 
of Biblical and Christian standards within society. Nicholas Bennett MP, for example, 
contended that the Scriptural teaching on homosexuality was unequivocal and that, as Britain 
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was a Christian country, the nation‟s schools had an obligation to teach about relationships 
in accordance with the „Judaic-Christian principles which underlie our society‟.140  
Given this Christian outlook, it was unsurprising that many Anglican Conservatives 
raised the issue of the Church‟s confusing stance on homosexuality during the Section 28 
debate. The previous November, the Synod had passed a resolution affirming that sexual 
relationships should be conducted within marriage and that homosexuals should be called 
upon to repent.141 For some, however, the language of the resolution had not been 
emphatic enough; for while adultery in a heterosexual relationship had been classified as a 
„sin‟, this wording had not been used in reference to homosexuality, which was merely 
deemed to fall short of the Christian „ideal‟. Many traditionalists were also disappointed that 
the statement had not explicitly ruled out homosexuality amongst the priesthood.142 The 
press duly mocked the resolution, taking it as the Church‟s enthusiastic endorsement of 
homosexuality (see fig.1). While in the parliamentary debate on Section 28 more than one 
Conservative pointed to the ambiguousness of the Church‟s position on homosexuality.143 
Baroness Blatch, for example, figured that the Church‟s abstruse statement demonstrated a 
failing lack of certainty, as she rather pithily stated: „I am not entirely sure that the Church 
of England is unanimous in its opposition to sin. Nor am I entirely sure that it is 
unanimous in its definition of sin.‟144 The Church‟s confusion on this matter was confirmed 
when the prelates entered the division lobby, for four bishops voted against its inclusion 
and two supported the clause.145 In the debate, the Archbishop of York had explained that 
his opposition to section 28 concerned civil liberties rather than sexual ethics, while the 
Bishop of Manchester had focused on how the bill threatened the independence of local 
government.146 These positions, although perfectly rational, hardly reassured Anglican 
Conservatives and it was left to lay Catholic peer and moral campaigner, Lord Longford, to 
forward the view that homosexuality was forbidden under Christian law.147 The fact that 
some prelates supported the right of teaching of homosexuality in schools while at the same 
time appeared reluctant to enforce the Christian basis of RE in schools (as revealed in the 
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passing of the Education Act the same year), meant it was easy to dismiss the Church as 
retreating from its moral role and for Christian parliamentarians along with the moral lobby, 
to position themselves as the true promoters and defenders of Christian standards in public 
life.148  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Daily Express, 13 November 1987.  
 
The accusation that the Church had willingly and woefully embraced the „new morality‟ may 
have successfully rallied the traditionalist troops and made neat headlines but it was an 
extremely generalised claim. It did not acknowledge the fact that the Church‟s approach to 
sexual ethics was far from uniform. The Church‟s strict stance on abortion differed 
significantly from its position on contraception and divorce for example. Moreover, when 
Anglican leaders did make a plea for individual moral virtue – such as the Bishop of 
Birmingham‟s statement on chastity in relation to AIDS – this was rarely reported by the 
press or supported by Conservative politicians. The Church of England, throughout its 
history, had always had a less moralistic culture than the Catholic Church as evidenced by 
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the decision of the 1930 Lambeth Conference to sanction individual choice in respect to 
contraception.149 As G.I.T Machin‟s survey of the Church during the twentieth century 
makes clear, the 1960s was not as much a moral watershed for the Church as traditionalists 
claimed, what is more accurate is that discussions about personal morality and sexual ethics 
within the Church have always historically been divided into two camps; those willing to 
accommodate to changing social trends and those fearful of any reordering of moral values. 
Such was the case in the 1930s, the 1960s, and again in the 1980s.   
Nevertheless there was some validity in what the traditionalists were saying. Since 
the 1960s the Church leadership had appeared more and more comfortable talking about 
the morality of government and less and less confident about the morality of the individual. 
A point raised by John Gummer as early as 1971 in a book on the „permissive society‟, in 
which he conveyed his shock that „at a time in which the Church is questioning its 
infallibility in matters of faith and morals it should be acting as if it had a special kind of 
infallible judgement in matters of politics.‟150 Gummer was to a degree right, for this decade 
had seen a cultural shift within the Church on sexual ethics, away from a message of 
condemnation towards an effort to understand people‟s life choices. However, this did not 
reflect a complete capitulation to liberal progressiveness, but simply a belief, that in an era 
when morality had been liberalised, privatised and secularised, such tact would prove 
ineffective and counterintuitive. As David Sheppard elucidated in a letter to suffragan 
Bishop of Stepney in 1979, in which he explained why he did not speak out more fervently 
on the issue of homosexuality:  
 
I have personally determined not to be involved more publicly than I 
need about this matter. I hope that it is not cowardice. My neck is 
exposed on a number of issues which I intend to try to see through for 
many years. I genuinely believe that there is a danger that a subject like 
this would be used by many of the more orthodox Christians as a reason 
for not listening to things that I believe I am meant to say about some of 
the other great human issues.151 
 
Sheppard‟s comments illustrate the difference in priorities between the two factions within 
the Church. For Sheppard it was a question of influence, a point he elaborated in a letter to 
a parishioner in 1981 explaining the Church‟s apparent „silence‟ on pornography. In the 
opinion of Sheppard, when the Church spoke disapprovingly of „things connected with 
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sex‟, it was not „very well listened to‟, yet in the realm of politics, on issues such as 
unemployment, race relations and poverty, Sheppard believed that the Church still retained 
some authority.152 Naturally this switch from the moral to the political made it vulnerable to 
accusations that its prophecy was conditioned by a desire for relevance in a secular age. This 
charge did have validity, but only in the same way that the traditionalist cause could also be 
said to be a response to the changing fortunes of Christianity in Britain.  
In the eighties a new specific concern emerged. For not only did it seem that the 
Church had acquiesced on the „new morality‟, but that the „new morality‟ was filtering into 
the Church structures itself. This was evident in the debate about divorced clergy but was 
even more apparent and controversial over the issue of homosexual priests. The focus of 
this debate was not Christian standards in society, but the interpretation of these within the 
Church.153 This would be a long and fractious debate which would further spilt the 
reformists and traditionalists at home and the Anglican Communion abroad, ruthlessly 
exposing the doctrinal divisions and cultural differences within the organisation in the 
process. This topic also greatly excited the tabloid press, which frequently ran stories 
speculating on the prevalence of homosexuality amongst the priesthood. As with tales of 
adulterous vicars, the press revelled in these supposed examples of clerical hypocrisy.154 The 
long-term outcome of this internalisation of the debate about sexual ethics, however, was 
that the Church‟s opinion on questions of personal morality would be listened to less and 
less by the public and politicians. 
During the eighties meanwhile, it is notable how prominent members of the 
Conservative frontbench (like their backbenchers) became increasingly vocal about the 
shortcomings of the Church‟s moral leadership.155 For whilst the government tended not to 
get involved in ecclesiastical issues, the subject of morality held a particular interest. 
Thatcherite moralism, may not have resulted in reversing the „permissive‟ legislation of the 
1960s, however it remained a consistent rhetorical thread, recognised for its political value 
in appealing to the Tory faithful, the broader middle class and as a useful way of 
reproaching the more socially-liberal Labour and SDP-Alliance parties.156 It was also 
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recognised as a way of undermining the Church‟s attacks on the moral failings of 
Thatcherism. Faith in the City, for example, was criticised by the government not only for its 
supposed Marxist theology but also its lack of attention to the family. In the latter part of 
the 1980s, in answer to the repeated criticisms of the Church and in a desire to couch 
Thatcherism within a more moralistic framework, government ministers turned their 
attention to lecturing the Church on its moral obligations and responsibilities in society. In 
October 1987, for example, Mrs Thatcher delivered a speech in which she argued that the 
Church‟s failure to assert moral discipline accounted for society‟s dependency on the 
secular state: „When the authority of those institutions [the churches] is undermined 
because they haven‟t been forthright, it is then that people turn too much to the State.‟157 
This message was one that clearly resonated with many within her parliamentary party and 
at the grassroots. The Daily Mail editorial the following day praised the Prime Minister‟s 
speech and contrasted it with the Church‟s „pussy-footing‟ over AIDS.158 A year later Home 
Secretary, Anglican Douglas Hurd, gave a speech to the General Synod in which he 
informed the assembled audience of clerics, bishops and laity that the Bible did not offer a 
blueprint for government but did provide resolute guidance on personal moral conduct. 
Hurd‟s message was clear; it was the Church‟s responsibility to strengthen individual moral 
standards in society rather than pass moral judgements on the government decisions.159 A 
year later, Conservative backbencher, Sir Hal Millar, tabled a government-backed motion in 
the House of Commons on the moral responsibilities of the Church of England. 
Introducing the debate, Millar, in a highly partisan speech, stated that he found it „odd and 
offensive‟ that bishops could deny the Creed, consider the ordination of divorced people 
and „purport to celebrate homosexual marriage.‟160 The debate that followed indicated the 
widespread dissatisfaction amongst Conservative ranks concerning the Church‟s weak 
moral leadership and its unhealthy preoccupation with political issues. Speaking on behalf 
of the government, Home Office Minister John Patten, offered the Church leaders what he 
considered to be some worthy advice; to concentrate on „spiritual guidance‟ rather than 
lecturing politicians on „how to divide up the national cake.‟161 
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Writing in 1990, in a book entitled Christianity and Conservatism: Are they compatible?, 
John Gummer  lambasted the Church for its social approach to sin and emphasis on state 
salvation and urged it to rediscover a „theology of judgment‟.162 Gummer, however, 
remained doubtful whether his call would be listened to, and concluded therefore that it 
was his government, with its commitment to the family and individual responsibility, which 
was „nearer the traditional understanding of the gospels than much of contemporary 
Christian social comment‟.163 Gummer‟s contention was that in its present guise, 
Anglicanism was not compatible with Conservatism or even Christianity. Gummer sought 
to offer some words of reassurance for Anglicans Conservative voters, suggesting that while 
they may have felt let down by the Church, they could feel confident that the government 
was taking its Christian responsibility seriously.  
 
Anglican Political Theology  
While developments in theology, governance and morality certainly heightened the sense of 
division between Church and the Conservative party, the main area of grievance – one 
which united both Anglican and non-Anglican Conservative MPs alike – was the Church‟s 
condemnation of its policies. As has been demonstrated in earlier chapters, the party and 
other factions within the New Right took great efforts to publicly counter the political 
protestations emanating from Anglican quarters. This was done through various means: by 
dismissing the clergy as ignorant and naïve, by discrediting their views as socialist, and by 
accusing the Church of neglecting their moral and spiritual duties.  A sermon by Roman 
Catholic Conservative MP John Biggs-Davison entitled „Christians can be Conservatives‟ 
delivered in a London parish in 1978 was typical of the sort of message emerging from New 
Right circles from the mid-1970s onwards and which was to become the standard response 
in the 1980s. Biggs-Davison began by laying out what he considered to be the doctrinal 
flaws of the social gospel, which had transformed the Church into „little more than agencies 
of Oxfam, Shelter, the United Nations Association – or unqualified off shoots of the 
welfare state.‟164 He then went on to condemn its most extreme manifestation, liberation 
theology, which he deemed to be a Communist corruption of the Gospel. Taking the 
Edward Norman line, Biggs-Davison attributed the growth of social Christianity to a desire 
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to be relevant in a secular age: „perhaps they fear abandonment by the multitude and the 
loneliness their Master knew, so they adjust the eternal to the fashionable.‟165  
Social Christianity, Conservatives repeatedly claimed, was not only a 
misinterpretation of the Scripture but also distracted the clergy from their true evangelical 
mission. In the opinion of Anglican Conservative MP John Stokes in 1984, the Church of 
England needed to „get back to basic Christianity‟ for its secular political preoccupations 
would only result in the „churches being left empty and the people of England engulfed in 
heathenism‟.166 The implication was that not only was the Church‟s position determined by 
secular priorities, but also that by pursuing this road the Church was inadvertently hastening 
the process of secularisation. Stokes‟ comments point to the way in which Anglican 
Conservatives were inclined to position themselves as defenders of the Christian nation, 
while at the same time accusing the Church of being consumed by a liberal internationalist 
outlook which was decidedly un-English.  Runcie encountered such criticism when he 
delivered his „pacifist‟ sermon for the Falkland‟s thanksgiving service, as did those clerics 
who stressed the West‟s obligations to the developing world.167 This pointed to an 
underlying paranoia concerning the breach between Christianity, Conservatism and 
Englishness, for in the heightened climate of Thatcherite nationalism the Anglican 
hierarchy looked more than a little uncomfortable, preferring to express their spiritual 
patriotism by emphasising the duty of welfare rather than the glory of warfare.  
It was not simply that the Church was intervening in political matters, but the way 
in which leaders proclaimed divine authority on these affairs. David Sheppard‟s accusation 
that it was impossible to be a Christian and vote Conservative seemed ample proof that the 
Church was unwilling to accept that Conservative politicians could be acting in sincere 
faith. For John Gummer, such intransigence merely confirmed the fact that a political 
rather than spiritual bias was at the core of the` Anglican critique of Thatcherism. Speaking 
in 1984, soon after the Bishop of Durham‟s political enthronement sermon, for example, 
Gummer sought to disrobe the prelate‟s opinions of any spiritual authority: „Mr Jenkins is 
plain Mr Jenkins when he gives me his political views‟.168 It is, however, highly unlikely that 
Conservatives would have criticised the Church for its politicisation of Christianity had the 
Anglican leadership endorsed the politics and policies of the New Right. For it was not the 
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fact that the Church were politicising the Gospel that Conservatives found objectionable, 
but that they were politicising it against the Right.  It would be left to Mrs Thatcher to 
articulate the alternative; that is, the Christian basis of New Right philosophy centred on the 
doctrine of original sin, free will and liberty.
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     CHAPTER SIX 
       Conviction Politician: Constructing the Thatcherite Theology  
 
„The Old Testament prophets did not say “Brothers, I want a consensus.” They said “This is my faith and 
vision….If you believe it too, then come with me.”‟ Margaret Thatcher, 1979.1 
 
            David Frost: But do you believe there is a God or do you know there is a God?  
            Prime Minister: I believe there is a God. 
                        David Frost: Do you know there is a God? 
                        Prime Minister: Believing there is a God is knowing there is a God. 
                        David Frost: Believing is knowing? 
                        Prime Minister: Yes, indeed! 
                                       Margaret Thatcher in interview with David Frost, 1988.2  
 
„Although I have always resisted the argument that a Christian has to be a Conservative, I have never lost 
my conviction that there is a deep and providential harmony between the kind of political economy I favour 
and the insights of Christianity.‟ Margaret Thatcher, The Path to Power, 1995.3 
 
 
When, in 1978, Mrs Thatcher was asked for her opinion on the ordination of women in an 
interview with the Catholic Herald, her reply was rather non-committal: „What you do has got 
to be somehow in touch with and in tune with the times, otherwise you cause friction and 
you mustn‟t cause friction if you have a positive message.‟4 Such a vague response would 
never have been uttered by her fellow Anglican Conservatives, who considered it a key 
issue which would determine the credibility and direction of the Church of England. 
Margaret Thatcher, in contrast, tended to steer clear of doctrinal and ecclesiastical matters, 
and, as we shall see, only ever articulated Christianity in respect to how it shaped and 
directed politics. Drawing on the religious instruction of her childhood and influenced by 
the evangelical and conservative Christian revival of the 1970s, Mrs Thatcher deployed the 
language and doctrines of Christianity to legitimize her political philosophy. It was a theo-
political world-view which weaved together secular and religious strands, such as choice and 
man‟s free will, sin and moral deviancy, national identity and Christianity, into an all-
encompassing public doctrine, which was applied not only to the domestic political scene 
but also underscored her crusade against international Communism. Margaret Thatcher is 
therefore a pivotal figure in the story of the interrelationship between religion and politics 
in the 1980s, not simply because she was the figurehead of the British conservative 
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movement, but also because she herself played a leading part in the development of the 
Christian basis of New Right philosophy during this period.  
 Despite the wealth of biographies on Margaret Thatcher, relatively few of these 
works have addressed her religion.5 Descriptions of her childhood usually serve as an 
explanation for Mrs Thatcher‟s ambition and identity, yet biographers have rarely delved 
any deeper into her Methodist upbringing or explored how her faith developed later in her 
life. Peter Riddell, for example, sees Thatcherism as a product of the „English suburban and 
provincial middle-class‟ world of interwar Grantham, yet he confines his analysis to class 
culture and does not sufficiently explore her religious roots.6 Moreover, there is a degree to 
which Mrs Thatcher‟s religious views are obscured by the frequently cited but rather 
generalised maxim: „Victorian values‟. Although Nonconformity is believed to be an 
important element in this, its specific contribution has not adequately been unpacked. 
Theologian Graeme Smith offers the only existing analysis of Mrs Thatcher‟s „theo-political‟ 
identity, which he labels as „Anglo-Saxon Nonconformity‟. Smith, however, does not 
contextualise her statements within contemporary developments within Christianity and her 
conflict with the Church of England, nor does he explore the ways in which Mrs Thatcher‟s 
religious protestations and missionary zeal contributed to her image and unique style of 
leadership.7 
This chapter seeks to construct Mrs Thatcher‟s religio-political world-view through 
a detailed analysis of her speeches and writings. It will first address Mrs Thatcher‟s 
Methodist upbringing and, through an exploration of her father‟s sermons, will illustrate 
how her father‟s theo-political understanding, his tying of politics and faith, proved to be 
particularly influential. It will then illustrate how Mrs Thatcher rediscovered these values in 
the 1970s as a response to the social, economic and political turmoil of this decade.  The 
second section will demonstrate the importance of evangelical language and rhythm to this 
discourse, revealing how Mrs Thatcher marketed herself as a missionary who aimed to 
bring about a national conversion to economic liberalism. The third section will explore in 
detail the ideas, beliefs and values which made up the „Thatcherite theology‟. Broken down 
into key themes, it shows how Mrs Thatcher weaved together notions of man‟s free will, 
the doctrine of original sin and the Protestant work ethic into a comprehensive Biblical 
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defence of the free market and small government. The aim here is to show how Mrs 
Thatcher was influenced by her Methodist heritage and the way in which she engaged, 
reflected and complemented the contemporary theo-political thinking within the Christian 
conservative movement. The chapter will end with an analysis of the aim and purpose and 
ultimately, the credibility of the Prime Minister‟s religious rhetoric to a secular electorate.  
 
I. From Finkin Street to Downing Street  
As Heather Nunn has correctly judged, Mrs Thatcher‟s tales of home life in suburban 
Lincolnshire built on the values of thrift, community spirit and responsibility, operated as a 
„template for the reconstruction of a stable nation‟.8 Margaret Thatcher‟s personal journey 
as a lower middle-class woman who had overcome gender and class barriers to achieve the 
highest office in the land was constructed as a narrative of self-responsibility and hard 
work, which infused „her political message with a personal authority‟.9 Not wishing to 
dispute the role that Grantham played in the image of Margaret Thatcher, the aim here is to 
uncover the real influence of Methodism and specifically, her lay-preacher father in shaping 
the mind and manner of Mrs Thatcher.10  The majority of the evidence for this comes not 
from the personal recollections of Mrs Thatcher herself, but an examination of her father‟s 
sermon notes, where connections will be made between the theo-political ideas of Albert 
Roberts and Mrs Thatcher‟s own religious protestations as Prime Minister.   
There is no doubt that religion played a central role in the early life of Mrs 
Thatcher. In her memoirs, The Path to Power, Margaret Thatcher describes how her 
upbringing was „intensely religious‟, with attendance at Finkin Street Methodist chapel three 
times a week, in addition to twice on Sundays.11 Religious and social life revolved around 
the chapel, with the young Margaret a member of both the Methodist Youth Guild and the 
choir. Strict Sabbatarians, Sunday in the Roberts‟ household was for worship and little else, 
with board games and even newspapers forbidden. Frivolous activities such as cinema-
going or dancing were frowned upon, and although, alcohol was kept in the house for 
guests, the Roberts themselves were teetotallers. All of this made for a rather puritan and 
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drab existence, which, even Mrs Thatcher later admitted, could be perceived as „rather 
solemn‟.12  
Her father, Alfred Roberts, looms large in the Grantham mythological tale, like an 
„Old Testament prophet‟ offering guidance and imparting onto his daughter a political and 
moral vision, which she would eventually fulfil as Prime Minister.13 As Margaret Thatcher 
herself admitted after winning her first election in 1979: „He brought me up to believe all 
the things I do believe and they are the values on which I have fought the election…I owe 
almost everything to my father.‟14 Further confirmation of this also came from her sister, 
Muriel Roberts, who commented simply: „to know Margaret, you have to know him.‟15 The 
figure of Alfred Roberts – preacher, shopkeeper and councillor – is well known.  A paragon 
of civic duty, he was deeply immersed in the political and religious associational culture of 
interwar Grantham. He was an elected member of the town council, a part-time Justice of 
the Peace, president of the Chamber of Trade, President of Rotary, a director of the 
Grantham Building Society, a director of the Trustee Savings Bank, chairman of the local 
National Savings Movement, a governor of the local boys‟ and girls‟ grammar schools and 
chairman of the Workers‟ Educational Association.16 This was in addition to his religious 
commitments. He was trustee of ten churches in Lincolnshire and, as a lay preacher, toured 
the county delivering sermons and meeting prominent Methodists, including Donald Soper 
who, incidentally, would go on to become a leading critic of his daughter‟s government fifty 
years later.17  
A collection of Alfred Roberts‟ sermon notes, deposited in Mrs Thatcher‟s personal 
archive and dated between c. 1941 and 1950, offer a crucial insight into the religious 
instruction Margaret Thatcher was exposed to as a child. Unsurprisingly, the sermons 
contain all the essential ingredients of the Methodist faith, with an emphasis on individual 
belief, the work ethic and moral virtue. Frequent references were made to Martin Luther‟s 
edict on individual salvation by faith alone while the Roman Catholic understanding of 
penance and the role of the priest as an essential intermediary between God and man, was 
also dismissed as contrary to Biblical teaching. He also denounced those churches tied to 
temporal power, judging that under the „tutelage of King‟s and Princes‟ the Word of God 
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had been led astray.18 On the subject of man‟s internal struggle with faith and sin, Roberts 
assured his parishioners that „strength comes from within‟ and that „The Kingdom of God 
is within you‟.19 In another sermon, Roberts repeated this claim, preaching that God‟s 
overpowering presence was in the „heart and mind‟ of every individual: „His Spirit dwelling 
in us casts out our fear and dread of anything that can overtake us.‟20 Roberts placed a high 
priority on the importance of the work ethic and of discipline, dedication and motivation in 
secular as well as religious life. „You possess all you need‟, he told his fellow Methodists, 
„There is nothing to acquire. Learn to recognise what is already yours.‟21 And in another 
note, idleness was deemed a sin, for „a lazy man‟ was one who had „lost his soul already‟.22 
By way of illuminating this message of perseverance and studiousness, Roberts preached a 
parable about a snail climbing a cherry tree which was determined to get to the top, 
undeterred by apprehension or the negative opinions of a sneering slug. The snail is 
presented as the embodiment of willpower and tenacity.23 Such resolution and self-belief, 
Roberts judged, emanated from the certainty of faith, which „prevents us being tortured by 
agony of doubt‟.24 Certainly these musings on the personal qualities of hard work, 
commitment and resolution personally shaped Mrs Thatcher for those who knew her as an 
MP frequently commented on her unrelenting studiousness and resolve. Yet the influence 
of her father‟s message was not confined to the personal, for the themes of resolution 
versus doubt and of idleness versus work would also be used to great political effect by his 
daughter when Prime Minister.   
According to John Campbell, there was no „distinction between commercial, 
political and religious values‟ in the Roberts‟ household, which was led by a man who was a 
leader in each sphere, as shop owner, councillor and lay preacher.25 This cross fertilisation 
between the religious and the political is clearly evident in his sermon notes. Roberts, for 
example, addressed the theme of social Christianity, a topic, which was then acquiring 
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greater respectability and prominence with William Temple‟s Christianity and Social Order 
penned in 1942 and with the ecumenical COPEC conference signalling a growing political 
consensus between the denominations.26  In Roberts‟ opinion, a church that was 
preoccupied with its „social conscience‟ was in danger of becoming „a glorified discussion 
group‟ and was negating its true calling as a place for evangelism where „men and women 
can come quite sure that their hungry hearts can find the living bread‟ of faith.27 Mrs 
Thatcher would famously take a similar line against the social Anglicanism of the 1980s, 
proclaiming, in her famous Sermon on the Mound in 1988, that: „Christianity is about 
spiritual redemption, not social reform.‟28 For her father, however, the pressing social issue 
during the interwar period was not „poverty‟, which he believed had been solved, but 
affluence, for the churches had a responsibility to preach that „no man‟s soul can be 
satisfied‟ with a „materialistic philosophy.‟29 This aspect of Alderman Robert‟s theology was 
notably less prominent in his daughter‟s public doctrine who tended not to emphasise 
ungodly associations with increasing wealth. 
A notable feature of Roberts‟ sermons was the fusion between political language 
and religious doctrine. On the subject of the universality and liberty of faith, for example, 
Roberts stated that God „refuses to put grace on a tariff.‟30 In Roberts‟ opinion, just as there 
should be no restrictions on the market, nor should there be a „tariff‟ imposed on God‟s 
grace. Here Roberts was of course, referencing the key debate, which dominated interwar 
British politics: tariffs verses free trade.31 As a Liberal, Roberts was a keen advocate of the 
latter, yet more importantly, this statement inferred that there was a convergence between 
the universal availability of grace and the free market; a concept, which, as we shall see, Mrs 
Thatcher would articulate with even equal passion years later.32  
As a dissenter it is perhaps not surprising that Roberts laid great emphasis on the 
importance of religious freedom. Yet more revealing, is the political language and 
comparisons he used to criticise its opposite: religious uniformity.33  In one instance it is 
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denounced as „a denominational closed shop‟, with compulsory trade union membership 
compared to mandatory affiliation to a particular faith.  In another sermon, uniformity is 
likened to totalitarianism for both sought to restrict individual freedom. „Uniformity‟, he 
argued, „can be a soul destroying agent, as evil as totalitarianism, and totalitarianism, can end 
in the systematic dehumanisation of man.‟34 Mrs Thatcher would adopt exactly the same 
type of language in her ideological battle against communism and socialism. A theological 
notion of individual liberty and man‟s relationship with God underpinned Alfred Roberts‟ 
political outlook. In another sermon written in 1950, at a time when the Attlee government 
was constructing the „New Jerusalem‟ and radically extending the powers of the state, 
Roberts felt the need to remind the congregation of its restrictive possibilities in that it 
offered no route to redemption: „Men, nations, races, or any particular generation cannot be 
saved by ordinances, power, legislation. We worry about all this, and our faith becomes 
weak and faltering.‟35 These were sentiments Mrs Thatcher would later reiterate as Prime 
Minister and the direct influence of her father on this point is illustrated by the fact that she 
quoted this extract in her memoirs.36  
Yet what of the intervening years between Finkin Street and Downing Street? While 
at Oxford, Margaret Thatcher continued to attend Methodist chapel and joined the choir, 
although she channelled most of her efforts into politics, leading the University‟s 
Conservative Association, where she encountered a recently-demobbed Robert Runcie.37 In 
1951 she married Denis Thatcher in John Wesley‟s Chapel in London and two years later 
the twins Carol and Mark were christened there.38 Margaret Thatcher never forced her 
children to attend Church, which, as she later explained, was because she did not wish to 
inflict on her children the same strict religious upbringing that she herself had had.39 We do 
know that at some point in the 1950s Margaret Thatcher converted to Anglicanism. 
Speaking in 1978 she clarified her reasons behind this: „I went for something a little more 
formal‟ in service and „formality in the underlying theology.‟40 It could be that this switch 
was for political rather than religious considerations, for in the days when Conservatives 
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were still assumed to be practising Anglicans, Mrs Thatcher‟s Methodism might have posed 
an obstacle to her political ambitions. This is reinforced by the fact that the above quotation 
is the only reference (that the author is aware of) that Mrs Thatcher made about her 
adopted Church. Nonetheless, if Mrs Thatcher had a denominational identity it was 
certainly Nonconformist rather than Anglican. 
 As a young female Conservative candidate and later as an MP in the 1950s and 60s, 
Mrs Thatcher delivered numerous talks to congregations (both free churches and Anglican) 
cultivating an image of a politician of faith.  In 1951, as the prospective nominee for 
Dartford in Kent, she gave a speech to the local Free Church Council. According to the 
Dartford Chronicle, it began with a text from Genesis and wove together themes of 
patriotism, Christian decency and the religious calling to public service; all qualities that 
Miss Roberts, reportedly a politician of „sound Christian convictions‟, sought to personify.41  
The young candidate gave other talks to congregations while canvassing in the Kent 
constituency. This is hardly surprising given that Dartford had a strong dissenting tradition, 
and even in the 1950s, the churches remained the main access point for the community and 
its votes.42  
Mrs Thatcher, however, clearly felt comfortable speaking on religious topics and 
preaching from the pulpit and, as the elected MP for Finchley, continued to lecture to local 
church groups. In 1963, Mrs Thatcher gave a speech to the Christ Church Youth 
Fellowship on „What it means to be a Christian Member of Parliament‟. Interestingly, she 
offered a traditional Tory-Anglican view, praising the constitutional link between the 
spiritual and the temporal within the English constitution. In a sentiment worthy of William 
Temple, she affirmed that freedom and democracy could not be sustained on „an empty 
stomach‟ and that Britain as a „Christian nation‟ provided this political nourishment through 
the welfare state.43 Here, Margaret Thatcher‟s sentiments were more a reflection of the 
ethos of Macmillan Conservatism than her own religious heritage. During the 1960s, 
however, she, along with fellow Conservatives, voiced her fears about rising 
„permissiveness‟ and declining religiosity. In an interview with the Finchley Press, for example, 
she called for the „reversal of the permissive society‟, which, in her opinion, had made man 
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„slave to his own appetites.‟44 Mrs Thatcher‟s rhetoric, however, did not quite match her 
voting record. Far from being opposed to the „permissive‟ legislation, she had in fact 
supported the legalisation of homosexuality and abortion (although she had been against 
divorce reform and the repeal of the death penalty).45 As this brief survey of her early 
political career suggests, although Mrs Thatcher fashioned herself as a woman of faith, she 
did not display the same zealousness or Nonconformist outlook which would characterise 
her later political life.46  
It is evident, however, that just as Mrs Thatcher‟s politics underwent a 
transformation in the mid-1970s, so she also rediscovered her Nonconformist roots. The 
faith, values and certainties, which she had heard delivered weekly from the pulpit of Finkin 
Street Chapel, assumed a new relevance and meaning in the political and moral confusion 
of 1970s Britain. And so as the postwar consensus collapsed and the Conservative party 
veered to the Right, Mrs Thatcher deliberately evoked Nonconformist ideas such as self-
reliance, hard work and moral restraint as the only true path for a nation overwhelmed by 
the excesses of bureaucratic welfare, union militancy and immoral conduct. What this 
analysis of her father‟s sermons reveals is that the Grantham tale was not simply an artificial 
construction of Margaret Thatcher‟s imagination or one dreamt up by Conservative spin 
doctors, but a real experience. Her upbringing had instilled a sense of class and cultural 
identity, but also a specific religious consciousness and an understanding in how faith 
related to politics. Margaret Thatcher‟s Nonconformist religious ethos and specifically that 
of her father, provided the means, language and motifs through which she articulated the 
neo-Conservative agenda. Reference to her childhood religious values, therefore, would 
always be articulated in terms of their contemporary relevance.  Thus Mrs Thatcher 
constantly shifted between past and present tense when speaking about her life in 
Grantham: as the following comments made in an interview with the Sun reveals:   
  
we were brought up to work. It was a sin not to work. Idleness itself was a 
sin. We always did work. We were also brought up to be involved with 
people. Everything we did. We had a shop which automatically involved 
us with people, we went to Church you are automatically involved with 
people, you do all sorts of voluntary work you are automatically involved 
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with people. I just suppose I've seen my father work extremely hard, my 
mother worked extremely hard, we had to work extremely hard to climb 
your way up the ladder as education mattered tremendously.47 
 
Mrs Thatcher always painted her interwar childhood as Victorian, evoking romantic 
idealized visions of a prosperous and industrious nation, thriving under laissez faire 
capitalism and Protestant values and held together by the philanthropic and communitarian 
civic culture that complemented this economic order. Recollections of her childhood, 
therefore, did not operate as mere nostalgia, or sentimentality, but were projected as a full-
bodied political programme and as a relevant set of values, which needed to be installed in 
Britain. Nonetheless, it was not simply in the articulation of Nonconformist principles 
where the influence of her religious heritage could be deciphered, but also the way in which 
she fashioned herself as a conviction politician and packaged neo-liberalism as a religious 
endeavour.  
 
II. Thatcherism as a Conversion Narrative, 1975-1983 
Addressing a congregation in the city church of St Lawrence Jewry in 1981, Margaret 
Thatcher proclaimed that „unless the spirit of the nation which has hitherto sustained us is 
renewed, our national way of life will perish.‟48 The missionary zeal and evangelical tone 
here is demonstrative of the way in which Margaret Thatcher presented herself as a prophet 
leading the British people out of the dark days of national decay and moral decline and into 
the path of economic and moral salvation. Margaret Thatcher was not the first to envision 
neo-liberalism as a religious cause. Most famously, Keith Joseph had described his switch to 
economic liberalism in conversion-like terms, delivering a series of speeches in 1974, in 
which he renounced the false dogma of consensus politics and declared his newfound faith 
in the market economy. As he wrote a year later: „it was only in April 1974 that I was 
converted to Conservatism. (I had thought I was a Conservative but I now see that I was 
not really one at all).‟49 In one important speech, which is now famous for scuppering 
Joseph‟s leadership ambitions, he presented the state of the nation as an economic and 
moral challenge whereby national decline, economic stagnation, industrial unrest, social 
dependency and moral deviancy were all interlinked. Tying together the fate of the nation, 
community and the individual, Joseph called for the revitalisation of British „civilised 
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values‟: „If we cannot restore them to health, our nation can be utterly ruined.‟50 On hearing 
the speech, Mary Whitehouse was said to have commented: „the people of Britain have 
been like a sheep without a shepherd. But now they have found one.‟51 Whitehouse was 
right to recognise the religious fervour of this political vision, despite identifying the wrong 
„shepherd‟.  
Margaret Thatcher, after winning the ballot for the leadership of the party, also 
adopted this discursive framework, couching her political vision in Christianised language 
and doctrine with even greater confidence and certainty than the Jewish Keith Joseph. This 
evangelical tone featured heavily in the early part of her leadership from 1975 until her 
second election victory in 1983, serving to reinforce her position as leader and to legitimise 
her policies amidst increasing criticism and doubt. In 1981 in a speech to the Conservative 
Central Council, for example, Mrs Thatcher offered the following vindication for her 
government‟s controversial budget which had significantly cut borrowing in order to reduce 
interest rates: „This is the road I am resolved to follow. This is the path I must go. I ask all 
who have the spirit – the bold, the steadfast and the young in heart – to stand and join with 
me as we go forward. For there is no other company in which I would travel.‟52  
As Heather Nunn has analysed, the Thatcherite public doctrine relied heavily on 
Biblical imagery such as Babylon, the exile from Egypt and the Ten Commandments. 
Throughout her premiership, religious imagery was drawn upon to present Mrs Thatcher as 
a woman of resolve and force operating in a man‟s world and as a guiding light amidst the 
chaos and confusion. It also served to legitimise her conflicts against the IRA, Argentina, 
the unions and communism, by presenting these in terms of strict duel between good and 
evil.53 According to Nunn, an evangelical structure and rhythm, encapsulated in her famous 
mantra „There is no alternative‟, became Mrs Thatcher‟s signature tone, one which 
contrasted sharply with the „managerial rationality‟ of her predecessor Edward Heath.54 It 
was deliberately deployed to differentiate Thatcherism from „wet‟ Conservatism, as Mrs 
Thatcher pointedly remarked: „The Old Testament prophets did not say “Brothers, I want a 
consensus.” They said “This is my faith and vision….If you believe it too, then come with 
me.”‟55  Mrs Thatcher was not the first nor would she be the last to anoint her political 
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vision with the language of faith, yet in many ways she was unique because of the secular 
context in which she operated, the confidence and boldness with which she proclaimed her 
public doctrine, the extent to which she relied upon this discourse for her personal and 
political authority and, as we shall see, the way in which she consciously drew upon the 
contemporary evangelical and traditionalist movements within Christianity.56  
 This preaching style came naturally to a woman who had spent much of her 
childhood sitting in the pews listening to her father deliver a message on the importance of 
conviction. Mrs Thatcher recounts in her memoirs how as a child her father had bestowed 
on her an independence of mind and personal resolve.57 And her father‟s sermon notes 
contain some further reflections on how he believed this could be achieved:  
 
Your task demands and deserves sheer hard work. Sweat of brains and 
discipline of soul. Such toil and care can never be wasted for under God 
you desire your sermon to make a difference to human lives and lead 
them more thoroughly to surrender to the sovereignty of Christ.58 
 
Mrs Thatcher would certainly apply these qualities, even though it was to be in a secular 
rather than spiritual context. Mrs Thatcher, however, always liked to portray herself as a 
preacher and often spoke of her politics and leadership in missionary terms:  
 
You‟ve got to take everyone along with you…you can only get other 
people in tune with you by being a little evangelical about it…I‟m not a 
consensus politician or a pragmatic politician: I‟m a conviction politician. 
And I believe in the politics of persuasion: it‟s my job to put forward what 
I believe and try to get people to agree with me.59  
 
According to her father it was about evoking the instincts within man, „whenever you speak 
to men in the name of Jesus Christ unseen instincts deep within them are reinforcing every 
word.‟60  This was a theme, which ran throughout Mrs Thatcher‟s discourse, for she always 
presented herself as an instinctive politician in tune with the popular will of the majority, as 
she stated in 1975: „It is our duty, our purpose...to sound the trumpets clearly and boldly, so 
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that all can hear them. Then we shall not have to convert people to our principles. They will 
simply rally to those which truly are their own.‟61 What Thatcher called „instinct‟, others, 
notably Stuart Hall, called „authoritarian populism‟; a deliberate exploitation of the base and 
selfish motivations of the electorate.  Mrs Thatcher, however, tended to contrast her 
populist antennae with the intellectualism and elitism of the Establishment.62 Such anti-
intellectualism appears to have been something which her Nonconformist father also 
appreciated. According to Alfred Roberts, in order to inspire faith and conviction in man: 
„have something to say, say it as clearly as you can‟ for „the idea that the way to reach the 
human heart is to bypass the human understanding is a sadly mistaken strategy.‟63 In both 
style and substance therefore, Mrs Thatcher‟s father seemed to have left an indelible mark, 
and one which she readily acknowledged:  „Deep in their instincts people find what I am 
saying and doing right. And I know it is, because that is the way I was brought up.‟64  
 
III. The Gospel According to Mrs Thatcher  
It is not simply at an oratorical level that this Nonconformist heritage can be detected, for 
religious doctrine also played a central role in underpinning Mrs Thatcher‟s political 
ideology. Any survey of the Prime Minister‟s speeches will reveal the key themes of 
economic and individual freedom, patriotism and populism and law and order, yet to this 
list must also be added Christianity. So is it possible to demonstrate a consistent use of 
religion and a coherent „Thatcherite theology‟? Unlike Enoch Powell, Mrs Thatcher did not 
write or comment in any great detail about her personal religious faith or spirituality. 
Instead, it is in her elucidation of a public doctrine that Mrs Thatcher revealed her theo-
political outlook.   
During her time as leader of the Conservative party, Margaret Thatcher delivered 
four key speeches on Christianity. These were: the Iain Macleod Memorial lecture in 1977 
to the London Young Conservatives; the 1978 sermon entitled „I Believe‟ delivered in St 
Lawrence Jewry Church in London; a second lecture „The Spirit of the Nation‟ at St 
Lawrence Jewry in 1981 (this time as Prime Minister); and finally a speech to the Assembly 
of the Church of Scotland in 1988.65 This was in addition to numerous interviews, penned 
articles, and public statements in which she reiterated her core message. These declarations 
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all followed a similar discursive formula: an exposition of the Christian Revelation, the 
application of this to politics, an assertion of the ideological harmony between Christianity 
and Conservatism/capitalism, and its complete antithesis to both socialism/Marxism.  
There are obvious problems in attributing a politician‟s public statements as their 
own given the reliance on speechwriters. Mrs Thatcher, however, was notoriously hands-on 
in the writing of her public statements, often re-drafting them even after her aides had 
printed off the final copy.66 The playwright Ronald Millar, who penned many of Mrs 
Thatcher‟s speeches and provided her with some of her now infamous lines, explained that 
when he drafted an address: „Her views, her opinions, her kind of language and her 
guidance were behind every syllable.‟67 In respect to the „religious speeches‟ we do know 
that right-wing journalist and Anglican T.E. Utley provided some of the ideas and text for 
the St Lawrence Jewry 1978 sermon and also helped with the draft of her speech to the 
Church of Scotland just before he died in 1988.68  Brian Griffiths, then head of her policy 
unit, was also believed to have been the inspiration behind the 1988 speech. Even so, Utley 
and Griffiths‟ input merely demonstrate the cross-fertilisation between Mrs Thatcher‟s 
public doctrine and the conservative and evangelical movement within the Church.  
Margaret Thatcher rarely referred to the institutional churches in her speeches 
preferring to speak in broader terms about Christianity, Scripture and popular religious 
culture – she frequently cited her favourite hymns and poetry, particularly the writings of C. 
S. Lewis and Rudyard Kipling for instance.69 It was a doctrine rooted in the authority of the 
Bible and displayed a preference for the Old Testament over the New, with the more 
prescriptive Ten Commandments quoted more often than the Sermon on the Mount for 
example. The overriding theme was not personal spirituality, but her understanding of the 
synthesis between religious and political values, specifically the theological coherence 
between Christianity and Conservatism.   
In 1977, delivering the Iain Macleod memorial lecture, Mrs Thatcher reminded the 
audience of the historic connection between Conservatism and Christianity. „The Tories 
began as a Church party‟, she affirmed, „concerned with the Church and state…Religion 
gives us not only our values….but also our historical roots.‟70 Despite this explicit reference 
to the traditional connection between Church and party, Mrs Thatcher‟s public doctrine, as 
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we shall see, owed very little to this heritage, and was in both style and substance 
remarkably distinct from the Tory-Anglican tradition personified in Harold Macmillan. If 
Macmillan‟s theo-political outlook was paternalist, high-anglican and consensual, then Mrs 
Thatcher‟s in contrast was evangelical, culturally Nonconformist, and emphasized the 
values of respectability, self-reliance and the work ethic. The Archbishop of York, John 
Habgood clearly thought so, commenting in a letter to a parishioner in 1983: „I would say 
that she takes it seriously though her religion is perhaps more individualistic than that of 
Harold Macmillan.‟71   
 
Individualism 
The Archbishop was right, for the cornerstone of Mrs Thatcher‟s public doctrine was man‟s 
individual relationship with God. Speaking in terms that displayed her Nonconformist 
upbringing, Mrs Thatcher time and time again reiterated the individualistic basis of the 
Revelation. At the Iain Macleod Memorial lecture in 1977, for example, she affirmed that 
man was entirely responsible for „working out his own salvation.‟72 Preaching from the St 
Lawrence Jewry pulpit three years later, Mrs Thatcher elucidated further on this point:  
 
It is to individuals that the Ten Commandments are addressed. In the 
statements, “honour thy father and thy mother”, “thou shalt not steal”, 
“though shalt not bear false witness”, and so on, the “thou” to whom 
these resounding imperatives are addressed is you and me. In the same 
way, the New Testament is preoccupied with the individual, with his 
need for forgiveness and for the Divine strength which comes to those 
who sincerely accept it.73   
 
 
As the above sentiments suggest, Mrs Thatcher believed that there was an underlying 
political message in this religious doctrine, for if faith was predicated on the relationship 
between God and individual, then the same should apply in the political sphere. Like her 
fellow Christian economic liberals, Margaret Thatcher argued that as Christianity was a call 
to men individually rather than to collective society, it should follow that political choices 
should reside with the citizen rather than the state. Conservatism, which was rooted in the 
individual, was thus lauded as closer to the Christian ideal than socialism.  „Whereas 
socialists begin with society‟, Thatcher told the audience at the Macleod Memorial Lecture, 
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„we (Conservatives) start with Man.‟74 There was no room for any intermediaries such as the 
priest in Mrs Thatcher‟s theology, just as there was no room for intermediary institutions 
such as local government or unions in her political analysis: such agencies interfered with, 
rather than aided, the relationship between the individual and government. As commentator 
Jonathan Raban rightly noted, one of the key aspects of Mrs Thatcher‟s theo-political vision 
was that „man shall stand as nakedly before his Government as he does before his Maker.‟75  
By way of explicating the social and political ramifications of this individualistic 
message, Mrs Thatcher unpicked what she considered to be the real meaning of the 
Christian maxim: „Love Thy Neighbour as Thyself‟. Speaking at the Iain Macleod lecture, 
Mrs Thatcher explained that it was the „thyself‟ part of the sentiment which was important. 
The Christian doctrine of interdependence did not mean to „denigrate‟ the self or „elevate 
love of others above it‟, but worked on the assumption that „concern for self‟ was 
something to be expected and one, which merely demanded „that this be extended to 
others.‟ In an interpretation that no doubt incensed many Anglican clergy, Mrs Thatcher 
proclaimed that the real meaning of this axiom, therefore, was that „self-regard‟ was „the 
root of regard for one‟s fellows.‟76 The aim here was to counter the supposition that 
Christian duty to others should supplant or suppress personal responsibility, while the 
underlying political intention was to disprove the often-quoted Biblical basis for state 
socialism. Mrs Thatcher sought to offer an alternative understanding of how Christian 
benevolence to others was fulfilled, for  „generosity‟ she proclaimed was „born in the hearts 
of men and women‟ and could not be „manufactured by politicians.‟77 Christian 
responsibility, therefore, was not demonstrated through a redistributative state, but via three 
separate spheres: the family, community and nation.78 Denouncing the concept of collective 
altruism as a delegation of responsibility and a manufacturing of false guilt, Mrs Thatcher 
reaffirmed in 1981, the individualist precept of the Biblical message: „We are called on to 
repent our own sins, not each others‟ sins‟.79 
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Liberty  
It was not simply that the Christian faith operated as a call to individuals, but that God 
had also bestowed on man free choice between eternal salvation or damnation. Liberty, 
therefore, was deemed to be at the heart of the Christian message.80  As Mrs Thatcher 
explained in an interview with David Frost in 1988: „if he (man) did not have the 
fundamental choice, well he would not be Man made in the image of God‟. She 
concluded, therefore, that a restriction of choice dehumanized man: „If God could 
interfere and change everything, then we should not be human beings with this God-
given right to choose.‟81 That same year, in her address to the Church of Scotland, Mrs 
Thatcher told the story of the crucifixion as essentially one of choice rather than sacrifice: 
„when faced with His terrible choice and lonely vigil, [he] chose to lay down His life that 
our sins may be forgiven.‟82 This theological interpretation prompted Jonathan Raban to 
accuse the Prime Minister of mindlessly appropriating theology for partisan means: 
„Christ dying on the Cross joins those folk who have exercised their right to choose – to 
buy their own council houses, to send their children to private schools, to occupy 
„paybeds‟ in NHS-funded hospitals.‟83 In some respects, Raban was right, for Mrs 
Thatcher was not simply using religion for rhetorical ornamentation, but was consciously 
seeking to link God-given liberty to a distinctly Thatcherite notion of political freedom. 
Yet Raban was wrong to label this as crass theology, for the application of divine free will 
in the political realm had roots dating back to the nineteenth century and was a legitimate 
understanding which the Prime Minister shared with many in her party and in the pews. 
Anglican John Gummer had put forward precisely this view in his chapter to Christian 
voters in 1987: „Choice lies at the heart of the Christian revelation‟ judging that „there is 
something wrong in believing a man fit to choose his eternal destiny but not to decide on 
the education of his children.‟84 Such sentiments clearly resonated with many Christians. 
In a response to the Bishop of Manchester‟s attack on private healthcare in 1981, one 
layman wrote to remind the prelate that it was right that political choices should operate 
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in the same way as religious liberty: „haven‟t we all been given free will?.... Our way to 
God is free for us, we choose what prayers suit us best, we also choose the Churches that 
we wish to worship in.‟85 One meeting at Chequers between the Anglican bishops and 
Margaret Thatcher in 1987 (later recounted by Bishop Jenkins in his memoirs) 
demonstrates the wide doctrinal differences between the Church and the government on 
this point:   
 
The highlight of the meeting came when she was telling us how 
disappointed she was that we bishops did not seem to appreciate that her 
motivation stemmed from Christianity. Both Christianity and liberal 
market democracy, she stated, “were about freedom”. At this point the 
evangelical Bishop of Chester, Michael Baughen, gently corrected her in 
his grandfatherly way: “oh no, Prime Minister. Christianity is not about 
freedom, it is about love.” Far from demolishing her, this comment 
scarcely interrupted her flow.86 
 
This „theological handbagging‟ from Mrs Thatcher serves as a useful illustration of the 
theo-political divide between the bishops and the Prime Minister and her resolute belief 
that free-market economics had Scriptural authority.  
Mrs Thatcher conceptualised liberty as beyond politics, belonging to the religious-
moral sphere and as a supreme indisputable doctrine. Yet it is clear that there her concept 
of freedom was a restricted and highly politicised one. There was never any hint that the 
state could be an instrument of liberty or could extend the freedom of its citizens. At a 
speech at the Carlton Club in 1984, for example, Mrs Thatcher rejected an understanding 
that liberty could be engineered by government or achieved through collective struggle, 
declaring simply that freedom and individualism were „God-given, not state-given.‟87 Liberty 
increasingly came to be the slogan of Thatcherism; the justification for Conservative 
domestic policies such as rising property ownership, restriction on union practises and the 
deregulation of the market as well as the rhetorical cloak Mrs Thatcher would adorn every 
time she ventured out onto the international stage. Addressing the party-faithful at the 
Conservative conference in 1989, for example, Mrs Thatcher proclaimed: 
 
At the heart of our belief is the principle of freedom under the rule of 
law. Freedom that gives a man room to breathe, to take responsibility, to 
make his own decisions and to chart his own course. Remove man‟s 
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freedom and you dwarf the individual, you devalue his conscience and 
you demoralise him.88 
 
What Mrs Thatcher labelled as „the freeing of the human spirit‟ was clearly a specific and 
highly contestable notion of political liberty, yet it was also one, which she legitimised by 
routinely drawing on religious doctrine.89 
 
The Doctrine of Original Sin  
As has been explained in the previous chapter, the doctrine of original sin had been 
advanced by the New Right as a way of countering socialist utopianism and reinforcing the 
value of individual responsibility over structural solutions. Commenting on the initial drafts 
of Mrs Thatcher‟s sermon for St Lawrence Jewry, Anglican Simon Webley encouraged Mrs 
Thatcher to adopt this position on the „Biblical view of man‟ explaining: „It is about 
inherent selfishness or sinfulness. It is about Original Sin‟ for „the evils of society are not 
due to the accident of class, education, income or region but to the inherent frailty of the 
individual himself.‟90 Mrs Thatcher took Webley‟s advice and lecturing from the pulpit of St 
Lawrence Jewry proclaimed that Christianity teaches that „there is some evil in everyone and 
that it cannot be banished by sound policies and institutional reforms‟ and denounced any 
political beliefs which advocated that „man is perfectable‟ as „heresy‟.91 Socialism she argued 
enslaved man, depriving him of his moral responsibility by seducing him with false hopes of 
a Promised Land whereas Conservatism, was naturally in tune with the religious and social 
reality of sin. In this, Mrs Thatcher was not blindly preaching the views of Simon Webley. 
These sentiments were all very familiar to her for it harked back to what her father had 
preached: „Men, nations, races, or any particular generation cannot be saved by ordinances, 
power, legislation‟.   
Original sin proved a convenient concept with which to debunk the myth of the 
state yet it was also deployed in respect to individual morality. Those on the Right – Mrs 
Thatcher included – frequently associated moral „permissiveness‟ with socialism whether in 
respect to sexual education literature produced by Labour-run councils or by pointing out 
that the  „new morality‟ of the 1960s had been ushered in under a Labour administration.  
Underlying such accusations was an assumption that socialism, because it weakened 
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individual responsibility, encouraged a morally defunct and irresponsible citizenry, creating 
a society where men renounced their traditional responsibilities as fathers and where the 
single mother embodied the dependent amoral citizen. It was only through a reassertion of 
liberty, Mrs Thatcher explained, that moral responsibility could be restored; „without choice, 
talk of morality is an idle and an empty thing,‟ she told the party conference in 1986.92 As 
has already been explained, this was a somewhat restrictive version of liberty, yet it was also 
a highly contradictory message. For while Mrs Thatcher advocated greater individual 
freedom, she also denounced social liberalism (i.e. choice in the moral sphere) for giving 
rise to immoral behaviour.  On one level, Mrs Thatcher argued that citizens in order to 
exercise their moral faculties needed to be free from state interference, yet on another level, 
Mrs Thatcher had a fixed and conservative idea of which moral paths citizens should 
choose. This pointed to an overwhelming contradiction between the two strands of 
Thatcherism: liberty and social conservatism. This tension was blatantly exposed by Mrs 
Thatcher‟s relations with the moral conservative movement whose demands for greater 
state regulation of morality were to be largely unfulfilled. Journalist Melanie Phillips 
observed that on the subject of morality, Mrs Thatcher was „trapped between her belief that 
individuals must be free to make their own choices and her equal belief that she must do 
something about it when those choices are in her view wrong‟. Phillips rightly surmised that 
when it came to a choice between liberty and social conservatism, in the end the 
Thatcherite doctrine of freedom reigned supreme, for „the mother of the nation washes her 
hands of any responsibility.‟93  
 
A Christian Nation 
Margaret Thatcher liked to claim that the theo-political values outlined above were not 
simply personal or political beliefs, but were the essential ingredients of the nation‟s 
spiritual identity, deeply rooted in the country‟s history and culture.94 In her St Lawrence 
Jewry sermon, „The Spirit of the Nation‟, Margaret Thatcher, for example, drew heavily on 
this discourse of spiritual nationalism, pointing to how Britain, as nation „founded on 
Biblical principles‟ had historically integrated Scriptural teachings such as „the 
acknowledgement of the Almighty, a sense of tolerance, an acknowledgement of moral 
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absolutes and a positive view of work‟, into its legal code and culture.95 Mrs Thatcher, 
however, was at pains to point out that the nation was in danger of loosing its Christian 
ethos and, in a rousing plea, called for the reinvigoration of the „spirit of the nation.‟ „Each 
generation must renew its spiritual assets if the integrity of the nation is to be survive‟ she 
warned the congregation.96 In this instance, Mrs Thatcher linked Britain‟s Christian survival 
with its economic and moral survival, implying that a religious revival, like a political revival, 
was only possible under her direction. The fate of the nation‟s Christian heritage, it seems, 
was in the hands of Mrs Thatcher who was determined to set the country back on its 
providential path.  
 To some extent, this was familiar territory for the Conservative party. Stanley 
Baldwin had also interlinked Conservatism, Protestantism and national identity in his 
„fireside chat‟ broadcasts during the interwar years for example.97 Yet while Baldwin could 
rightly assume that the nation to which he referred was Christian (if not Protestant), 
Margaret Thatcher enjoyed no such luxury. Could it be that the Prime Minister was as guilty 
as the Church of England in presupposing that Britain remained a Christian country in the 
1980s?  
Mrs Thatcher always articulated the nation as a spiritual community united in a 
common Christian heritage rather than a populace united in faith. This was an implicit 
recognition of the decline in Christian worship, but also a conviction that Christianity 
remained central to the nation‟s heritage and continued to frame its political and moral 
values. This points to the way in which Mrs Thatcher (and the New Right) tended to frame 
the preservation of Christianity in Britain as a cultural rather than an explicitly evangelical 
issue.  Secularism was conceived as a threat to values and tradition rather than faith per se 
while issues concerning the prevalence of Christianity in society were defended on the 
grounds of cultural conservation. A Christian-centric Religious Education syllabus in 
schools became a statutory requirement in 1988 in order to protect the nation‟s religious 
heritage rather than as a form of evangelisation; restrictive Sunday trading was preserved in 
1986 out of a desire to maintain the „traditional English Sunday‟ rather than weekly 
worship; and the Christian Blasphemy Act was kept not because it was believed to be 
necessary, but because it was felt that removing it would undermine the Christian 
foundations of British law. What can be termed here as the „heritage‟ argument, amounted 
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to a post-modern, post-secular preservation of religion, one which tacitly recognised its 
decline as a belief-system, but reflected a desire to sustain this tradition in a secular plural 
country. This cause was as much about national identity and maintaining conservative 
cultural traditions from encroaching modernity as it was about defending the Word of 
God.98  Mrs Thatcher‟s and the New Right‟s repeated evocation of Britain‟s Christian 
identity therefore chiefly reflected the cultural concerns of conservatism in a secular plural 
modern age. Conservatives may have been appealing to tradition, but it was wholly in 
reaction to contemporary challenges.  
Ironically, Mrs Thatcher‟s concept of the religious nation was not so dissimilar from 
that being propagated by Anglican leaders in this period. Even though their political 
message was different, both the Church and Mrs Thatcher spoke of the nation in 
Christianised terms and both drew on the idea of a diffusive Christianity amongst a non-
churchgoing public. The dialogue between the Church and state, therefore, was entirely 
predicated on this shared understanding and was thus both reflective of the widely held 
fears about the disintegration and fragmentation of Englishness.99 Mrs Thatcher‟s „Spirit of 
the Nation‟ speech then, was not so different from David Sheppard‟s Dimbleby Lecture, 
for both anointed their separate political visions with Scriptural authority and both 
forewarned that a failure to follow their specified course would result in the further 
secularisation of the nation.  
The debate over the legal regulations on religious education to be included in the 
1988 Education Act is a case in point. The campaign for a Christian-based curriculum by 
those on the right had very little to do with the realities of the classroom but chiefly 
concerned the politics of national identity. RE became the battleground on which the fate 
of British Christianity supposedly hinged, with Anglican traditionalists, the Conservative 
government and peers (led by cross-bencher Baroness Cox), all agreed that in an era when 
children were unlikely to receive religious instruction in either the home or parish, it was 
vital that the next generation received this instruction at school. Progressive education had 
always been a particular bugbear for the New Right, and in respect to RE, the specific 
complaint was that a secular multicultural curriculum – one which equated all religions and 
included the teaching of non-theistic ideas such as humanism and communism – had 
infiltrated the nation‟s classrooms. As Baroness Cox put it, under current circumstances, 
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Britain was in danger of selling its „spiritual birthright for a mess of secular pottage.‟100 Cox 
and her followers thus advocated a Christian-centric curriculum, one, which included a 
traditional understanding of the Christian faith and emphasised morality and individual 
responsibility. Delivering her sermon in Edinburgh in 1988, as the Act was proceeding 
through Parliament, Margaret Thatcher pledged her support for Cox‟s position, affirming 
that the nation‟s youth needed to be taught about „the part which the Judaic-Christian 
tradition has played in moulding our laws, manners, and institutions‟ so that this heritage 
could be „preserved and fostered.‟101  
The Church, because of its role as educational providers and as the spiritual voice of 
the nation, was naturally involved in discussions surrounding the drafting of the Bill.102  Led 
by the head of its Board of Education, the Bishop of London, the Anglican position was 
more accommodating than that of Cox and her followers, aiming for consensus across all 
faith groups while also ensuring a privileged place for Christianity on the curriculum. This 
conciliatory approach roused objections from Anglican traditionalists, who forwarded a 
resolution in the Synod calling for the syllabus to be entirely devoted to Christianity. Within 
Westminster, criticisms on the Anglican line were also vocalised, with many accusing the 
Church of being willing to sell out its own faith in order to protect others. After much 
negotiation and debate, however, the Bishop of London eventually managed to achieve an 
agreement in the form of an amendment, which gained the support of the government, 
Baroness Cox and her followers and other faith groups. The following words in respect to 
RE teaching were inserted into the final Act:  
 
Religious education should reflect the fact that the religious traditions in 
Great Britain are in the main Christian, whilst taking into account the 
teaching and practises of other principle religions represented in Great 
Britain.  
 
Similar wording was used in respect to the compulsory daily act of worship for schools and 
it was agreed that the specific syllabus content would be decided at local level between the 
council, the Church of England and other relevant faith communities in the area.103  On the 
surface, the 1988 Act appeared to be attempt by Mrs Thatcher and the Christian right to 
instigate some sort of re-evangelicisation of the nation. This is certainly how the Guardian 
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saw it, commenting that: „a government which has done its best to ignore the problems of 
falling school rolls now appears set to try and halt falling church rolls.‟104 In fact, the 1988 
stipulations were an attempt to certify the nation‟s Christian heritage on the statute book at 
a time of rising concern about the nation‟s spiritual identity.105 Moreover, the final 
stipulations were an illustration of the fact that the Church, government and the New Right 
shared a desire to reassert Britain‟s status as a Christian country. The saga, however, had 
revealed that the main obstacle to this was not secularism but the accommodation of other 
faiths, and was thus a sign of much bigger problems to come.106 
 
Judeo-Christian heritage 
One notable feature of Mrs Thatcher‟s theological discourse was her persistent use of the 
term „Judeo-Christian values.‟107 In theological terms, this was a recognition of the doctrinal 
unity between Judaism and Christianity shared through Old Testament law. Seen in a 
political light, however, it alluded to Mrs Thatcher‟s own personal respect and affiliation 
with Judaism.  Many commentators have remarked on the Prime Minister‟s favourable 
relationship with the Jewish community. Indeed, as MP for Finchley, a constituency with a 
large Jewish population, she could hardly have been otherwise.108 These ties, however, went 
beyond mere political expediency. As Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher would frequently 
proclaim her respect for the Jewish community‟s emphasis on self-reliance and hard work, 
citing a genuine correlation between Nonconformist and Jewish values.109 According to 
Hugo Young, the high proportion of Jewish members amongst MPs and in cabinet (which 
by 1987 had outnumbered the more traditionally welcoming Labour party) was illustrative 
of the fact that Judaism had found a new home on the right in British politics.110 Nowhere 
was this more evident than in Mrs Thatcher‟s relationship with the Chief Rabbi, Immanuel 
Jakobovitz. In 1986, Jakobovitz, in response to Faith in the City, issued a „Jewish‟ perspective 
on inner city poverty and the relationship between government and its citizens. Entitled 
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From Doom to Hope, this pamphlet amounted to a spiritual and theological defence of small 
statism and individual responsibility.  In words that could have been uttered by Mrs 
Thatcher herself, the Chief Rabbi claimed that „cheap labour‟ was „more dignified than a 
free dole‟ and that community responsibility was more valuable and worthwhile than 
collective altruism and state aid.111  Judging that social transformation lay „within the heart 
of man‟, the Rabbi praised hard work and the acquisition of wealth while at the same time 
lambasted the unions and dependency culture.112 The Rabbi‟s contribution was 
enthusiastically welcomed by Mrs Thatcher, who quickly granted him a peerage, no doubt 
in the hope that he would prove an effective counter point to the Anglican bishops in the 
House of Lords. Speaking at an occasion marking Jakobovitz‟s retirement in 1991, Mrs 
Thatcher heaped praise on a man whose twenty-four years of leadership had been marked 
by „unyielding commitment to principle, a refusal to seek easy popularity at the expense of 
integrity and a fearless statement of values symbolised not just in the life of the Jewish 
people but of lasting relevance and general application to the modern world.‟113 Mrs 
Thatcher never lavished such praise on any of her Anglican bishops, for it was in the Chief 
Rabbi that she had found her spiritual soul mate. 114 
 Towards the end of the 1980s, with Islam increasingly on the agenda both at home 
and abroad, Mrs Thatcher‟s use of the term „Judeo-Christian‟ acquired new meaning and 
currency. In an interview with The Times in 1988, a month after the controversial publication 
of Salman Rushdie‟s The Satanic Verses, Mrs Thatcher remarked that the Jewish and 
Christian faiths had a sense of personal responsibility evident in „the Old Testament and the 
New, which you do not get in the other religions.‟115 However questionable this statement, 
the aim of distinguishing Judaism and Christianity above other faiths was clear.  At the time, 
the Muslim opposition to the publication of Rushdie‟s novel (even before the book 
burnings the following year) was considered to be an overreaction, an un-British response, 
which supposedly unmasked the illiberal and unsophisticated nature of Islam. Coming as it 
did at a time of growing public consciousness (and suspicion) of the Muslim faith, there is 
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little doubt that Mrs Thatcher was referring to Islam in her comments.116 Those hearing Mrs 
Thatcher‟s Church of Scotland sermon the previous May had also detected that Islam 
assumed the place of the „other‟ in the speech. According to Jonathan Raban, Islam was 
cast as a shadowy threat to Christian England while T.E. Utley, who had helped draft the 
speech, considered that Mrs Thatcher‟s explicit link between the nation and Christian values 
indirectly positioned Muslims as outsiders, for it hinted that „culturally…a practicing 
Muslim from Pakistan who is (say) a second generation immigrant is not as wholly British 
in quite the same sense as a native Englishman.‟117  
The term „Judeo-Christian values‟ also served as part of Mrs Thatcher‟s theological 
assault on progressive secular values. Mrs Thatcher liked to claim a religious ownership for 
those principles associated with the Enlightenment.  Speaking in 1988, for example, the 
Prime Minister declared that the „flowering of individuality, the concept of human rights, 
the tradition of unfettered thought, the rule of law and the idea of progress‟ had all flowed 
from the Old Testament.118 The implicit calculation was to divorce human rights and justice 
from their secular eighteenth century connections by emphasising their Scriptural roots. 
The French Revolution, in contrast, as Mrs Thatcher famously remarked in 1989 during the 
biennial celebrations in Paris, had not given birth to liberty, but merely „resulted in a lot of 
headless bodies and a tyrant.‟119  
 
Atheistic Socialism and Socialist Christianity  
The underlying purpose of Mrs Thatcher‟s public doctrine was to wrestle the moral mantle 
from socialism. This was done chiefly in two ways: firstly, by claiming the Christian basis of 
capitalism and secondly by labelling socialism as an atheistic creed devoid of any religious 
credibility. Margaret Thatcher did not mince her words on this subject; one time stating that 
„the Promised Land‟ of communism „turned out to be the Gulag‟, and on another occasion 
claiming that Marxist economic determinism was an „out-right denial of the Christian 
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faith.‟120  The origins of socialism, as Mrs Thatcher liked to remind her Christian audiences, 
were atheistic with Marx describing religion as a form of false consciousness that oppressed 
the mass.  And yet, it was not only this which made Marxism unchristian, but its rejection 
of individual freedom, as Mrs Thatcher made clear in her 1978 sermon: „If you deny 
personal responsibility you are denying the religious basis of life – that‟s the difference 
between me and a Marxist. The values by which you and I live are not values given by the 
State.‟121 On this occasion, Mrs Thatcher aimed to highlight the philosophical divide 
between Christianity and secular socialist ideology, yet there was hardly a Christian 
consensus on this point, as the Church of England hierarchy frequently reminded her. Nor 
was it evident that „personal responsibility‟ was a shared characteristic between Christianity 
and Conservatism, for an equal case could be made (and was by liberation theologians) on 
the important ties between Marxism and Christianity.  
 Like her ideological comrade Ronald Reagan, Mrs Thatcher also deployed the 
armory of religious rhetoric in her crusade against international communism. As early as 
1977, in a speech to the University of Zurich‟s economic society, Mrs Thatcher affirmed 
that socialism was contrary to the ethical and religious traditions of Western thought for it 
created a „centralised economic system….which subjugates [man], directs him and denies 
him the right to free choice.‟122 Ten years later, on her historic tour to Russia in 1987, Mrs 
Thatcher made a point of visiting Zagorsk, the seat of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
touring its medieval monastery and meeting with Orthodox Church leaders. During the trip, 
Mrs Thatcher publicly made reference to the persecution of the Orthodox Church under 
the Soviet regime, citing it as proof of the complete incompatibility between Christianity 
and an ideology that sought its extermination. In Mrs Thatcher‟s view, the new dawn of 
religious freedom in post-communist Russia was a sign that the moral and indeed, Christian 
argument had been won.  
Three years later in autumn 1990, as the Iron Curtain was being ripped down across 
Europe, Mrs Thatcher used the occasion of her party conference speech to proclaim that 
the „secular creed‟ of socialism had „utterly failed‟ and that the moral sovereignty of 
capitalism reigned supreme: „Ours is a creed which travels and endures. Its truths are 
written in the human heart. It is the faith which once more has given life to Britain and 
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offers hope to the world.‟123 The victory of capitalism over communism was presented not 
as an economic or diplomatic success but as a moral victory. Capitalism was depicted as the 
natural state of societies, one which, both Britain and Western Europe had temporarily 
diverted from, but had returned to the right path once more.  Such heightened discourse 
seemed to present the outcome of the Cold War as an act of Divine Providence, with Mrs 
Thatcher herself emerging as a victorious Christian warrior; a portrayal which her 
subsequent memoirs and lecture tour did much to cement.124 Delivering a speech to the 
Polish Parliament in 1991, when she was out of office, Mrs Thatcher declared: „It is not just 
that capitalism works. It is not just that capitalism is morally right. What we have to 
recognize and proclaim with the most intense conviction is that capitalism works because it is 
morally right.‟125 Mrs Thatcher‟s ideological war of words with Moscow lent an unwavering 
sense of purpose and Manichean coherence to her anti-socialist message, one, which she 
successfully transported back home.  By presenting this as a strict dualism between 
communism and capitalism and in terms of a battle between good and evil, Mrs Thatcher 
effectively tarnished all socialist thought and action with the same brush; not least those 
views emanating from the Church of England.   
In her 1978 sermon at St Lawrence Jewry Mrs Thatcher had chastised those who 
considered „socialism as a direct expression of the Sermon on the Mount‟ and associated 
„virtue with collectivism‟ for, in her opinion, it was „a grotesque distortion of politics‟ and 
„worse still, it is a blasphemous trivialisation of religion.‟126 On this point, Mrs Thatcher had 
taken the advice of T.E. Utley, who had initially suggested that the „purpose‟ of the speech 
should address „the identification now being widely made between “the Christian ethic” and 
all forms of egalitarianism.‟127 Simon Webley, in agreement, had argued that in the postwar 
years „the Christian ideal of love for one‟s neighbour‟ had transformed into „a sort of 
humanistic socialism‟ that needed to be publicly countered.128 The aim of the speech 
therefore, should be to challenge not only the presumed moral superiority of socialism, but 
also specifically Christians who proselytised such ideas. Mrs Thatcher dutifully did this, 
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questioning whether Christian socialists „should stop and ask if their zeal has not somehow 
led them astray‟.129  The implication was that any cross-fertilization between socialism and 
Christianity not only polluted the Christian message, but ultimately stemmed from political 
rather than spiritual motivations. Mrs Thatcher returned to this subject three years later in 
1981, this time hinting at the political divisions emerging within Christianity and warning of 
the potential dangers of Church leaders „descending into the political arena to take sides on 
those practical issues over which many good and honest Christian sincerely disagree. This 
surely can only weaken the influence and independence of the Church.‟130 Of course, Mrs 
Thatcher may have dismissed Christian socialism as a politicisation of the Word, yet, as we 
have seen, she was equally guilty in appropriating Christian doctrine for political means.  
As the Church leaders increasingly spoke out against her government, so Mrs 
Thatcher directly attempted to strip their analysis of any spiritual credibility. In particular, 
she sought to undermine any inference that the welfare state could be accorded religious 
status. In her words, it was an irreligious intrusion, which should not appear „in the guise of 
an extravagant good fairy at every christening, a loquacious and tedious companion at every 
stage of life‟s journey, the unknown mourner at every funeral.‟131 In a radio interview with 
Jimmy Young in 1987 while on the election trail, Mrs Thatcher was even more unequivocal, 
labelling any plea for progressive taxation as „immoral‟ and asserting that the „right to 
choose‟ was the „essence of Christianity.‟132  
Her speech to the Church of Scotland in 1988 revealed Mrs Thatcher at her most 
bold and blatant and, even though the audience was made up of Scottish ministers, there 
was little doubt that her message was also directed to the Church of England prelates. Mrs 
Thatcher began with the proclamation that „Christianity is about spiritual redemption, not 
social reform‟, deliberately pitting her individualized concept of faith against the communal 
understanding of the Christian ethic. She followed this with a warning to Christians: „we 
must not profess the Christian faith and go to Church simply because we want social 
reforms and benefits or a better standard of behaviour – but because we accept the sanctity 
of life, the responsibility that comes with freedom.‟133 In one full swoop, Mrs Thatcher had 
completely undermined the religious motivations and sincerity of social Christianity. The 
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Prime Minister then addressed the charge of the immorality of wealth creation and 
materialism by drawing on the words of St Paul („If a man will not work he shall not eat‟) as 
proof that „abundance rather than poverty‟ had Biblical legitimacy.134 This scriptural 
rationale for enterprise culture also conveniently served to counter the Anglican mantra 
„bias to the poor‟. Finally, the Prime Minister ended her speech by setting out the separate 
responsibilities of politicians and religious leaders: „We parliamentarians can legislate for the 
rule of the law. You the Church can teach the life of the faith.‟135 In this, Mrs Thatcher was 
addressing one of the main concerns of Anglican traditionalists; that the church leadership 
was prioritizing social issues over evangelism. Soon after the speech, the BSR issued an 
open letter, dutifully thanking Mrs Thatcher for giving „time and thought to matters of 
Christian faith‟.136 It then proceeded to reject the speech in its entirety, challenging the 
Prime Minister on her understanding of the Christian ethos of mutuality, her failure to 
acknowledge the indignity of charity and her lack of appreciation for the responsibilities of 
government. Seen side-by-side these two documents perfectly illustrate the theological and 
political divide between the Church and state in this decade.  
The „Thatcherite theology‟, as has been dissected here, was rooted in a belief in 
liberty and an individualized faith as the basis of the Revelation. It was however, doctrinally 
inconsistent and patchy, and despite her claims to the contrary, it was unashamedly a 
politicized interpretation of Christian doctrine. It merged theology with the secular language 
of ethics and philosophy and directly drew upon the evangelical and traditionalist 
movement within Christianity. It contained much of the theo-political instruction that Mrs 
Thatcher had been exposed to as a child, but reinvented for the politics of late-twentieth 
century Britain. Moreover, the aim of all this was twofold: firstly, to undermine the assumed 
association between socialism and Christianity and secondly, to revive nineteenth century 
ideas about the moral and Christian virtues of capitalism. This was a personal conviction 
which ran consistently throughout her premiership and could be traced back to her early 
days as Conservative party leader, as the notable „convert‟ on the right, journalist Paul 
Johnson, commented in 1978:  
 
She is the first proper Christian as a political leader that we‟ve had in a 
very long time!…She is what you might call an orthodox Christian in the 
sense that she accepts the teachings of her church and is not a kind of 
subversive, trendy revolutionary element in it. She does believe in the ten 
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commandments. She does make very clear distinctions in her mind 
between what is morally right and wrong...one of the points she 
continually makes, and is gradually getting across, is that it used to be 
thought that the Labour party had morals on its side, that it somehow 
had a respect for equality, justice and moral goodness which the 
Conservatives, the party of capital, didn‟t possess, but that now the 
pendulum has swung the other way.137 
 
 
As the triumph of capitalism over communism was assured, so Mrs Thatcher spoke in even 
more confident tone of the moral validity of her politics.  And yet, subsequent events 
would suggest that Mrs Thatcher ultimately failed in her aim to quash the moral credibility 
of socialism and revive the reputation of capitalism. In the 1990s, as the stark realities of 
globalization were exposed, this triggered an even greater chorus of protest against 
capitalism, not just from Christians, but also from a much more powerful and ethically 
inspired-NGO movement. The Conservative party meanwhile remained burdened by the 
legacy of the Thatcher years, characterized in the public mind as the „nasty party‟, which led 
them to suffer three subsequent election defeats. At the same time, socialism in Britain, 
under the reformed guise of New Labour, successfully shed its radical associations and re-
embraced its ethical socialist tradition, which strengthened rather than the weakened the 
moral credibility of the left. It would thus take more than a few sermons by Mrs Thatcher 
to imprint the moral virtues of capital into the public mind. Even if capitalism was 
considered necessary, it was deemed a necessary evil rather than a virtuous one. Mrs 
Thatcher may have created a nation of Thatcherites, but few truly believed that it was a 
morally righteous lifestyle.  Given this then, how can we assess the impact and significance 
of Mrs Thatcher‟s public doctrine? It is to this subject, to which this chapter now turns.  
 
IV. Audience and Reception: Assessing Mrs Thatcher’s Public Doctrine 
Commenting on Mrs Thatcher‟s St Lawrence Jewry speech in 1978, Maurice Cowling 
remained unconvinced of the effectiveness or even the rationale behind Margaret 
Thatcher‟s partisan theology. Arguing that the Christian case for Conservatism could 
equally be made for socialism, Cowling considered that, although such protestations may 
provide „political encouragement to Christians who happen to be Conservatives‟, Mrs 
Thatcher‟s speech was somewhat naïve given that the nation was now largely indifferent to 
Christianity.138 Cowling was right, there was no substantial electoral advantage to be gained 
from making appeals to Christians. Christian Conservatives, although an important 
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constituency, did not have the power to swing elections, moreover Christian voters in 
Britain were on both sides of the political divide. America proved to be a contrasting 
example, where Ronald Reagan‟s Republican party was particularly adept at marshalling the 
support of the evangelical churches by making specific appeals to their moral conservative 
agenda. When Reagan drew upon Christian language and ideas, he was therefore appealing 
to an important and influential constituency in a way that Mrs Thatcher was not.139  
 This is not to say that Mrs Thatcher‟s religious rhetoric completely fell on deaf ears 
for, as we have seen, there were significant numbers of Christians (predominantly 
Conservatives) with whom her appeal found favour. Her marrying of politics, morality and 
faith resonated with the prevailing ethos of the conservative Anglican movement whilst her 
conflict with the liberal Anglican leadership merely confirmed the ideological harmony 
between political and religious conservatism in this period. Many people, it seemed, were 
also convinced of her Christian sincerity. One parishioner, for example, in a letter to the 
Bishop of Manchester admonished his Church for its „unchristian denigration of Mrs 
Thatcher‟, who, he believed, carried out „her great responsibilities with a genuine Christian 
faith.‟140 Even in the Methodist Church there were those who considered Mrs Thatcher as 
one of their own, with one pastor in a letter to the Methodist Recorder declaring that the Prime 
Minister preached Wesleyianism more truthfully and successfully than his own church.141 
On a broader level, Mrs Thatcher‟s conscious revival of Nonconformist values did feed a 
certain yearning for a more decisive and resolute direction in the 1970s. Because of this, her 
doctrine was welcomed by a significant section of the populace, notably parts of the middle 
classes, who saw it as a necessary remedy for the social, economic and moral excesses of the 
postwar world. It could be said that Thatcherism satisfied a national thirst for a more 
prescriptive outlook at a time of uncertainty and change, which was also being quenched in 
the religious sphere with the blossoming of conservative evangelicalism.142 Moreover, this 
packaging of a political vision in Christianised terms by Mrs Thatcher and others on the 
right, suggests at the very least, that theological discourse remained a linguistic resource in 
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British politics, even in more secular times. The New Right may have exaggerated the 
extent to which Britain remained a Christian nation, but for Mrs Thatcher‟s public doctrine 
to have any credibility or reverberation at all, there needed to be some level of residual faith 
and sympathy, even if this belief did operate at a tectonic level of British society.  
Cultural theorist Stuart Hall famously defined Thatcherism as a „hegemonic project‟, 
a discourse, which „interpreted and legitimated economic changes through a set of moral 
and ethical codes and latched anxieties about money, taxation and unemployment onto 
broader evocations of national loss and disintegration.‟ 143 In his view, authoritarian 
populism was central to its power for it translated economic theory into the language of 
aspiration, fear, moral virtue and common sense. Hall omitted religion (separate from 
morality) from his analysis, yet these last two chapters on the role of the New Right and the 
Thatcherite theology suggest that Christianity was a key part of the British neo-
Conservative movement, as a motivation and in shaping the tone, language and ideological 
direction of the „Conservative turn‟. This chapter has revealed how Christianity – 
specifically Protestant-capitalist values – proved to be one of the central tools Margaret 
Thatcher used to legitimise her political vision. This was a theology which mixed economic 
self-interest with man‟s individual relationship with God, connected an evangelical 
moralism with illusions to the Victorian past, associated fears about national unity with the 
loss of Christian heritage and presented Thatcherism as the true political route to economic 
and moral redemption.  Regardless of whether Thatcherism constituted a hegemony or not, 
it is clear that Christianity was an important element in the neo-Conservative discursive 
armoury and moreover, one which needed a degree of religious literacy on the part of the 
public in order to operate.  
Yet this aside, there does remain the fundamental issue of the predominantly secular 
audience. Surprisingly, Mrs Thatcher was always mindful about speaking on religious 
matters, mostly out a fear of alienating non-believers. Ronald Millar has recounted how Mrs 
Thatcher was initially reluctant to quote the prayer of St Francis of Assisi on the steps of 
Number Ten in 1979 as she thought it too controversial and preachy.144 She remained wary 
of being seen to be politicising faith, although admittedly, this did not stop her from doing 
just that. Conscious of such criticisms, T.E.Utley, in a letter to her advisors in 1978, 
explained that in order to gauge public approval and side step any unnecessary controversy, 
Mrs Thatcher needed to speak from a personal rather than a political perspective:  
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public interest would be captured by using some of this autobiographical 
material. This would also have the advantage of making her comments 
on theological matters read more like a personal testament. On the 
whole, for example it is not a good idea to have the Tory Party leader 
leaping in to theological controversy between the liberal and 
conservative wings of the Church unless she makes it perfectly clear that 
she is doing so in a private capacity.145 
 
 
To a certain extent Mrs Thatcher took Utley‟s advice; she did always speak from a personal 
perspective, it was just that her conviction style meant that she tended to present these as 
doctrinal absolutes. But this ability to merge the personal with the political was one of the 
key features of Mrs Thatcher‟s style of leadership. As Peter Clarke has correctly judged, 
„Thatcherism without Thatcher is difficult to imagine‟, testifying to the centrality of her 
image to her authority and how Mrs Thatcher was the personal embodiment of precisely 
those values, prejudices and aspirations that she sought to instil within the nation.146 As 
Heather Nunn and others have analysed, Mrs Thatcher‟s persona was crucial to her 
authority as leader, with the vision of the Iron Lady assuming an almost mythical-like status 
in British political consciousness. 
It is here that Max Weber‟s theory on the nature of leadership might shed some 
light on the issue. According to Weber there are three types of authority: legal, traditional 
and charismatic authority. Under these definitions, Mrs Thatcher would be classified as a 
charismatic leader, which Weber stipulated as „a certain quality of individual personality by 
which he is set apart and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least 
specifically exceptional powers or qualities.‟147 Expanding on Weber‟s analysis, Ann Ruth 
Willner has set out the key characteristics that constitute a charismatic ruler. These 
included: the importance of image, an individual from a lower social economic background 
(i.e. not from the established ruling elite), an inexhaustible vitality, great composure under 
stress and a determination and stubbornness combined with a revolutionary agenda.148 
Willner has argued that the projected image, however distant from reality, was absolutely 
fundamental to a leader‟s charismatic authority.  
The figure of Margaret Thatcher certainly corresponds with this analysis, not only in 
origins and agenda, but also in the construction of her image as someone with super-
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human-like capabilities. She was presented as a woman of great physical resilience who 
could exist on less than four hours of sleep; of strong mind, who was always better briefed, 
more informed and more decisive than any of her wobbling „wet‟ ministers; as a warrior 
figure, who emerged unscathed from the ashes of the bombing of the Grand Hotel in 
Brighton and who successfully defeated the „enemies within‟, such as Arthur Scargill, and 
threats beyond Britain‟s shores such as General Galtieri.149 In the construction of this 
image, the religious language and element was crucial. Mrs Thatcher‟s public doctrine – her 
preacher-like tone, evangelical mission, her heightened revivalist language and Biblical 
vision – were absolutely fundamental in creating a religious aura and a providential air 
around her role and position as Prime Minister.150  
The political scientist Ivor Crewe, assessing the relationship between the public and 
Mrs Thatcher, has drawn upon opinion polls to conclude that there is little evidence that 
the British electorate had become „suffused with Thatcherite values on either the economic 
or moral plane‟.151 Crewe attributed Mrs Thatcher‟s electoral success not to her popularity 
but to the specific appeal of her charismatic authority; a presence, which proved particularly 
alluring at a time of weak parliamentary opposition. As Crewe explains: „Mrs Thatcher‟s 
warrior style – setting objectives, leading from the front, confronting problems, holding her 
position – did make a major electoral impact.‟152 This points to the real significance of Mrs 
Thatcher‟s public doctrine. For if an overriding religious ethos and language was central to 
the image of Mrs Thatcher and if we are to be convinced by Crewe‟s argument on the 
popular appeal of her charismatic authority, then we must conclude, therefore, that her 
public doctrine and preacher-like persona was absolutely central to her legitimacy and 
success with the electorate. Even though the public were not predominantly active 
believers, it was the authority of Mrs Thatcher‟s religious ethos, rather than the religious 
message itself, which was significant. Mrs Thatcher‟s relationship with the British electorate 
has and always will be, a contestable issue; did Mrs Thatcher reflect the values of the public 
or reshape them? We will never know the thought-process of every voter at the ballot box 
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and so while we can only allude to the possible influence that Mrs Thatcher‟s religious 
authority had in determining votes, we can speak in more assured terms about the direction 
that this religious authority took once Mrs Thatcher was in power.  Part reality, part 
construction, Mrs Thatcher‟s priestly moralising drew inspiration from the example of her 
father, assumed both a muscular Christianity and a feminine piety, tapped into a 
Nonconformist heritage and contemporary paranoia about secularism and reflected a desire 
for certainty in an age of doubt. Seen in this light then, perhaps Mrs Thatcher‟s use of the 
prayer of St Francis of Assisi on the steps of Number 10 in 1979, no longer seems so out of 
step with her style and approach to leadership: „Where there is discord, may we bring 
harmony. Where there is error, may we bring truth. Where there is doubt, may we bring 
faith. And where there is despair, may we bring hope. 
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                                           CHAPTER VII: EPILOGUE 
The Death of Protestant England and the Birth of Multi-Faith Britain: the 1990s 
 
   „A Society has not ceased to be Christian until it has become positively something else‟ 
                                                                         T.S. Eliot, Christianity and Culture, 19401  
 
The dialogue between the Church and the Conservative government in the 1980s was 
predicated on a shared understanding that Christian values continued to underscore the 
nation‟s politics, even if these two positions were diametrically opposed. Those on the right 
sought to fuse their ideology with a moral legitimacy, by reasserting the doctrinal harmony 
between Christian and capitalist values and affirming the nation‟s Christian heritage. The 
Anglican position, on the other hand, linked a diffusive Christianity with a reaffirmation of 
the Biblical basis of statutory welfare, stressing national unity and the altruistic relationship 
between the classes. The new decade would see a series of events and developments, which 
would eventually render both these positions untenable and this conflict largely irrelevant, 
as the ruling elite was forced to recognise the multi-faith nature of British society.  
The aim here is not to trace this transition in its entirety, which is beyond the 
bounds of this thesis, but rather to show how three main developments meant that the 
conflict between the Church of England and the Conservative government dissipated and 
was eventually replaced with a new configuration of the relationship between religion and 
politics in Britain. Firstly, this epilogue shall trace the decline of public Anglicanism, which 
had characterised the Church‟s prophetic ministry in the 1980s. The subsequent decade 
would see the Church of England become consumed with its own internal divisions and its 
leadership less inclined to assert their presence on the national stage. The second theme will 
be the death of Tory-Anglicanism. As this thesis has argued, Conservative disaffection with 
the Church of England had been growing steadily since the 1970s, however, it was to be the 
passing of the Ordination of Women Measure by the Synod in 1992, which marked the 
symbolic end of the historic relationship between Church and party. Finally, it shall examine 
The Satanic Verses controversy and the problems and questions that this furore triggered. 
This event was a monumental turning point in the religious history of the nation for it 
raised the central issue of the rights of Britain‟s religious minorities, which, in turn, 
prompted a reordering of Britain‟s national religious identity and changed the role and 
position of religion in British politics accordingly.  
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I. The Death of Public Anglicanism 
If Archbishop Runcie‟s reign was characterised by a revival of public Anglicanism and his 
Church‟s conflict with the Thatcher government, then his successor‟s time in office was 
characterised by a more internalised perspective and a retreat from the political stage. In the 
1990s, the BSR was notably more muted, the Synod became increasingly embroiled in 
ecclesiastical affairs and even the new generation of bishops seemed unwilling to rock the 
political boat as their predecessors had done a decade earlier. Faith in the City had 
undoubtedly left an indelible mark on the Church at both a central and parish level, yet the 
two follow-up reports in the nineties were less penetrative and political and received little 
attention as a result.2  More so, the Church Urban Fund, which had generated huge 
investment for urban ministry and social projects, drew back from pursuing its more 
political goals. By the early nineties, the CUF had generated over £18 million, yet only 21 
per cent of affluent parishes and 18 per cent of urban parishes were still involved in the 
link-up programme, with many pointing to unbridgeable class and cultural differences as 
the key reasons for its lack of success.3 According to a report on the CUF published in 
1994, the educational message of the Fund had not penetrated „comfortable Britain‟ and 
had subsequently been replaced with a „less contentious frame of reference‟ so as to ensure 
unequivocal support from the Church.4 In recent times, there has been ample evidence that 
congregations could still prove an effective political force in Britain, as demonstrated by the 
mobilisation of the Christian community in Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History 
campaigns, but tellingly, these were on matters of international rather than domestic 
concerns. 
One chief reason why public Anglicanism, which had been such a prominent force 
on the political stage in the 1980s, more or less disappeared in the 1990s was that the 
economic debate had changed. The triumph of global capitalism after the collapse of the 
Cold War triggered a significant shift in thinking towards a more internationalist 
perspective. Christian social theology adapted accordingly, focusing more on the rights and 
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wrongs of globalisation and less on the domestic political agenda.5 The Church‟s own 
ethical investment policy, for example, became a key issue for Anglicans seeking to 
demonstrate good practice in what was now labelled „corporate social responsibility‟ while 
there was even greater prominence given over to the developing world in this analysis. This 
change had its downsides though, for theologians and church leaders found it difficult to be 
heard in this widening and increasingly secularised sphere. This focus on the global rather 
than national scene also inevitably meant that Christian commentators tended not to stress 
the distinct role of the Church of England as the „conscience of the nation‟, and instead 
made much more generalised claims about the distinctive insights that Christian ethics and 
theology could make on the universal debate about capitalism and wealth. 
Of equal significance was the fact that the domestic political situation had also 
changed. The election of John Major triggered an immediate shift in the political milieu. 
Not only was his political style less confrontational than Mrs Thatcher, but the new Prime 
Minister also appeared committed to pursuing a „compassionate Conservative‟ agenda, in 
his words, creating a „nation at ease with itself‟. Moreover, the reconfiguration of the 
Labour party under John Smith and subsequently Tony Blair signalled a realignment of 
British party politics and meant that the Church‟s function in occupying a centrist platform 
during the eighties was no longer necessary. The Thatcher years, it seems, had posed a 
unique political challenge. The Anglican hierarchy had entered the political fray in the 1980s 
to speak out against what they saw as a fundamental undermining of Christian values, yet 
surprisingly once Mrs Thatcher left office, the heat, tension, and along with it much of the 
motivation behind this public prophecy had diminished. Subsequent years under the Major 
and New Labour governments would in fact see the forging of a productive and fruitful 
partnership between the Church, Whitehall and local councils, as Christian charities and 
churches were increasingly seen as vital agencies for fostering social capital within 
communities.  A story of conflict, it seems, was replaced with one of growing cooperation 
between Church and the state.6  
Anglicanism under Archbishop Carey was also marked by a greater internalisation, 
as the Church directed its energies away from the public political stage into getting its own 
house in order. Part of the reason for this was practical. In a wicked twist of irony, the early 
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1990s saw the Church suffer huge financial losses on the stock market. This was primarily 
the fault of the Church Commissioners who had engaged in exactly the type of casino 
capitalism, which the Anglican leadership had spent so much time condemning. All of this 
cost the Church dear, wiping a reported £500 million off its assets and forcing Archbishop 
Carey to implement an urgent restructuring of its finances.7 Another consequence of this 
was that the Church became ever more reliant on contributions from its congregations, 
which inevitably forced its leadership to become more accountable to its loyal members. 
The key issue that dominated the first years of George Carey‟s incumbency was the 
ordination of women priests. This was entirely an internal ecclesiastical affair one which 
aroused great passions within the Church, but generated little interest amongst the general 
public. The passing of the Measure has sufficiently been documented elsewhere; of 
relevance here is the way in which the debate preoccupied the Church and the ramifications 
of this for public Anglicanism.8  The campaign for the ordination of women had been 
gathering pace for over twenty years, yet it was in the 1980s, as the decision was coming to 
a head, that it emerged as the main bone of contention between traditionalists and liberals.  
Synod debates on the issue aroused some of the most heated discussions within the 
chamber in this decade and when it eventually passed in November 1992, the vote was met 
with a mixture of jubilation and despair by those within the Church.9 If the press reports 
were to be believed, the Church of England was seemingly on course for a schism not seen 
since the Reformation.  
For traditionalist Anglicans the admittance of women into the priesthood 
fundamentally altered the identity of the Church of England. It undermined Anglican‟s 
place within Christendom and disrupted what Richard Hooker had originally deemed to be 
the doctrinal balance of Anglicanism among Scripture, Tradition and Reason. To a certain 
extent, the ordination of women debate was as much about the direction of the Church as it 
was about whether a female priesthood was in accordance with Biblical or canonical law. 
For some, the passing of the Measure was a sign that the traditionalist cause had been lost 
and they felt that they had no option but to leave the Church of England. Many looked to 
Rome as their new spiritual home with four bishops, 300 clergy and many laity converting 
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in the aftermath of the Synod‟s decision.10 In an effort to appease those that remained, the 
Church appointed a number of „flying bishops‟ to administer those parishes unwilling to 
accept female priests. Admittedly, this settlement was not a solution nor did it make much 
logistical or theological sense, however, it did reflect a genuine desire on the part of the 
Anglican leadership to ease the Church through this change with the least possible pain. 
The establishment of the anglo-catholic organisation, Forward in Faith, and the 
conservative evangelical group, Reform, was testimony to the fact that the traditionalist 
cause had not completely been defeated by the ordination decision. The 1990s would see 
Anglican traditionalists soldiering on to new battles inevitably lurking on the horizon; 
female bishops and homosexual priests.11  
While Archbishop Carey concentrated on guiding the Church through this 
momentous and historic transformation, the view forwarded by the press and some 
Anglicans was that the Church had been irrevocably damaged by the ordination crisis. As 
we have seen, the media in the eighties had been crucial in according the Church its national 
status and platform, yet in the 1990s the predominant portrayal of the Church was that of a 
broken family, wrought with internal problems and seemingly unaware of the outside world 
which it was meant to serve. The passing of the ordination of women was undoubtedly 
newsworthy stuff – „Vicars in Knickers‟ so the Sun headline ran – but perhaps for all the 
wrong reasons. It created the sense of a backward looking Church, barely able to get to 
grips with the modern world and immersed in an internal schism, which was tearing the 
Church apart. The following Easter in 1993, newspapers were dominated with stories of 
mass priestly conversions to Rome and Archbishop Carey‟s weakening authority, with the 
Guardian running the headline: „Dr Carey „In the Name of God, go!‟ - reporting an appeal 
from disaffected Anglicans.12 The press were guilty of exaggerating this schism, nonetheless, 
it created the impression of a Church lost in a tumultuous sea of fragile leadership, doctrinal 
confusion and fractional dissent, with little sense of national purpose and presence. 
In the 1980s the Church had confidently proclaimed itself as outward looking, in 
service to society and as the „conscience of the nation‟, yet in the context of the female 
ordination issue, such claims appeared remarkably far-fetched. All the priestly moralising 
about consensus politics now seemed empty rhetoric at a time when consensus was far 
from being the prevailing mood within Anglicanism. As the Church became embroiled in 
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ecclesiastics, the aspiration and image of the Church of England, as set out in Faith in the 
City, became increasingly untenable. The fact that the public were completely distanced and 
disengaged from the debates about female ordination only reinforced this point. To broad 
sections of the non-churchgoing public, Faith in the City had at the very least showed the 
Church engaging and relating to the „real world‟, yet in the 1990s, with sectarian interests 
dominating the agenda and the headlines, the Church appeared to be once again retreating 
behind its walls of piety.13 If the ordination of women, as traditionalists argued, robbed the 
Church of England of its right to be part of the Universal Catholic Church, then it perhaps 
also robbed it of any pretensions of being a national Church. 
This crisis was coupled with a continual dwindling of its congregations. The 1990s 
had been designated the „Decade of Evangelism‟, and with the evangelical Carey at the 
helm, the Church had sought to rediscover its missionary zeal and purpose. Despite some 
notable successes, such as the celebrity-endorsed Alpha course, these endeavours did not 
halt the decline in congregations and the decade saw a further drop of six per cent in weekly 
attendances.14 Reflecting on the fate of Anglicanism in the 1990s, historian Adrian Hastings 
has concluded that while the conflict over women priests endangered Anglicanism‟s 
„confessional‟ identity, falling church rolls further undermined its „national‟ identity, which 
together struck a significant blow to the role, purpose and authority of the established 
Church.15  
As has been argued throughout this thesis, the established Church in the 1980s 
projected an image of the spiritual head of a nominally Christian nation. This was an idea 
that existed very much in the Anglican imagination, but one, which was readily endorsed by 
the media and the ruling elite. In the subsequent decade, as the Church were attracting 
headlines of a different sort, so it signalled that the concept of public Anglicanism no 
longer held sway both outside or within the Church. In historical terms, the 1980s signalled 
the last gasp of public Anglicanism. This was a concept, which had first emerged at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, reached its high point under William Temple and was 
resuscitated once again in the 1980s.  Its subsequent demise, however, revealed its 
insubstantial foundations and the fact that its premise in the 1980s had been more slogan 
than coherent principle, more imagined than real and was therefore ultimately unsustainable 
when challenged.  
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II. The Death of Tory Anglicanism 
Just as the ordination of women was an important moment for Anglican traditionalists, so it 
also posed a major dilemma for the Christian components of the New Right. As we have 
seen, the Thatcher years saw relations between the New Right and the liberal Anglican 
hierarchy become increasingly fractious with clear dividing lines emerging over politics, 
theology, morality and liturgy. In many respects, the disaffection with Anglicanism was to 
reach its crisis point over the Ordination of Women Measure, signalling the final end of the 
historic linkage between Toryism and Anglicanism.  
 This long-term development is clearly evident if we survey the passing of Church 
Measures in Parliament from the Worship and Doctrine Measure of 1974 to the ordination 
of women priests, twenty years later, in 1993. In 1974, opposition from Conservative MPs 
had been framed on the grounds that, as representatives of the party of Church interests, it 
was their duty to uphold the traditional spiritual responsibilities of Parliament, even against 
the Synod. Conservative MP John Stokes spoke for a number of his fellow Conservative 
MPs when he declared that his opposition was out of „passionate conviction‟ and „as a 
member of a party which owes its very existence to defending Church and Monarch.‟16 As 
we have seen, a small but significant cohort of Anglican Conservatives felt so strongly 
about the direction of Anglicanism in the 1980s that they used their parliamentary privilege 
to defeat Church Measures and attack the Church leadership. The debate on female 
ordination, however, roused no such opposition and instead reads like a lament for the 
passing of the historic alliance between Anglicanism and Toryism. Very few Conservative 
MP articulated a belief that the party and church were interlinked, whilst the response from 
the few Conservatives Anglicans in the chamber was one of disaffection and 
disappointment. Over all, the Tory benches seemed indifferent to the Measure, with many 
Conservative MPs, like their Labour and Liberal counterparts, commenting that it was a 
matter for the Church to decide and that Parliament was in no position to have much input 
on the Measure. This was in part reflective of a generational shift within the party, for the 
likes of Bernard Braine, Peter Bruinvels, Peter Mills, John Stokes, Ivor Stanbrook and 
Enoch Powell, who had led the Anglican Conservative faction since the 1970s, had all left 
Parliament by 1993 only to be replaced by a younger cohort of Conservative MPs for 
whom Anglicanism was not a key part of their political DNA. Tellingly, whereas Viscount 
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Cranborne‟s bill in 1981 to protect the Prayer Book had amassed the support of 130 
(mostly Conservative) MPs, only nineteen members voted against the Ordination of 
Women Measure.17  
For the few remaining Conservative Anglicans, such as Ann Widdecome and John 
Gummer, the acceptance of women into the priesthood was merely the climax of a series of 
events which signalled the corrosive effect of liberal Anglicanism on the Church. During 
the Commons debate, Ann Widdecome spoke of her feelings of hurt and betrayal towards a 
Church to which she felt she could no longer belong. When asked by former Catholic 
Labour MP Clare Short why she felt so much bitterness, Widdecome replied: 
 
I must say to the Hon. Lady that she is not hearing bitterness…It is utter 
grief and anger, which sometimes sounds like bitterness. It is utter 
disbelief at what has been going on, that we have not only managed to 
consecrate bishops who do not believe in the resurrection and the virgin 
birth, but that we cannot get our moral message across. Yes, I am very 
angry.18  
 
For Widdecome, the Anglican leadership had shown itself to be completely consumed with 
the spirit of the age and on the specific issue of women priests, had completely capitulated 
to secular feminist thought. Widdecome eventually came to the conclusion that only the 
Roman Catholic Church had the authority, conviction and self-assurance to oppose the 
evils of the „permissive‟ society.19 John Gummer, also spoke of his personal dismay during 
the parliamentary debate, arguing that the Measure compromised the comprehensiveness of 
Anglicanism by alienating traditionalist Anglicans and therefore undermined „the whole 
basis of the Elizabethan settlement, which sought to create a Church of the nation in which 
everybody, except those who were at the extreme ends, could worship together.‟20 For 
Gummer, it represented a significant break with Anglican tradition from which there would 
be no turning back: „when the Measure is passed we will be excluded from the Church of 
England and a great part of its way of presenting the gospel to England will be damaged.‟21 
Gummer subsequently resigned from the Synod and converted to Roman Catholicism.   
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Many among the Conservative intelligentsia, who had spent much of the 1980s 
criticising the Church leadership, also felt that the ordination decision meant that they could 
no longer remain within the Church of England.  Charles Moore‟s explanation of his 
conversion to Roman Catholicism is worth quoting at length:   
 
Over the past ten years or so it became ever clearer to me that the 
Church of England was deep in the thicket. Its traditional via media had 
degenerated from an intellectual position to mere weakness of mind. Its 
public moral stances seemed indistinguishable from those of a 
reasonably decent, mildly Left-wing agnostic. Its retreat into self-
government and its attack on the parish system made it less national and 
more sectarian…..I found that my gloom and irritation interfered with 
my worship. I felt as someone feels who has lived in the neighbourhood 
all his life, and notices it going downhill. There are small niggles – more 
noise, more satellite dishes, more litter, ruder neighbours. Then there are 
worse things – demolition of buildings he loves, the tearing up of a park, 
the closing of a library, the spread of crime. At first he is determined to 
stay. But eventually something snaps.22 
 
Moore‟s likened his detachment from Anglicanism to that of someone who no longer 
recognised the place in which he lived and felt compelled to move. This metaphor 
positioned Anglicanism as a disrupted and disordered community destroyed by modernity 
and constant change. Here Moore was linking the familiar themes of community, 
preservation and conservatism yet positioning modern Anglican as divergent from these 
core values.  Moore‟s reflections hint at the way in which his renouncement of Anglicanism 
involved a significant breach of his identity: „I feel rather like a man standing among 
packing cases and looking, for the last time, at the bare boards of his old home.‟23 For many 
Anglicans, converting to Roman Catholicism was not simply a switch of denomination, but 
involved a serious reshaping of their own understanding of what it meant to be a 
Conservative and English. Many Anglican converts to Rome admitted that they had initially 
been reluctant to adopt Catholicism precisely out of a fear that it would make them un-
English.24  Foreseeing the potential ramifications of becoming a Catholic as early as 1987, 
conservative journalist T.E. Utley had described this process in pretty bleak terms:  
 
I shall have to become a ghetto Christian. This is a tragic thing for a man 
who is, not only by intellectual conviction but to the marrow of his 
being, an Anglican, one who loathes the idea of belonging to a sect 
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which separates itself from English life and closes its mind to the 
changing fashions of English culture.25   
 
The conversion to Roman Catholicism required, as William Oddie explained, a fundamental 
transformation of „one‟s entire historical consciousness‟.26 Englishness as well as 
Conservatism had been established on a specific reading of English history, one that was 
largely shaped around anti-Catholicism. How one viewed key episodes in England‟s past, 
such as the Reformation and crucially, the Glorious Revolution of 1688, was central to 
Conservative identity. Becoming a Catholic, therefore, demanded a rewriting of this 
narrative, not least a shift from the side of victor to that of the oppressed in English history.  
In this way, converting to Rome posed a challenge not just to their religious outlook, but 
also their political and national identity. As Charles Moore saw it, however, it was about 
taking one‟s national identity out of the equation and accepting that God was no longer an 
Englishman: „Even I could see that a religion which was merely English could not possibly 
have been what Christ intended.‟27  With the conversion of figures like Moore to Rome, so 
one of the remaining threads of English Protestant nationalism went with them.  
These high-profile conversions naturally received much attention in the press and 
contributed to the prevailing sense of crisis within Anglicanism. More significantly, it 
signalled the decline of a particular Anglican-Conservative presence in British public life, 
which although, admittedly had been dwindling for some time, by the end of the 1990s had 
more or less completely dissipated. No longer was the Conservative cause uniquely bound 
to Anglicanism or necessarily Christianity, in the way that it had always been: Anglicanism, 
once the bastion of Conservatism and Englishness, ceased to be a core component of 
either. At the same time, however, the conversion of public figures such as Widdecome, 
Moore and Gummer also gave rise to a new era of respectability and prominence for 
Roman Catholicism, which had always had the position of suspicion and foreignness in 
English society. This was, therefore, a cultural and political development as much as a 
religious one.  
While converts came from all shades of Anglicanism (most notably the anglo-
catholic wing), they were united in their desire to hold the liberal Anglican hierarchy entirely 
responsible for the crisis. It was the Church leadership, they argued, which had forced the 
Church down the road of reform and change, leading it to renounce its heritage, abandon 
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its fundamental beliefs and accommodate its ethos around secular fashions. As Anglican 
Conservative MP Robert Key explained in 1989, he felt detached from a modern politicised 
Church, which was betraying its history:  
 
I am the first person to admit to being confused about where the Church 
is trying to go at present. I am confused in so many areas of life because 
my traditional education and upbringing have not only been challenged 
but positively blown apart. When I sit in Salisbury Cathedral on Sunday 
…I look round at the tombs of crusaders and memorial tablets to 19th 
century missionaries...I cannot understand why the crusaders and the 
missionaries have been debunked by the current trendies of the Church 
leadership...the disrespectful way in which hundreds of years of English 
history are written off by the current interpretation from Church leaders 
leave me somewhat gasping.28 
 
Although Robert Key had chosen not to admit it, it was not only Anglicanism that had 
changed, but also the Conservative party, particularly in the 1980s. Under Mrs Thatcher, the 
party had abandoned its distinctly Anglican ethos and embraced a theo-political outlook, 
which had more in common with nineteenth-century liberalism than traditional 
Conservatism. Moreover, the new batch of MPs were, broadly speaking, more Thatcherite 
and came from a much wider base, both socially and religiously. Those that were Christian 
were predominantly from the evangelical side of Christianity and, as their muted response 
to the Ordination of Women Measure suggests, they did not have any same affiliation with 
Anglicanism – with the traditionalist wing or otherwise.  Mrs Thatcher‟s public doctrine 
may have been a crucial component of Thatcherism and her authority, but it would not be 
adopted by subsequent leaders of the Conservative party. The replacement of Mrs Thatcher 
with the irreligious John Major (rather than his fellow contender, the Anglican Douglas 
Hurd) further ensured that the party‟s Christian ethos would be less pronounced – 
although, admittedly, it was not entirely silenced.29 
The historic linkages between Toryism and Anglicanism had taken a long time to 
wither and die.  The interwar period had witnessed the beginning of the end of this alliance 
and from the 1960s onwards, as Anglican social thought established itself on a more 
socialist and anti-capitalist platform and the Conservative party veered increasingly to the 
right, this divergence became ever more apparent. In the 1980s, therefore, the Conservative 
party in partnership with Anglican traditionalists engaged in a battle against the liberal 
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Anglican leadership and evoked its „Church and party‟ heritage as a way of highlighting the 
perversions of modern Anglicanism. In this sense, Conservative-Anglicanism enjoyed a 
brief revival in the 1980s, but this was to be short lived and was followed by a final 
loosening of the ties between the Church of England and the party.  Even though this 
political and religious affiliation continued to exist amongst some voters, it was no longer 
represented in the parliamentary party to any significant degree. When, twenty years later, 
David Cameron sought to reconfigure Conservatism in the mould of earlier Anglican 
paternalistic traditions, tellingly it was done so in a secular rather than Christian framework 
and language.30  
 
III. The Birth of Multi-Faith Britain  
The demise of public Anglicanism and the breach between Anglicanism and Toryism in this 
period was superseded by a much more important event, however, one which would 
determine the course and position of religion in the public political sphere for the next 
twenty years. The publication of Salman Rushdie‟s novel The Satanic Verses in September 
1988 sparked outrage within Muslim communities from Bombay to Bradford, resulting in 
widespread demonstrations, violence and even the death of those associated with its 
publication. It was in Britain, the adopted country of the author and home to its publishers 
Penguin Viking, where the crisis reached its height with newly-formed Muslim pressure-
groups campaigning for the book to be banned and subsequently pursuing legal means to 
try Rushdie for blasphemy. The Satanic Verses controversy, as it became known, has been 
sufficiently analysed by both academics and commentators.31 The purpose here is not to 
rehearse this narrative, but instead to reflect on how the Rushdie affair forced a greater 
recognition of the nation‟s religious pluralism and changed the way in which politicians and 
the Church articulated and negotiated religion in the public domain.  
If the furore surrounding Salman Rushdie‟s book had achieved anything, it was to 
ensure that the religious rights of Britain‟s Muslim population could no longer be ignored.  
The event had successfully mobilised the community, leading to the formation of the 
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Muslim Action Front, which pursued the legal trial against Rushdie and the UK Action 
Committee on Islamic Affairs, which would eventually become the Muslim Council of 
Britain. Sociologist Tariq Modood has correctly judged that the Rushdie affair was a crucial 
turning point in that it put the spotlight on long-held Muslim grievances and revealed the 
failures of the existing multicultural legislation. In demographic terms, Britain had become a 
multi-faith nation in the early 1970s, and yet it was not until the late 1980s when the 
religious (rather than racial) dimensions of this social change were addressed. Modood has 
rightly contended that diversity policy up until that point had been conceptualised around a 
racial (and secular) framework, underscored by a white/black dualism, which completely 
overlooked the notion of religious identity.32 Secular multiculturalism, therefore, could (and 
indeed did) co-exist quite happily alongside the continual prioritisation of Christianity in 
law.33 The shortcomings of this situation were blatantly exposed by the Rushdie affair, for it 
revealed the lack of legal redress for the nation‟s largest religious minority, the limitations of 
multiculturalism and the problems concerning the privileged place for Christianity on the 
statute book in a secular plural nation.  
One of the most contentious aspects of the whole episode was the attempt by the 
MAF to try Salman Rushdie under the existing Blasphemy Act.34  After a lengthy legal 
process and appeal, the High Court in April 1990 finally rejected the case, ruling that the 
existing Act only protected Christianity. The Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, had refused 
Muslim pleas to ban the book or extend the act, arguing not from the Christian foundations 
of the law, but from the point of freedom of speech and the legal difficulties of establishing 
the appropriate boundaries for protecting religious sensibilities.35  These were perfectly 
legitimate reasons, although subsequent utterances by Hurd and fellow Home-Office 
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colleague John Patten, questioning the loyalty and Britishness of the Muslim community 
seem to suggest that the Conservative government saw the problem as principally one of 
Muslim unwillingness to assimilate into British society rather than one of artistic liberty.36  
Those on the secular left, who, were as mobilised and as vocal as the Islamic community 
during the saga, vigorously defended Rushdie‟s right to freedom of expression and 
denounced the unreformed and illiberal nature of Islamic fundamentalism.37  
The Satanic Verses controversy had important ramifications for the Church of 
England, not least because the whole debate about the extension of the Blasphemy Act 
raised serious questions about the prioritisation of Christianity in British law and the 
establishment of Anglicanism itself. Yet, surprisingly, as the controversy unfolded, it 
became less about the tensions of Islam in a Christian country and more about the position 
of Islam in a secular nation.38 This was in part a reflection of greater secularism, but it was 
also largely down to the Church of England‟s response to the crisis. 
The Anglican position, first stated by Robert Runcie and reiterated by his successor, 
Archbishop Carey, was one of solidarity with the Muslim community. Speaking soon after 
the fatwa on Rushdie was issued, Runcie made a public statement affirming that, although 
the book should not be banned, the Islamic faith should be respected and protected: „I 
firmly believe that offence to the religious beliefs of the followers of Islam or any other 
faith is quite as wrong as offence to the religious beliefs of Christians.‟39 By aligning 
Christianity with Islam, Runcie aimed at creating a sense of solidarity of sacred interests. 
There was a growing consensus amongst the Church leadership that faiths should stand 
shoulder to shoulder together against an increasingly vocal and ever-more dominant secular 
culture. Such was the rationale behind Lambeth Palace‟s attempts in July 1989 (at the height 
of the controversy) to persuade the BBC to reschedule a broadcast of Tony Harrison‟s A 
Blasphemy‟s Banquet, a poem constructed around an imaginary dinner party of various 
blasphemers from history including Rushdie, Bryon and Voltaire.  
The Church‟s position had always been to support the retention of the Blasphemy 
Act and to press for an incitement to religious hatred bill for protection of other faiths. In 
the aftermath of Rushdie controversy, however, the Church became even more 
accommodating calling for recognition of all faiths within the eyes of the law and the 
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extension of the Blasphemy Act to include all religions.40 Soon after the fatwa Runcie set up 
an Anglican-Muslim consultation party to consider a reformulation of the Blasphemy Act. 
The intention was clear: that interfaith dialogue on this matter could be a constructive way 
of legitimating Muslim grievances and bringing Islamic activists into the fold, or as Andrew 
Brown of the Independent put it: „there is no better and more effective way of disarming a 
potential book-burner than to take him to tea at Lambeth Palace and draw him into the 
endless Anglican conversation.‟41 Brown‟s mockery was slightly unfair, for the Church‟s 
support for the Muslim community (especially the Archbishop‟s) was extremely important 
at a time when both the press, the government and secular liberals were engaged in 
whipping up Islamophobia and when the debate was increasingly being framed as one of 
British liberal values verses an uncompromising and un-British Islamic fundamentalism. 
This became even more important during Carey‟s leadership in the context of the Gulf 
War.  With sensitivities still high and the fatwa still hanging over Rushdie‟s head, Carey 
issued a statement in which he let it be known that he understood „the devout Muslim‟s 
reaction wounded by what they hold most dear and what they themselves would die for.‟42  
Assessing the Anglican response to the Rushdie affair, Paul Weller has argued that 
the Church proved itself to be a crucial „facilitator‟ in legitimising and helping vocalise the 
concerns and rights of the Muslim community.43 Weller is correct, for while, theoretically, 
establishment religion appears to prioritise one faith to the detriment of other religious 
minorities, in this case, the Church of England acted as an enabler for dialogue and as an 
important spokesperson for a discriminated faith. If The Satanic Verses controversy had 
directly challenged both liberal tolerance and Christian privilege, it became increasingly less 
about the latter and more about the former, as the debate developed into one about the 
rights and recognition of the sacred in a secular liberal country. This dualism between the 
sacred and the secular was reinforced by the fact that the Muslim community not only 
received support from the Church of England, but also the Chief Rabbi, inter-faith forums 
and the Roman Catholic Church.44  
For Modood, the obstacle to Islamic integration was not other faiths or the 
established Church, but the prevailing secular culture. The cause of religious equality, 
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therefore, did not start with disestablishment – as previous historical struggles had done. As 
Modood has explained:   
 
The minimal nature of the Anglican establishment, its relative openness 
to other denominations and faiths seeking public space and the fact that 
its very existence is an ongoing acknowledgment of the public character 
of religion are all reasons why it may seem far less intimidating to 
minority faiths than a triumphal secularism.45  
 
For this reason, Muslims leaders had not called for the abolition but for extension of the 
Blasphemy Act, as the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs put it: „Abolition would 
mean negative equalisation.‟46 Muslims did not seek to undermine all religions by the 
removal of the Blasphemy Act, but equal recognition of all faiths through the extension of 
it; sentiments with which Anglicans broadly agreed.  
The 1980s had seen the established Church increasingly taking an interest in inter-
faith dialogue acting as important leaders in the debate about the accommodation of 
religious minorities within a secular plural country. The British Council of Churches had 
paved the way with the formation of its „Committee for Relations with people for Other 
Faiths‟ and this was reinforced with the establishment of the Inter-Faith Forum in 1987. 
Collaboration between faith communities had also been making headway at a local level, 
even though the hierarchy rarely addressed this issue on the national stage.47 It was the 1988 
Education Act which first forced the Church of England to consider where it stood in 
relation to other faiths.  As we have seen, the Church had advanced the proposal of a multi-
faith syllabus while at the same time had sought to maintain Britain‟s Christian heritage. 
Therefore, even though the final Act had retained a privileged status for Christianity, it 
could be interpreted as a victory for all religions over secularism, for it explicitly prohibited 
the study of non-theistic world views in RE classes while local RE syllabus boards better 
reflected the religious pluralism within communities in Britain.   
Anglicans continued to act in this spirit of cooperation throughout the 1990s and 
with even greater urgency in the next decade in the wake of 9/11 and the „War on Terror‟.48 
Yet all of this was not simply an act of Christian benevolence, for the Anglican policy of 
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reaching out to other faiths and speaking on their behalf had the effect of reinforcing rather 
than undermining the Church of England‟s position as the established Church. Just like 
ecumenicalism in the earlier part of the century, so inter-faithism also served to enhance the 
Church of England‟s constitutional credibility. As John Habgood put it in a letter to the 
Independent in the wake of the Rushdie affair, Anglican establishment was necessary precisely 
because it allowed other religions to flourish, and acted as a protector and enabler of 
religious pluralism within the nation.49 The rationale behind establishment was being 
reconfigured once more; it was no longer the spiritual arm of a nominally Christian nation, 
it was now the main spiritual representative of a secular religiously plural society. Whereas 
earlier in the decade the Church had been seeking to mobilise and articulate the unity values 
of a Christian nation against the forces of social fragmentation and individualism, now the 
Church positioned itself as the chief defenders of the sacred (rather than simply Christian) 
impulse in society, in unison with other faith groups and against the dominant and hostile 
culture of secularism. There were obvious contradictions with this position, given that it 
was largely operated on a notion of Anglican dominance (and self-interest), nonetheless it 
was an idea that was seemingly welcomed and of genuine benefit to other faiths.50  
Nevertheless, familiar voices of disquiet could be heard within Anglicanism from 
those who saw inter-faith dialogue as further evidence of the de-christianisation of their 
Church. Some were at pains to point out that while the ecclesiastical leadership had 
supported Muslim calls for the extension of the Blasphemy Act, it had not endorsed Mary 
Whitehouse‟s blasphemy case against the editor of Gay News in 1977. The accusation was 
that Christianity was increasingly being sidelined in this new multi-faith landscape.51 The 
refusal by the Bishop of Manchester to use the traditional hymn „O Valiant Hearts‟ at the 
Remembrance Day service in 1989 so as not to offend non-Christian faiths, was just one 
example of what many Christians viewed as the Church being overly accommodating to 
other faiths at the cost of Christian sensibilities.52 Some conservative Christians saw the 
Rushdie controversy in slightly different terms, contrasting the Muslim reaction to Rushdie‟s 
book with the muted response from British Christians to the film The Last Temptation of 
Christ, which had been released the same month as Rushdie‟s novel. The silence of 
Christians in contrast to the vocalisation of Muslims was cited as evidence of the lack of 
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piousness and religious sensibility amongst the British laity. Traditionalist Anglican Rev. 
Peter Mullen, for example, viewed the Rushdie furore not as an illustration of Islamic 
extremism, but further confirmation of paucity of sacredness and religious consciousness 
within the nation:  
 
Up until fairly recently in England, Christian classic texts were known by 
heart in large chunks. In the Muslim faith, children still learn the Holy 
Koran in its original language: these words are not written not just in the 
refined intellect, but in the heart…the words are truly made flesh, 
incarnated.53  
 
New alliances were formed among conservative Anglicans, Catholics, Jews and Muslims. 
Catholic campaigner Victoria Gillick, for example, was surprised to find that her crusade 
against contraception had more support from non-Christian faiths than the mainstream 
Christian denominations.54 Just as liberal Catholics, Jews, Muslims and Anglicans were 
engaging in fruitful dialogue, so too did conservative factions of all religions began to realise 
that they had more in common with each other than those of a liberal persuasion within 
their own faith.   
The Satanic Verses controversy was important precisely because it triggered a gradual 
acceptance of the nation‟s religious diversity. It also prompted a transformation of the 
understanding of the religious nation, for no longer could it be simply assumed that Britain 
was Christian in values or faith. This understanding, which had underlined so much of the 
debate about political values between the Church and government in the 1980s, was no 
longer credible and in this new climate, seemed inappropriate and presumptive. While the 
notion of Britain‟s Christian heritage still retained currency, no longer did politicians and 
churchmen make wide-ranging assertions about the relationship between Christian values 
and the contemporary political scene. This development was both an indication of greater 
secularity within the political realm and also an increasing investment in the concept of 
religious plurality. This was a broader shift whereby the key issue was no longer the 
relationship between Christianity and political values but the rights of the religious 
individual of all faiths in a liberal secular democracy. It was a change ultimately reflective of 
a more secular society, but one where the Church of England did still have a vital part to 
play. This situation in Britain was mirrored across Europe, as nations gradually sought to 
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accommodate the new Islamic faith communities.55 The European Declaration on Human 
Rights, which was incorporated into English and Scottish law in 1998, provided for the first 
time legal recognition, rights and freedom for all faith groups in Britain. What was once 
considered as blasphemy, as a crime against God and the Christian state, was now 
reclassified as a challenge to individual rights and identity. Further legislation was enacted, 
such as the Race and Religious Hatred Act which aimed to rectify the deficiencies and gaps 
in previous legislation, although this inevitably encountered opposition from secularists 
who viewed it as censorship, as well as faith groups, who complained that legislative 
changes only went part of the way for full recognition of religious rights within British 
society.  
These developments, which had started with the Rushdie controversy, 
fundamentally reordered how religion was spoken about and dealt with by the ruling elite 
and the press. Gone were the days when politicians could speak confidently about the 
Christian ethos of British politics, as Margaret Thatcher had done.56  This was replaced with 
much talk of Britain‟s tradition of diversity and tolerance. Also gone were the days when 
the religious correspondent was simply the „correspondent for the Church of England‟. 
Reporting of religion in Britain increasingly addressed all faiths (and none), while the 
coverage of the Church of England became more detached and seemingly inconsequential 
for society as a whole. The status of the Anglican bishops also diminished.  The new 
generation of prelates could not expect to be invited to give televised lectures, act as 
figureheads for national crisis appeals or assume that their sermons would make front-page 
news.57 Meanwhile, it was the press itself which gradually assumed the moral mantle as 
guardian of the nation‟s conscience, obtaining ever-increasing power and influence in 
setting the boundaries of what constituted „moral‟ and „deviant‟ behaviour in Britain. When, 
in 2001, the national Census revealed that over 70 per cent of Britons still identified 
themselves as „Christian‟, it was greeted with surprise and confusion by the press, politicians 
and even some clergy, who remained doubtful of its significance or sincerity.58  
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  The 1980s had seen numerous challenges to the nation‟s Christian legislation and 
culture in respect to the Blasphemy Act, Sunday trading laws and Christian teaching in 
schools. On each occasion, the law was unchanged and in some cases was reinforced; the 
restrictive Sunday trading laws were kept in 1986, the 1988 Education Act reinforced a 
predominantly Christian curriculum and the Blasphemy law remained in tact.59 Clearly this 
was a defence born not out of confidence in Britain‟s Christian identity, but out of a 
concern for it, alluding to a prevailing uneasiness about secularisation and national 
fragmentation. Yet this process of strengthening various aspects of Christian culture and 
law obscured the fact that Britain was a nation in transition. Britain in the 1980s was at the 
crossroads of its religious identity: neither wholly secular, multi-faith, nor Christian, unable 
to completely reverse to its Christian past, yet neither ready to see itself as a secular plural 
country. Two decades on, Britain has gradually refashioned herself as a multi-faith nation; a 
concept, which itself has given rise to a completely new set of questions, challenges and 
tensions. 
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       CONCLUSIONS    
          The State of Faith and the Faith of the State  
 
Of all the Biblical references that littered the political speeches in the 1980s it was the 
parable of the Good Samaritan that was most frequently evoked by politicians and clergy.1 
For liberal Anglicans, the story of a Samaritan helping an unknown wounded and battered 
man lying helpless in the road illustrated the universality of human fellowship and the 
justification for the indiscriminate redistribution of wealth. For the Conservatives, however, 
the parable was the shining example of charitable giving and demonstrated the credibility 
and importance of individual effort, as Mrs Thatcher viewed it: „No-one would remember 
the good Samaritan if he'd only had good intentions; he had money as well‟.2 These 
differing interpretations neatly demonstrate the wide theo-political gulf that existed between 
liberal Anglicanism and Conservatism in this period. Both these outlooks presumed an 
antithesis between transforming the individual and society and were underscored by 
conflicting understandings of the role of the Christianised state and citizenship. 
            This debate may have been uniquely focused around the politics of late-twentieth 
century Britain, yet these contrasting doctrinal positions had a much longer history. 
Emerging in embryonic form in the nineteenth century, this division had become part of 
the mainstream of religio-political debate by the interwar period. For this reason, it could be 
argued that much of the script and sentiments, which would determine the conflict between 
the Church and state in the 1980s, had already been penned by William Temple in his 
Christianity and Social Order and preached by Alderman Roberts from the pulpit of Finkin St. 
Chapel some forty years earlier.  A reading of G.I.T Machin‟s historical account of the 
Christian churches‟ engagement with politics in twentieth-century Britain illustrates how the 
dialogue between the Church and the New Right in the 1980s was far from new.3 For it is 
clear that throughout the century the continual division between reformists and 
reactionaries within the Church had loosely paralleled the progressive and conservative 
boundaries within politics and had shaped both Christianity and politics accordingly. If 
anything, this dualism intensified rather than dissipated in the aftermath of the social and 
religious upheavals of the 1960s. What makes the conflict between the New Right and 
liberal Anglicanism in the 1980s significant, however, is that it represented the final gasp of 
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this theo-political tradition as the ruling elite and the Church were finally forced to 
accommodate and adapt to the new secular plural age.  
In 1941, William Temple claimed that „all the great political questions of our day are 
primarily theological‟ and one of the aims of this study has been to demonstrate how in the 
1980s, Christian doctrine continued to be an important means and prism through which 
political decisions were conceived, communicated and assessed.4  Reformulating Temple‟s 
statement slightly, it could be said that all the great theological questions of the day are 
primarily political, for one of the major themes of this story has been of the cross-
fertilisation between both religious and political conservatism and liberal Anglicanism and 
progressive principles. This thesis therefore has sought to demonstrate how the New Right 
posed a theological challenge to liberal Anglicanism as much as liberal Anglicanism posed a 
political challenge to the New Right.  
In emphasising the particular contribution of the Church of England, this study 
does not intend to underplay important oppositional forces to the Thatcher government 
such as the Labour party, but rather to argue that the Church, because of its historic links to 
Conservatism, offered a distinct challenge to Mrs Thatcher‟s government.  Moreover, it has 
also demonstrated how the Church of England, as the established Church, inhabited a 
unique space in the public realm operating as a spiritual check and balance to the state. Its 
intervention and influence was limited but important and demonstrated that even in more 
secular times, the Church was still seen as the custodian of moral judgment and still retained 
residual authority. Yet the story of Anglicanism in the 1980s is not simply one of intellectual 
musings by theologians and ecclesiastical leaders, for much of what the Church was saying 
was in this period entirely set within its experiences in the parishes. The Church emerged as 
an important voice within the community, benefiting from the disillusionment towards 
bureaucratic centralism and capitalising on its role as a source of pastoral support within 
civil society. It was thus the social, rather than spiritual, aspect of Anglicanism that attained 
new credibility in this era.  
The Church‟s foray into politics, however, exasperated existing tensions within the 
organisation. Social Christianity and the nature and purpose of the Church‟s prophecy 
emerged as one of the chief dividing lines between liberals and traditionalists in this period. 
And the prelates found themselves increasingly compromised as they struggled to both lead 
the Church and assert their voice on the national stage. At the heart of tension was a 
fundamental dilemma concerning the role of the national Church in a secular age: should 
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the Church exist for the benefit of those who are not members of it?5 This was recognised 
by Robert Runcie himself, who, in one of his final Synodical speeches as Archbishop, 
acknowledged the Catch-22 scenario which had plagued his period in office: „A Church that 
finds itself listening only to the tradition will end up speaking only to itself, a Church that 
listens only to the world will end up by being simply a dull echo of passing trends.‟6 For 
Runcie the answer lay in a middle course between the two, although according to Rev. 
Gareth Bennett, this was a policy of abstaining from all questions „until someone else makes 
a decision for him.‟7  A neat parallel can be made between the traditionalist cause in the 
1980s and the Oxford Movement in the 1850s – the last occasion when a number of 
notable Anglicans felt so at odds with the Church‟s apparent capitulation to the temporal 
world that they converted to Roman Catholicism.  Schisms within Anglicanism always have 
been and will remain, a consistent theme in its history. Part of the reason for this is due to 
the original premise of the Church of England as a theological accommodation between 
divergent opinions and traditions.  Its policy of inclusiveness and consensus, therefore, has 
inevitably led to fragmentation and factionalism in a way which the more dogmatic and 
uniform Roman Catholic Church has not.  
The challenge posed by Edward Norman‟s analysis however, remains: was the 
Church‟s prominent involvement in the politics of the 1980s indicative of the secularisation 
of Christianity or was it instead reflective of the continual religiosity within the political elite 
and the nation as a whole? It is the contention here that the 1980s demonstrated both. That 
secular understandings about equality and social justice had informed Church teachings is 
incontestable, but this was a demonstration of a genuine exchange of ideas rather than a 
complete capitulation to secular thought.8 At the same time, however, there is little doubt 
that the Church was engaging with a political culture and society that still valued and 
respected Christianity, in particular, the Church of England. It was easy to accuse the 
Church of diluting the Christian faith, but this overlooks the fact that the Church 
recognised that in order to suffuse political debate with a Christian ethos, it needed to 
engage in the secular language of political debate. The fact remains that the Church‟s 
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influence in the 1980s would have been unachievable had the Church restricted itself to 
speaking in purely theological terms.9  
Historians Callum Brown and Hugh McLeod have both concluded that the 1960s 
triggered a decline in the influence of Christianity within society and in godly perceptions of 
the self.10 One principle argument put forward here is that while the 1960s was an 
important watershed in the secularisation of individual private morality, the 1980s 
represents another key turning point; the moment when Christianity finally seeped out of 
the nation‟s public and political culture. Moreover, this study adds to existing debates about 
the impact of secularisation on religious institutions by specifically focusing on how those 
within the Church either rejected or embraced the challenges of the new secular age. One 
of the fundamental features of public Anglicanism in the 1980s, therefore, was how it was 
able to position Christianity in tune with, rather than against modernity, and as a 
progressive rather than reactionary force in society operating on behalf of the whole of the 
nation rather than simply its core membership.  
Britain‟s unwritten constitution remains to this day a seemingly archaic and 
confused settlement particularly in respect to its religious aspects.  The established Church 
of England with the monarch as its head and its bishops in the House of Lords is a 
situation that few can understand, let alone defend in a secular multi-faith society. And yet, 
the arrangement of an established Church is not simply an anomaly or hangover from 
history but a situation which has been debated, defended and ultimately, retained 
throughout history; with the growth of Nonconformity in the seventeenth century, the 
acceptance of Catholicism in the nineteenth century, increasing secularisation in the 
twentieth century and finally, the incorporation of non-Christian faiths in the twenty-first. 
The 1980s represented an important juncture in this process yet another example of when 
the Church recalibrated the concept of establishment and adapted its role accordingly to 
validate its position as the spiritual head of a secular plural society. It is, however, inevitable 
that the Church will need to return to this issue and the outcome (whether disestablishment 
or otherwise) will once again reflect Britain‟s evolving relationship with religion and its 
relationship to the political system and its people.  
The 1980s and Mrs Thatcher have already claimed their place in history; yet this 
makes it all the more important that historians highlight and assess the oppositional forces 
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and challenges that the Conservative government faced in this tumultuous period. It is 
historically inaccurate but also irresponsible to fuel perceptions that Thatcherism took place 
in a political vacuum and to portray it as somehow an inevitable providential force in 
British history; a narrative which this study hopefully goes some way to refuting. 
 Both Britain and the US in the late-twentieth century saw the emergence of a 
Christian Conservative movement which intertwined a moralistic with a capitalistic agenda 
and engaged in a cultural and economic war of words with secular progressive liberals. 
Assessing the fortunes of the Christian Right in Britain, Steve Bruce has judged that it was 
unable to penetrate culture and politics to the same degree that it did in America, chiefly 
because Britain was a secular society.11  This is no doubt true and yet the analysis of the 
New Right in this thesis suggests that the parallel with the US is limited for altogether 
different reasons. An examination that incorporates the views of Maurice Cowling, Enoch 
Powell, Mary Whitehouse and Margaret Thatcher, pertains to the way in which the New 
Right in the UK was not part of an international phenomenon but very much rooted in the 
ideas, prejudices and tastes of Englishness. The nature, focus and flavour of the Christian 
Conservative movement was inextricably tied to the religious culture of England (rather 
than Britain) and in particular, to the historic bond between Toryism and Anglicanism. 
Tellingly, the revision of the 1662 Prayer Book incited more anger and mobilised greater 
opposition within the Synod than the reform of the Abortion Act. While the seventeenth-
century Puritan tradition continued to prevail in America, it appears that sixteenth-century 
debates about the essence of Anglican uniformity continued to be the source of conflict 
within England. Contrasting religious histories and cultures, therefore, are as crucial as 
congregational figures in explaining the varying fortunes and character of UK and US 
Christian conservatism in this period.  
This thesis has sought to show how the traditional movement in Christianity 
paralleled the rise of neo-Conservatism in politics, sharing many of its traits, agenda and not 
least its votes.  Mrs Thatcher, however, stands slightly apart from this, not only because she 
was culturally Nonconformist but also because her public doctrine was unique to her own 
religious upbringing and subsequently her personal authority as leader. Even though it 
could be said that Thatcherism owes more to Methodism than Monetarism and more to 
Alderman Roberts than Milton Friedman, Margaret Thatcher‟s specific religious ethos 
would not have a lasting impact on the party. The new generation of Thatcherites may have 
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enthusiastically embraced her political ideology but they abandoned the theological precepts 
underpinning it. This hints at one of the chief contradictions of Thatcherism, for while the 
right spent much of their time arguing in the name of preservation, tradition and history, 
particularly in respect to religion, the Thatcher administration would oversee a period in 
which Britain would completely transform and modernise into a new entity and in religious 
terms, become not more Christian, but more secular and pluralist.   
The dialogue between the Church and state in the 1980s concerned two conflicting 
religious narratives of modern English history. Mrs Thatcher characterised the postwar 
years as a period of personal and political immorality, while she heralded the Victorian 
values of self-help, moral restraint and laissez faire capitalism as the essential ingredients that 
would ensure national prosperity and confidence. Anglican leaders, in contrast, portrayed 
the nineteenth century as a time when wealth and imperialism had been borne on the backs 
of the nation‟s powerless citizens. It was not until the twentieth century with the foundation 
of the welfare state when the nation transformed into a compassionate Christian society. 
Both the public doctrines of Thatcherism and liberal Anglicanism therefore, were rooted in 
conflicting providential narratives of the political history of England, which projected two 
completely divergent understandings of the meaning and characteristics of Englishness and 
of the nature of Christianity itself.  
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   APPENDICES  
 
Appendix I: The changing fortunes of Christianity in Britain, 1950-1985  
 
Set out below are relevant statistics relating to religious change in the second half of the 
twentieth century; while the old Protestant churches experienced steady decline, new free 
churches, especially the charismatic and evangelical churches, were an important growth 
area.  
 
A. Membership of Christian Denominations, 1950-1985 
 
Year 
 
 
Denomination 
 
C. of E C. in Wales 
 
C. of 
Scotland 
Pres./Con. 
Total* 
Methodists Roman 
Catholic 
1950 
 
1955 
 
1960 
 
1965 
 
 
1970 
 
1975 
 
 
1980 
 
1985 
 
2 958 840 
 
2 894 710 
   (1956) 
2 861 887 
 
2 682 181 
   (1966) 
 
2 558 966 
 
1 912 000E 
   (1976) 
 
1 815 000E 
 
1 672 000E 
182 000E** 
 
176 000E 
 
182 864 
 
165 273 
 
 
153 925 
 
133 107 
 
 
131 518 
 
116 911 
 
1 271 247 
 
1 307 573 
 
1 301 280 
 
1 247 972 
 
 
1 154 211 
 
1 041 772 
 
 
   953 933 
 
   870 527 
2 053 059 
 
2 075 274 
 
2 033 920 
 
1 939 455 
 
 
1 771 610 
 
1 716 543 
 
 
1 508 968 
 
1 388 594 
744 815 
 
744 321 
 
728 589 
 
690 347 
 
 
601 068 
 
541 518 
 
 
487 972 
 
436 049 
3 557 059 
 
3 926 830 
 
4 495 157 
 
4 875 825 
 
 
4 932 471 
 
4 996 310 
 
 
5 085 889 
 
5 023 736 
   (1974) 
*Presbyterian and Congregational churches in the UK combined, which from 1975 
included the United Reform Church. 
** (E) stands for estimated numbers.   
 
Source: Table adapted from Peter Brierley, „Religion‟ in A. H. Halsey (ed.), British Social 
Trends since 1900 (London, 2nd revised edition, 1988), Table 13.3, p. 526. Brierley‟s statistics 
for 1950-1966 are taken from Currie, et al., Churches and Churchgoers; figures for 1970-1985 
are from Brierley (ed.), UK Christian Handbook, 1987-8.  
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B. Numbers of Religious Marriages in England and Wales, 1970-1984 
 
 
Year 
 
All marriages 
 
Total religious 
marriages 
C. of   E &  C. in 
Wales 
Roman Catholic  
 1970 
 
 1975 
 
 1980 
 
 1984 
 
415 487 
 
380 620 
 
370 022 
 
349 186 
251 368 
 
198 796 
 
186 627 
 
178 680 
170 146 
 
133 074 
 
123 400 
 
117 506 
43 658 
 
32 307 
 
33 615 
 
25 609 
 
Source: Peter Brierley, „Religion‟, Table 13.23, p.552.  
 
 
     C. Numbers of Anglican Churches and Clergy, 1950-1985 
 
 
Year  
 
Total parochial 
clergy* 
 
Churches 
 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
13 500 (1951) 
13 090 (1956) 
13 151 
13 508 
12 905 (1971) 
11 176 
10 563 
10 074 (1984) 
       _ 
 17 980 (1956) 
 17 973 (1961) 
 17 761 (1966) 
 17 670 
 17 212 
 16 984 
 16 582 
*This figure does not include non-stipendiary clergy or those employed full time as hospital, 
prison or college chaplains. 
 
Source: Table adapted from Peter Brierley, „Religion‟, Table 13.4, p.527. Brierley‟s statistics 
on churches are from Currie et al., Churches and Churchgoers; 1970-1985 figures from Brierley 
(ed.), UK Christian Handbook, 1987/8.  
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         D. Growth of other Christian Churches in the UK, 1970-1985 
 
 
Religious organisation 
 
1970      
 
1975 
 
1980 
 
1985 
 
African/West Indian Churches 
 
„House Church‟ movement 
 
Christian Brethren 
 
Pentecostal/Holiness 
31 867 
 
100 
 
80 000 
 
91 439 
59 510 
 
10 000 
 
73 000 
 
83 742 
65 076 
 
20 000 
 
68 000 
 
89 066 
65 324 
 
75 000 
 
70 000 
 
78 247 
 
 
 
Source: Table adapted from Peter Brierley, „Religion‟, Table 13.11, p.536-7, sourced from 
Brierley (ed.), UK Christian Handbook, 1987/88.  
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Appendix II: Christian Congregations in the 1980s 
 
Between 1975-1989 Roman Catholics suffered the largest fall, a drop of nine per cent of 
those attending mass, while traditional Nonconformity and Anglicanism continued to 
decline.  
 
A. Total Adult Churchgoers in England, 1975-1989 
 
Year  
 
 
Adult 
Churchgoers 
 
Percentage  
Change (%) 
 
Percentage of 
adult 
population (%) 
1975 
 
 1979 
 
 1985 
 
 1989 
 
4,093,000 
 
4,025,000 
 
3,755,000 
 
3,706,900 
 
-2  
 
-7 
 
-1 
 
 
 11.3 
 
 11.0 
 
  9.9 
 
  9.5 
 
Source: Peter Brierley, Christian England‟: What the 1989 English Church Census Reveals 
(London, 1991), Table 2, p.30.  
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Appendix III: Implicit Christianity in the UK: Results of the EVSSG Survey  
 
The EVVSG survey conducted in the late 1970s offers the best indication of nominal 
Christianity in the UK from this period.  
 
Indicators of religious and moral beliefs and 
attachment  
 
Great 
Britain 
(%) 
European  
Average 
(%) 
Often think about the meaning and purposes of life 34 30 
Need moments of prayer, etc. 50 57 
Define self as a religious person 58 62 
Believe in God 
                 Sin 
                 Heaven 
                 The Devil 
                 Hell 
 
76 
69 
57 
30 
27 
73 
57 
40 
25 
23 
Personally full accept Commandments demanding: 
No other Gods 
Reverence of God‟s name 
Holy Sabbath 
 
 
48 
43 
25 
 
48 
46 
32 
Absolute guidelines exist about good and evil 28 26 
Personally fully accept commandments prohibiting: 
Killing 
Adultery 
Stealing 
False Witness 
 
 
90 
78 
87 
78 
 
87 
63 
82 
73 
Agree with unrestricted sex 23 23 
Claiming un-entitled benefit is never justified 78 - 
Homosexuality is not justified 47 - 
Great confidence in Church 19 21 
Church answers moral problems 30 35 
Church answers family problems 32 33 
Church answers spiritual needs 42 44 
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Attend Church monthly 23 35 
Denomination: 
Roman Catholic 
Protestant (established) 
Free Church/Nonconformist) 
 
11 
68 
6 
 
 
54 
29 
2 
Believe religion will become: 
More important in future 
Less important in future 
 
 
21 
40 
 
19 
34 
Religious faith an important value to develop in children 14 16 
 
Source: Table adapted from Mark Abrams, et al., Values and Social Change in Britain, Table 
3.1, p.61.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 244 
Appendix IV: Partisan Group Affiliations in the General Synod 1975 and 1981 (%)  
 
Within the General Synod, there was large degree of disparity between the House of Laity 
which had a large proportion of evangelicals (over a third) and the House of Clergy of 
which were anglo-catholics (over half). Between 1975 and 1980 there was an overall 
increase in the number of evangelicals in the House from 27 to 32 per cent. Also important 
here is the large proportion of members who had no affiliation which accounted for 23 per 
cent of the Synod in 1975, but only 15.8 per cent in 1981, pointing to the hardening of 
positions within the Synod in these years.  There was also a rise of liberal factions, rising 
from 32 to 52.5 per cent from the members of 1975 and 1981.   
 
Group              Laity            Clergy             Overall 
 
 
A. 1975 
Evangelical                               33.3                 18.5                   27.1 
Liberals                                    37.6                 24.4                   32.0 
Catholic                                   18.8                  48.7                   31.3     
None                                       24.8                  21.8                   23.6 
 
N                                           165                   119                    284 
 
B. 1981 
Evangelical    34.3  23.4    32.9 
Liberals   57.6  40.2    52.5 
Catholic    27.7  56.1    44.7 
None     15.8  15.9    15.8  
 
N              165           107   272  
 
 
*Percentages do not amount to 100 as some members claimed an affiliation with more than 
one faction.  
Source: Medhurst & Moyser, Church and Politics in a Secular Age, Table 9.2, p.208. 
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Appendix V. Recommendations to Church and Nation in Faith in the City  
 
To the Church of England 
1. A national system for designating UPA parishes should be developed.  
2. Dioceses should devote greater attention to the effective collection and presentation 
of accurate statistics.  
3. The internal distribution of clergy by diocese should be adjusted where necessary to 
ensure that UPA parishes receive a fair share, and particular attention should be 
paid in this respect to parishes on large outer estates.  
4. Dioceses should explore the possibilities of fresh stipendiary lay ministries, not 
necessarily tied to one parish.  
5. The „Audit for the Local Church‟ which we propose should be further developed, 
and adopted by local UPA Churches.  
6. In urban areas the deanery should have an important support and pastoral planning 
function.  
7. Each parish should review, preferably annually, what progress in co-operation has 
been made between clergy and laity, between Churches, and ecumenically, with the 
aim of developing partnership in ministry. 
8. Appointments should be made to the Broads and Councils of the General Synod, 
and a new Commission on Black Anglican Concerns established, to enable the 
Church to make a more effective response to racial discrimination and disadvantage, 
and to the alienation experienced by many black people in relation to the Church of 
England.  
9. The General Synod should consider how a more appropriate system of 
representation which pays due regard to minority interests can be implemented for 
the Synod elections of 1990. 
10. The appropriate Church voluntary bodies should consider how schemes for 
voluntary service in UPAs could be extended to widen the age range of those 
eligible, and to allow for part-time as well as full-time volunteering.  
11. Dioceses with significant concentrations of UPAs should initiate Church 
Leadership Development Programmes.  
12. Our proposals for an extension of Local Non-Stipendiary Ministry, including those 
relating to selection, training, and funding should be tested in dioceses, and 
monitored over a ten-year period.  
13. All dioceses should manifest a commitment to post-ordination training and 
continued ministerial education in UPAs to the extent at least of regular day-release 
courses.  
14. Urgent attention should be given to appropriate training for teachers and 
supervisors in all areas of theological training education, particularly those 
concerned with ministry in UPAs, and to the provision of theological and education 
resources in urban centres.  
15. ACCM should be adequately funded to promote and monitor officially sanctioned 
experiments in theological education.  
16. ACCM should be given power, in certain defined cases, to direct candidates to 
specific courses of training, and bishops should endorse such direction.  
17.  The role of non-residential training courses similar to the Aston Scheme should be 
further developed.  
18. Diocese and deaneries should undertake a reappraisal of their support systems for 
UPA clergy.  
19. The Liturgical Commission should pay close attention to the liturgical needs of 
Churches in the urban priority areas.  
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20. A reassessment of the traditional patterns of the Church‟s work of nurture of young 
people in UPAs is required at parish, deanery and diocesan level.  
21. Sharing agreements with other denominations should be adopted more widely, as 
should the informal sharing of church buildings (other than the church itself) with 
those of other faiths. 
22. In cases of the sale of redundant churches, there should be earlier and more open 
consultation with community organisations and bodies such as housing associations 
when future uses are being considered.  
23. The historic resources of the Church should be redistributed between diocese to 
equalise the capital and income resources behind each clergyman, deaconess and 
licensed lay worker in the stipendiary ministry. The redistribution formula should 
take account of potential giving.  
24. Within diocese, the acute financial needs of the urban priority area Churches require 
a clear response.  
25. A Church Urban Fund should be established to strengthen the Church‟s presence 
and promote the Christian witness in the urban priority areas. 
26. The Church of England should continue to question the morality of economic 
policies in the light of their effects.  
27. Churches should take part in initiatives to engage unemployed people in UPAs in 
job-creating projects. The use of Church premises for this purpose must be 
encouraged.  
28. The Church should build on good practice in ministry to unemployed people: 
Industrial Mission has an important role to play here.  
29. We commend the use of properly-trained social workers working with local 
Churches and neighbourhood groups as an important part of the total ministry of 
the Church in the urban priority areas.  
30. Church social workers should be trained within the mainstream of social work, but 
with particular attention paid to the character and needs of social work in the 
church context. The Church should initiate discussion with social work training 
agencies to this end.  
31. Diocese should, through their Boards for Social Responsibility, develop and 
support community work, and should exercise a strategic role in support of local 
programmes in their urban priority areas.   
32. Discussions should be held between the General Synod Board for Social 
Responsibility and the British Council of Churches Community Work Advisory 
Committee with a view to strengthening the national support networks for 
community work. The Church of England should be prepared to devote central 
resources to this end.   
33. Additional Church-sponsored urban studies centres for teacher training should be 
established.  
34. All diocesan Boards and Councils of Education should give special priority to the 
needs of the UPA schools for which they are responsibility.  
35. The governors and managers of Church schools should consider whether the 
composition of foundation governors in the school adequately reflects the ethnic 
constituency of its catchment area.  
36. Consideration should be given to a further exploration of the ecumenical dimension 
at secondary level, including the possibility of establishing Church of 
England/Roman Catholic schools in urban priority areas, which would offer a 
significant proportion of places to children of other faiths.  
37. A review of the Diocesan Education Committee measures should be undertaken, to 
allow the formulation of diocesan policies for Church schools on admission criteria 
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and other issues, such as religious education and worship, equal opportunities and 
community education.  
38. The General Synod‟s Board of Education, in consultation with Diocesan Youth 
Officers, should move towards a national strategy for the Church‟s work with 
young people in UPAs, and initiate and support work specifically within these areas.  
 
To Government and Nation 
1. A greater priority for the outer estates is called for within urban policy initiatives.  
2. The resources devoted to Rate Support Grant should be increased in real terms, and 
within the enhanced total a greater bias should be given to the UPAs. Efficiency 
audits should be used to tackle wasteful expenditure.  
3. The size of the Urban Programme should be increased, and aspects of its operation 
reviewed.  
4. The concept of „Partnership‟ in the urban priority areas should be developed by 
central and local government to promote greater consultation with, and 
participation by, local people at neighbourhood level.  
5. There should be a new deal between government and the voluntary sector, to 
provide long-term continuity and funding for recognised voluntary bodies working 
alongside statutory agencies.  
6. A new impetus should be given to support for small firms in UPAs, perhaps by the 
establishment of a Council for Small Firms in Urban Areas.  
7. There should be additional job-creating public expenditure in the UPAs on capital 
and current account.  
8. The Government should promote more open public discussions about the current 
levels of overtime working.  
9. The Community Programme eligibility rules and other constraints, including pay 
limits, should be relaxed, particularly to encourage greater participation by women 
and unemployed people with families to support.  
10. The Community Programme should be expanded to provide 500,000 places.  
11. The Government should extend to those unemployed for more than a year 
eligibility for the long-term rate of Supplementary Benefit, or an equivalent 
enhanced rate of income support under whatever new arrangements may be 
introduced.  
12. The present level of Child Benefit should be increased as an effective means of 
assisting, without stigma, families in poverty.  
13. The present levels of „earnings disregards‟ in relation to Unemployment Benefit and 
Supplementary Benefit should be increased to mitigate the effects of the poverty 
and unemployment traps.  
14. The Government should establish an independent enquiry to undertake a wide 
ranging review of the inter-relationship between income support, pay and the 
taxation system.  
15. Ethnic records should be kept and monitored by public housing authorities, as a 
step towards eliminating direct and indirect discrimination in housing allocation.  
16. An expanded public housing programme of new building and improvement is 
needed, particularly in the UPAs, to ensure a substantial support of good quality 
rented accommodation for all who need it, including single people. Each local 
authority‟s housing stock should include a range of types of accommodation, 
including direct access emergency accommodation.  
17. The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act should be extended to cover all who are 
homeless. Homeless people should be offered a choice of accommodation.  
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18. There should be further moves towards the decentralisation of local authority 
housing services.  
19. A major examination of the whole system of housing finance, including mortgage 
tax relief, is needed. It should have the objective of providing most help to those 
most in need. 
20. The concept of „care in the community‟ for people who might otherwise be 
institutionalised must be supported by adequate resources to allow the provision of 
propose locally-based support services for people (especially women) caring for 
vulnerable and handicapped people. 
21. Local authorities in boroughs and districts, which include urban priority areas 
should, with other agencies, develop policies to establish and sustain community 
work with adequate resources.  
22. The Recommendations of the Lord Chancellor‟s Committee on the funding of Law 
Centres should be implemented immediately.  
23. The Church, the Home Office and Chief Police Officers should give full support to 
the work of Police Advisory Committees, and a Police Liaison Committee for 
Greater London should be established. 
 
Source: Faith in the City, pp. 361-66.  
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Appendix VI: Resolutions and Votes Cast in the General Synod 1979-1990 
 
The following tables are a list of the significant resolutions and votes passed in the Synod 
relating to political, moral and ecclesiastical measures between 1979-1990. The purpose here 
is to show the manner of discussions within the debating chamber and the division within 
the Synod on these matters. The resolutions have been paraphrased, but it should be noted 
that the initial proposals often went through significant amendments and changes before 
they were put to a final vote.  
 
A. Political Matters 
 
* Abstentions. 
Source: Proceedings of the General Synod 1979-1990.  
 
 
Date  
 
Resolution 
 
Collective votes in all three 
Houses 
For Against Abs.* 
1981 Resolution in opposition to the 
government‟s British Nationality Bill, 1981 
198 1 - 
1981 Calls for the government to increase Child 
Benefit in line with inflation 
231 1 - 
1982 Resolution pertaining to the right of clergy 
to become MPs 
181 147 - 
1983 Resolution on the immorality of nuclear 
weapons and opposition to nuclear 
rearmament 
387 49 29 
1983 Resolution against the reintroduction of 
capital punishment by the government 
407 36 10 
1983 Resolution urging Parliament to adopt 
Proportional Representation 
251 61 - 
1986 Calls for the Treasury to prioritise job 
creation before cuts in taxation 
151 44 41  
1986 Not Just for the Poor debate, resolution 
relating to the right and purpose of 
statutory welfare 
246 2 16 
1987 Resolution on the need for decent housing, 
a revision of mortgage tax relief and the 
government‟s duty in respect to the 
homeless 
293 4 - 
1989 Resolution condemning the government‟s 
proposed changes to the NHS, urging that 
health rather than cost be the prime 
objective 
238 5 7 
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B. Resolutions and votes passed in the General Synod relating to issues of personal 
morality, 1979-1990 
 
* It should be noted that the final resolution diverged significantly from the initial proposal 
which classified homosexuality as a sin and explicitly denounced homosexuality amongst 
the priesthood.  
 
Source: Proceedings of the General Synod 1979-1990  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date  
 
Resolution 
 
Votes in all three Houses 
For Against Abs. 
1983 Proposal for the right of divorce people to 
get married in Church  
284 143 - 
1987 Resolution on AIDS, reasserting traditional 
teachings on chastity and fidelity and calling  
for compassion for those afflicted with the 
disease  
147 112 - 
1987 *Private members motion pertaining to the 
inherent „sinfulness‟ of sexual immorality 
and homosexuality  
403 8 13 
 251 
C.  Resolutions and votes passed in the General Synod relating to Ecclesiastical 
matters, 1979-1992 
 
 
* These votes did not receive the required majority of all three houses so therefore were 
defeated.  
Source: Proceedings of the General Synod 1979-1990  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date  
 
Resolution 
 
Votes in all three Houses 
For Against Abs. 
1982 Proposals for a Covenant*  340 173 3 
1983 The acceptance of ordained female priests 
from oversees to practise in England. 
266 153 19 
1983 Resolution allowing redundant church 
buildings to be used by non-Christian faith 
groups* 
216 191 - 
1983 The Appointments of Bishops Measure 233 8 - 
1987 Clergy Ordination Measure  293 147 6 
1992 Female Ordination Measure  384 169 - 
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Appendix VII: Party Political Affiliation in General Synod and at the Grass Roots 
(%) 
 
In the eighties political scientists Medhurst and Moyser conducted a survey of political 
affiliations of Anglican congregations and the Synod. The table below reveals that amongst 
the active, non-active and Synod laity there were a large proportion of Conservative voters. 
If we compare this with the political preferences of the clergy in the 1981 Synod (see 
below), only 27 per cent were Conservative voters, compared with 55 per cent of the laity.   
 
A. The Laity 
 
Party 
Preference 
  
 
 
Rank-and-file laity General  
Synod 
laity  
(1981) 
  (%) 
Penumbra 
 
 
Intermit-
tently 
active  
 
Active 
 
 
Overall  
(1979) 
(%) 
 
 Labour       45.2               25.4                 23.0               33.9               3.9 
Social 
Democrat* 
-                    -                       -                 -                 15.8 
 
Liberal 11.9               10.9                 14.8               11.7              20.4                            
Conservative 47.9               63.9                 62.3               54.4              55.3 
        N 
 
     219                205                    61                485              152                     
 
* The SDP was founded in 1981.  
Source: Medhurst & Moyser, Church and Politics in a Secular Age, Table 10.2a, p.227.  
 
B. The Clergy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Medhurst and Moyser, Church and Politics, Table 10.2b, p.227. 
 
 
 
Party Preference  
 
 
Rank-and-file 
clergy (1982) 
       (%) 
General Synod 
clergy (1981) 
        (%) 
 
Labour           13.0                      8.1 
Social Democrat         23.2                    27.0 
Liberal           10.1                    23.4 
Conservative          31.9         27.9  
Social Dem & other party          -            - 
Alliance           20.3            -   
 
N                                                  345                               111 
 
 253 
 
 
Appendix VIII: Attitudes Towards Sexual Morality by Level of Church 
Involvement*  (%)  
 
Attitude  Rank-and-file laity (1981)      General Synod (1981)  
 
  Penumbra   Intermittently   Active   Over-all     Over-all      Laity   Clergy   
          Active 
 
Gone much    35.9            42.4                 55.1       41.1             34.4         43.5      22.6 
too far 
 
Gone a little    33.5            32.7                 26.1       32.2             26.7         25.5      28.2 
too far 
 
About right    27.8            22.1                 15.9       23.9             30.2         22.4      40.3 
 
Not gone              1.6             1.8                   0.0         1.5               7.0            6.8        7.3   
quite far   
enough 
 
Not gone      1.2           0.9                   2.9          1.3               1.8           1.9        1.6  
nearly far  
enough 
 
Total    100.0         99.9        100.0      100.0      100.1       100.1    100.0 
 
N    245        217         69          531              285          161      124   
 
 
 
Source: Medhurst & Moyser, Church and Politics in a Secular Age, Table 10.5, p.240. 
* This was in response to the question: „How do you feel about: „The liberalisation of the 
law governing sexual morality?‟  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 254 
 
Appendix IX: Anglican Conservative faction in the Commons, 1970-1993 
 
A. Votes on Church Measures/religious bills in the Commons    
The following is a list of Church Measures and relevant bills relating to „religious‟ matters 
passed or proposed in the Houses of Commons between 1970-1993 („Moral‟ issues such as 
divorce and abortion have not been included here).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Parliamentary Proceedings, Hansard.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date  
 
Church Measure/ Religious 
Bills 
Commons 
vote 
Ayes Noes 
1974 
 
 
Church of England (Worship 
and Doctrine) Measure 
145 45 
1981 Prayer Book Protection Bill 152 130 
1984 Church of England 
(Appointments of Bishops 
Measure)  
17 32 
1986 Deacons (Ordination of 
Women) Measure  
303 25 
1986 Shops Bill on Sunday trading  
 
227 279 
1989 Clergy Ordination Measure  45 51 
1990 Clergy (Ordination) Measure 
(re-introduced) 
228 106 
1993 Church of England (Ordination 
of Women) Measure  
195 19 
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B. Prominent Anglican Conservatives in the Commons 1974-1993 
 
 
The following is a list of relevant Anglican Conservative MPs and how they voted on the 
Worship and Doctrine Measure (1974), the Prayer Book Bill (1981), Appointments of 
Bishops Measure (1984), Female Deacons Measure (1986), Section 28 (1988), Clergy 
Ordination Measure (1990), the Ordination of Women Measure (1993). Many were not in 
Parliament for the entire period from 1974-1993 (indicated by a space), some however also 
did not vote on these measures (absence is indicated -), others voted against or for the bill 
(a YES/NO denotes which way they voted). The list comprises of some of the key players 
who spoke out against the Church in this period, while the small numbers that opposed the 
female ordination Measure in 1993 indicates that this faction within the Conservative party 
had significantly waned by the mid-1990s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conservative 
MPs 
Wor. 
& 
Doc. 
1974 
Pray. 
Book 
1981  
App.  
Of 
Bps 
1984 
Fem.  
Deac. 
1986 
Sec.  
28 
1988 
Revd.  
Ord. 
1990 
Fem. 
Ord.  
1993 
Aitken, J.  _ X X _ _ YES _ 
Beaumont-Dark, 
A. 
 X _ YES X X  
Bennett, N.      X X  
Benyon, W. YES NO _ _ X X  
Biggs-Davison, J.  X X X X    
Bowden, A.  X X _ _ X X X 
Braine, B. _ X _ YES X X  
Bruinvels, P.   X X    
Carlisle, J.  X X _ X X _ 
Clegg, W. X X      
Colvin, M  X _ _ X _ YES 
Cormack, P. 
 
 
X X X _ X _ X 
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Conservative 
MPs 
Wor. 
& 
Doc. 
1974 
Pray. 
Book  
1981 
App. 
Of 
Bps  
1984 
Fem.  
Deac. 
1986 
Sec. 
28  
1988 
Revd. 
Ord.  
1990 
Fem. 
Ord. 
1993 
Cranborne, Visc.  X X _    
Eden, Sir J. X X      
Fairbairn, N. X X _ _ _ _ _ 
Hamilton, Neil   _ X X X _ 
Hunter, Andrew   _ X _ X X 
Greenway, H.  X X YES X X X 
 *Gummer, J.  NO _ X _ X X 
 Kellet-   
 Bowman, E. 
 
X _ _ YES X X X 
Knight, J.  
 
_ 
 
X _ X X X _ 
 Lloyd, P. _ X X YES X _ _ 
 Loveridge, J.  X X      
 **Powell, E. X X X X    
 Powell, W.   X X X X _ 
 Mates, M. X X _ YES _ _ _ 
 Maxwell-  
 Hyslop, R. 
 
X X _ YES X _  
 Mellor, D. _ X _ YES X _ _ 
 Macfarlane, N. X _ _ _ X X  
 Molyneaux, J.  X X _ _ _ _ _ 
 *Mills, P.  
 
YES 
 
_ X X    
 Norris, S. 
 
 
 
 
  X YES _ X _ 
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Conservative 
MPs 
Wor. 
& 
Doc. 
1974 
Pray. 
Book  
1981 
App. 
Of 
Bps  
1984 
Fem.  
Deac. 
1986 
Sec. 
28  
1988 
Revd. 
Ord.  
1990 
Fem. 
Ord. 
1993 
 Stokes, J. 
 
X 
 
X _ X _ X  
 Smith,    
 Dudley  
X X _ YES X X _ 
 Soames, N.   X YES X _ _ 
 Stanbrook, I. 
 
X 
 
X _ X X X  
 Taylor, R. X X      
 Taylor, T. _ X _ YES X X _ 
 Wells, J. X X X X    
 Widdecombe,    
 A. 
    X X X 
 Winterton, A.   _ X X X X 
 Winterton, N.  
 
X 
 
_ _ _ _ X _ 
 Vaughan, G. YES NO _ _ X X _ 
 Younger, G.  X NO _ _ X _  
* The following Conservative MPs were members of the General Synod 
** Enoch Powell is considered here as a Conservative, even though he sat on the Unionist 
benches from 1974 until he left Parliament in 1987.   
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Appendix X: Statistics on Multi-Faith Britain  
 
 
A. Figures on non-Christian faith groups in Britain 1970-1985 
 
Religion 1970 1975 1980 1985 
     
Buddhists  6 000 13 000 17 000  23 000 
Hindus 50 000 100 000 120 000 130 000 
Muslims 250 000 400 000 600 000 852 900 
Sikhs 75 000E* 115 000E 150 000E 180 000E 
Jews 113 000 111 000 110 915 109 150 
International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness 
500 10 000 35 000   40 000E 
Ahmadiyya Movement 5000E 8000 10 000 12 000E 
School of Meditation 2 821 3 862   4 820   6 000E 
* Estimates 
 
Source: adapted from Peter Brierley, „Religion‟, Table 13.21, p.550. Brierley‟s statistics are 
from UK Christian Handbook 1978, 1982, 1984, 1986.  
 
 
B. 2001 Census Results  
In the 2001 census a question on religion was introduced for the first time. The question 
was „voluntary‟ asking simply „What is your religion?‟. In the Scottish census the question 
was framed differently (I) „What is your current religion?‟ (II) „What was the religion of your 
upbringing?‟ 
 
 
Religion % 
Christian 71.8 
Muslim 2.8 
Hindu 1 
Sikh 0.6 
Jewish 0.5 
Buddhist 0.3 
Other religions 0.3 
All religions total: 77.3%  
No religion: 15%  
Not stated 7.7 
 
 
Source: Census, April 2001, Office for National Statistics, www.statistics.gov.uk 
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